

Debating Sufi Knowledge in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Thought: An Analysis of the Saçaqlizāde-‘Alamī Debate on Divine Inspiration (*‘ilm al-ladunn*)

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Abstract: At the beginning of the eighteenth century, two Ottoman scholars named Saçaqlizāde and ‘Alamī Aḥmad Efendi wrote treatises and engaged in a scientific debate about divine inspiration (*al-‘ilm al-ladunnī*). Saçaqlizāde’s *Risālat al-jawāb* is available in the Süleymaniye Library; however, ‘Alamī’s treatise does not appear in the catalogue of Turkey’s manuscript libraries. According to our review, Saçaqlizāde’s treatise includes a considerable part of both scholars’ opinions. One can, therefore, examine this debate through this treatise. Given that the matter in question led to a dispute, especially between the Sufis and the theologians, in terms of source of knowledge in the history of Islamic thought, examining it via this treatise would help researchers obtain some information about the characteristics of Ottoman scholarly and intellectual life, as well as the mentalities of Saçaqlizāde and ‘Alamī.

Keywords: Divine Inspiration, Saçaqlizāde, ‘Alamī Aḥmad Efendi, Eighteenth century Islamic thought, Ottoman thought.

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The parable of The Wise Servant (Khidr) and Moses (Qur'an 18:60-68) constitutes the basis for a theory in Sufi doctrine called *'ilm al-ladunn* (lit. the knowledge from His Presence, or divine inspiration received directly from God). The Sufis considered the expression "whom We had taught knowledge from Our Presence (*ladunnā*)" as "a special kind of knowledge believed to be given by God directly without an intellectual endeavor" and appropriated it for "God's saintly servants." The Sufi exegetes interpreted *ladunnā* (from Our Presence), as "from the level of Exclusive Unity (*aḥadiyya*) of Our Self" and developed an independent theory of knowledge on the basis of this interpretation.¹ This theory gradually gained acceptance among the scholarly circles, as in the case of al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111).² However, the theologians in particular never stopped discussing and questioning this theory in view of several points, including whether the inspiration presented as the way of acquiring divine inspiration is the source of knowledge as well as the conditions for validity of the knowledge gained thereby.³ This theory was mentioned intrinsically within the works of some Sufis and scholars during the Ottoman period.⁴ Moreover, it became the subject of an interesting scholarly debate between two early eighteenth-century Ottoman scholars: Saçaklızâde Muhammad al-Mar'ashī (d. 1732)⁵ and 'Alamī Aḥmad Efendi.⁶

According to Saçaklızâde, the debate took place as follows: When Saçaklızâde began gaining fame after writing his *Tartīb al-'ulūm*, he came across a treatise written by 'Alamī Aḥmad Efendi on some of his statements about divine inspiration. He examined 'Alamī's treatise, which 'Alamī claimed to have written so that "the weak students would not be deceived by the words of the man from Mar'ash" and

- 1 Mustafa Öztürk, "Bilge Kul-Musa Kıssası ve İslâm Kültüründe Hızır Mitosu," *Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 14-15 (2003), 275.
- 2 See İmam Gazâlî, *Hak Yolcusuna Öğütler (Ey Oğul/Eyyühe'l-Veled)-Ledünni İlim Risalesi*, trans. Asım Cüneyd Köksal (Istanbul: Büyüyen Ay Yayınları, 2015), 80-94.
- 3 See Abdülgaffar Aslan, "Kelâm'da İlhamın Bilgi Değeri," *Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 20 (2008): 35-44.
- 4 See, for example, Dâvûd el-Kayserî, *Ledünni İlim ve Hakiki Sevgi*, trans. Mehmet Bayrakdar (Istanbul: Kurtuba Kitap, 2011), 37.
- 5 For Saçaklızâde's biography, see Fındıklılı İsmet Efendi, *Tekmiletü'ş-şakâ'ik fi hakkı ehli'l-hakâ'ik*, haz. Abdülkadir Özcan (Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1989), 50-52. For Saçaklızâde's views and works, see İbrahim Çetintaş, "Saçaklızâde ve İlimleri Sınıflandırması" (PhD Dissertation: Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2006).
- 6 Concerning 'Alamī Ahmed Efendi, the eighteenth-century biography writer Shaykhî Mehmed Efendi says only that he left the Rawānī Chalabi Madrasa in 1705 (Muharram 1117), which served at the level of *kharij*, and then left Sahn-i Samāniya in 1711 (Shawwal 24, 1123). See Şeyhî Mehmed Efendi, *Vekâyi'ül-fudalâ*, ed. Abdülkadir Özcan (Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1989), II-III, 291, 621.

