Abstract
The question of the human rational soul’s relation with its objects of thought over the course of
actual intellection is one of the major problems in Ibn Sīnā’s epistemology. Concerning this issue, Ibn Sīnā
inherited a wide range of interpretations around the theory of the intellect and the intelligible’s identity
that was introduced in De Anima 3.4 by Aristotle.This study seeks to determine Ibn Sīnā’s final position on
this theory. However, there are certain difficulties in determining his original view and final position on
this issue. In his early work al-Mabdaʾ wa al-maʿād, he accepts the position of identity. And yet in his later
al-Shifāʾ/al-Nafs and al-Ishārāt, he sharply refutes a similar stance that he attributed to Porphyry – his real
opponent remains unacknowledged – and holds fast to the opinion of the immaterial representation of the
intelligibles. Yet again, he uses a language of identity (ittiḥād) in the works that come after al-Shifāʾ/al-Nafs.
To solve this apparent inconsistency and determine his real view, this article offers an aporetic reading of
relevant passages in his works. Accordingly, Ibn Sīnā held the view of identity in al-Mabdaʾ, in which he made
no distinction between direct self-awareness and indirect self-intellection. However, after al-Shifāʾ/al-Nafs,
in which he laid the ground for this distinction, he moved on to the theory of representation and adhered to
it consistently in his later works. The questions of the place of Ibn Sīnā’s theory of representation in the his-
tory of this problem and the possible identity of the real opponent(s) to whom he attributed the Porphyrian
position form the body of this article.