replied to it in his *Risālat al-jawāb*, presumably written sometime after 1708.⁷ In it, Saçaklızāde not only clarified his words, but also responded to ‘Alamī’s critiques. Two separate copies of this seven-chapter treatise, written in Arabic, exist in the Süleymaniye Library.⁸ However, we have not found al-‘Alamī’s *al-Ifhām fī al-ilhām*⁹ in our catalogue search of Turkey’s manuscript libraries so far. In fact, this points to an important insufficiency in view of conducting a comprehensive analysis of the debate and especially learning about ‘Alamī’s opinions. However, Saçaklızāde has at least eliminated this insufficiency by briefly mentioning ‘Alamī’s critiques in his treatise. Hence, one can examine the debate on the basis of this treatise, which we will seek to do in this article.

There are several reasons to study this debate. First of all, given that it is related to “a source and a kind of knowledge” such as divine inspiration adopted primarily by the Sufis and approached cautiously by the theologians, it includes some possibilities that can help researchers determine these two scholars’ intellectual attitudes and positions. Second, certain aspects of the debate (i.e. those related to epistemology, the theory of knowledge, and methodology) found in *Risālat al-jawāb*, if read as a continuation of the attitude of “reckoning in relation to the predecessors,”¹⁰ which seeks to subject the “methodological integration” efforts¹¹ characterizing the

- 7 Saçaklızāde gives this information in his treatise’s introduction. See Saçaklızāde, *Risālat al-jawāb* (Sulaymāniye Library, Murad Molla, no.1835), 29a-38b. At its end are two different historical records: “its fair copy was made (*tabyīd*) in Shawwāl 1141 (April-May 1729)” and “*al-faqīru al-dā’ī Yūsuf sene 1142/1730 fī awā’il-i Dhū al-Ḥijjah*” (June 1730). It is uncertain whether the first date belongs to Saçaklızāde or to the copyist. The treatise’s content contains an expression to signify the date of writing as “The Shaykh of Ayasofya Shaykh Sulaymān, the light of the time.” As Shaykh Sulaymān served as the Shaykh (preacher) of Ayasofya Mosque between Jumāda al-Awwal 1120 (July-August 1708) and Rabī’ al-Ākhir 1130 (February-March 1718) and died in 1722, it is possible that Saçaklızāde wrote this treatise sometime between 1708-18 or before 1722. For information about Shaykh Sulaymān, see Şeyhî Mehmed Efendi, *Vekāyi’ü’l-fudalā*, ed. Abdülkadir Özcan (Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1989), II-III, 678-80.
- 8 Besides the record given in footnote 7, the record of the treatise’s second copy is as follows: Saçaklızāde, *Risālat al-jawāb ‘an i’tirāḍ Ahmād ‘Alamī* (Sulaymāniye Library, H. Hüsnü Paşa, no. 631), 50b-56b.
- 9 Saçaklızāde does not mention ‘Alamī Ahmed Efendi’s treatise in *Risālat al-jawāb*. Sālim Qaddūri al-Ḥamad says that ‘Alamī’s treatise is entitled *Risāla al-ifhām fī al-ilhām*, based on a copy at the Saddam Center of Manuscripts (no. 10828/1). See Muhammed b. Abī Bakr al-Mar’ashī al-mulaqqab bi-Saçaklızāde, *Juhd al-muqill*, textual criticism and editing by Sālim Qaddūri al-Ḥamad (Amman: Dāru ‘Ammār, 2001), 30.
- 10 For the claim that the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries came into prominence by means of a critical evaluation of the methodological integration efforts in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, see İbrahim Halil Üçer, “İslam Düşünce Tarihi için Bir Dönemlendirme Önerisi,” 35-37; İhsan Fazloğlu, “Muhasebe Dönemi,” *İslam Düşünce Atlası*, III/1022-43; İhsan Fazloğlu, “Muhasebe Dönemi’nde Nazari İlimler,” *İslam Düşünce Atlası*, III/1043-58.
- 11 For the assertion that the “methodological integration” efforts, which seeks to integrate the methodologies of *naẓar* and *mushāhada* characterize Islamic thought during these centuries, see İbrahim Halil Üçer, “İslam Düşünce Tarihi için Bir Dönemlendirme Önerisi,” ed. İbrahim Halil Üçer,

fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of Islamic thought to a critical reading, the debate becomes crucial in determining the tendencies of Ottoman thought in particular and of Islamic thought in general during the eighteenth century.

Here, we will briefly review the approaches in Islamic thought concerning divine inspiration within the Khiḍr parable in general to make sense of the claims set forth in this debate. After this, we will discuss ‘Alami’s critique of Saçaklızâde and Saçaklızâde’s answers to these critiques. Finally, these critiques and answers, as well as other elements that attract our attention in *Risālat al-jawāb*, will be analyzed. In the appendix, Orkhan Musakhanov’s critical edition of *Risālat al-jawāb* will be given.

I. The Intellectual Background

The Khiḍr parable has been discussed from various perspectives.¹² However, the theory of divine inspiration grounded on it did not attract serious attention among the researchers, even though this theory constitutes one of Sufism’s two main principles.¹³ In fact, it is mentioned as a subject of discussion only in a few general studies that examine this particular parable¹⁴ and briefly in some studies on esoteric knowledge and the history of Sufism.¹⁵

One of the Sufis who developed this theory is Junayd al-Baghdādi (d. 910). According to him, the knowledge of Presence that Prophet Moses learned from Khiḍr and the esoteric knowledge known by Caliph ‘Alī is the same.¹⁶ Another Sufi who mentions this theory is al-Qushayrī (d. 1072), who interprets “we had taught knowledge from Our Presence” (*min ladunnā*) and defines divine inspiration in his *Laṭā’if al-Ishārāt* as follows:

İslam Düşünce Atlası (İstanbul: Konya B.B. Kültür Yayınları, 2017), I/19-35; Ömer Türker, “Yenilenme Dönemi,” *İslam Düşünce Atlası*, II/498-515.

12 See, for example, Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *İslâm-Türk İnançlarında Hızır Yahut Hızır-İlyas Kültü* (İstanbul: Kabalcı Yayıncılık, 2012); Öztürk, “Bilge Kul-Musa Kıssası,” 245-281.

13 Ocak, *Hızır-İlyas Kültü*, 85.

14 Öztürk, “Bilge Kul-Musa Kıssası,” 275; İsmail Albayrak, “Kur’ân ve Tefsir Açısından Hızır Kıssası ve Ledün İlmi,” in *Kur’ân ve Tefsir Araştırmaları-V (İslâm Düşüncesinde Gayb Problemi-I)*, ed. Bedrettin Çetiner (İstanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 2003), 200-10; Selahattin Aktı, “Süfi Epistemolojinin Önemli Dayanaklarından Olan Hızır Kıssasının Kaynaklarına Dair Oryantalist İddialar,” *Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 11 (2017), 49.

15 See, for example, Süleyman Uludağ, “Bâtın İlmi,” *DİA* 5 (1992), 188-89; Osman Türer, *Ana Hatlarıyla Tasavvuf Tarihi* (İstanbul: Ataç Yayınları, 2011), 211-16.

16 Uludağ, “Bâtın İlmi,” 188.

This is a kind of knowledge gained through inspiration which comes from God and which is attained without an effort of searching. The divine inspiration is the knowledge by which God made his saints knowledgeable on matters beneficial for them; its benefit is not peculiar only to its possessor; on the contrary, it is the knowledge that has benefits for all servants in that it includes matters concerning the right of God; it is the knowledge which is impossible to be denied by its possessor and is a proof for the certainty of what its possessor sees.¹⁷

Dāvūd al-Qayṣarī (d. 1350), the first Ottoman *mudarris* and who adopted the Sufi doctrine of the Oneness of Being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*), states that “the real elixir of life denotes the divine inspiration from God the All-Aware and the Omniscient, which flows over the sacred personalities those who have unveiled the veils of both light and dark and are purified from the human defects.”¹⁸ On the other hand, inspiration is the knowledge of unveiling on the level of the heart, which exists in the spiritual part of the knowledge of unveiling. This consists of two parts, namely, the “formal (*suwari*) and spiritual (*ma'nawi*). This sort of knowledge, the highest level of the knowledge of unveiling, “comes from God in a special manner without the intermediacy of an angel” and is given to “the saintly elite” (*walī*).¹⁹

Among the Sufis of the Ottoman period, the Khalwatī Shaykh Niyazī-i Miṣrī (d. 1694) and the Jalwatī Shaykh Ismā'īl Ḥaqqī Bursawī (d. 1725) also spoke of the theory of divine inspiration. According to Miṣrī, divine inspiration is called “the knowledge of *warāthah*” and “the divine knowledge,” which Allah bestows as a divine gift (*wahb*). One can attain this knowledge by being sincere through practicing the Sharia, abstaining from ostentation (*riyā*), avoiding arrogance and the love of worldly ranks and positions, and evading the absurdities.²⁰ On the other hand, Bursawī thinks that “we taught knowledge from Our Presence” is specific to the knowledge of the Unseen and informing humanity about it by God’s leave or to esoteric knowledge. He defines divine inspiration as a knowledge “placed into the heart immediately without an outward factor” and states that it is attained “by those saints who progressed on leading an ascetic life and who are reverent.”²¹

17 Abdulkerim el-Kuṣeyrī, *Kur'an-ı Kerim Tefsiri, Letâfi'l-işârât*, trans. Mehmet Yalar (Istanbul: İlk Harf Yayınları, 2013), III/269-70.

18 Dāvūd el-Kayserī, *Ledünni İlim*, 37; cf. Mehmet Bayrakdar, *Dāvūd el-Kayseri* (Istanbul: Kurtuba Kitap, 2009), 55.

19 Bayrakdar, *Dāvūd el-Kayseri*, 56-58.

20 Ethem Cebecioğlu, “Niyaz-ı Mısır'ye Göre Hz. Musa ve Hızır Kıssası: Çocuğunu Öldürülmesi,” *Akademiar Dergisi* 1 (2016), 54-55.

21 Öztürk, “Bilge Kul-Musa Kıssası,” 275.

These statements show that the Sufi theory of divine inspiration has three basic elements: its main basis is the Khidr parable, divine inspiration is considered a sort of knowledge directly given by God through inspiration, and this knowledge is appropriate only for saints.

As for the scholars' approach to this theory, one of those who mentioned it is al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111), who, as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī states, wrote a treatise "on the proof of divine inspiration."²² The following views are quite elucidatory concerning divine inspiration and inspiration:

Know that the human knowledge is attained in two ways: the human learning and the divine learning... the second way is Divine teaching and it has two aspects. The first one is to reveal... The inspiration is the universal soul's warning (tanbih) the human soul to the extent of the power of the latter's attributes, its sufficiency for this and the power of its capacity. The inspiration is an output of revelation; hence, the revelation means putting forth the unseen state explicitly whereas the inspiration means putting forth it in a veiled manner. The knowledge emanating from the revelation is called the prophetic knowledge ('ilm-i nabawī) and the one stemming from the inspiration is called the divine inspiration. In view of its attainment, the divine inspiration is the knowledge in which there is no intermediary between the soul and the Maker from Nothing (al-Bāri). This knowledge resembles to the light which is pure and unsullied, and which reaches the subtle hearts from the niche of the unseen...²³ The revelation is the ornament of the prophets and the adornment of the saints... And the divine inspiration can be attained by both the people of prophethood and of sainthood. Thus, as Allah informs us, the case for Khidr is as follows: "We taught knowledge from Our Presence" ... The truth of wisdom can be gained through the divine inspiration. One who cannot attain this level cannot be wise... And those who reach at the level of divine inspiration would be contented with the learning knowledge much and with the pains and weariness of learning. They acquire knowledge less, they know much, get tired less and rest much... On the other hand, the gate of inspiration is not closed and the light of the universal soul did not cease... Although Allah closed the gate of revelation, He opened the gate of inspiration out of His Mercy, He made the affairs concerning this matter easy and divided them into levels... Know that the divine inspiration – which is the flow of the inspiration light – occurs after the "levelling..."²⁴

22 Fahrurddin er-Rāzī, *Tefsīr-i Kebīr/Mefātiḥu'l-Gayb*, trans. Suat Yıldırım-Lütfullah Cebeci-Sadık Kılıç-C. Sadık Doğru (Istanbul: Huzur Yayın-Dağıtım, 2013), XV, 222.

23 At the end of these sentences, al-Ghazzālī says: "Revelation emerges from the flow (*ifādha*) of the Universal Intellect and inspiration emerges from the lighting (*ishrāq*) of the universal soul."

24 Gazālī, *Ledünni İlim Risalesi*, 80-94. Ghazzālī's other definition of inspiration is as follows: "Some knowledge not attained by learning from anyone or by deduction and gained without necessity rushes into the intellect as if thrown from somewhere. This kind of acquiring knowledge is called inspiration." See Mehmet Vural, "Gazzālī (ö.505/1111)'nin Epistemolojisinde Sezgi ve İlham," *Tasavvuf: İlmî ve Akademik Araştırma Dergisi* 3/9 (2002), 183-84.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210), another scholar who expounded this theory, wrote in his *Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb*:

“The expression ‘We taught knowledge from Our Presence’ in the verse points at the fact that the knowledge possessed by that servant is the one gained from Allah without intermediacy. The Sufis called the knowledge attained through unveiling (*mukāshafa*) as the divine inspiration (*‘ilm-i ladunni*)”

According to al-Rāzī, the “quintessential part” in this matter is as follows:

the knowledge in the form of verification (*tasdiq*) or envisagement (*tasawwur*) can be attained either by theoretically (*nazarī*) or by acquisition (*kasbī*). There are two kinds of the practical (*amali*) way. The first one is to listen to the theoretical and axiomatic (*badīhi*) knowledge and try to collect them. This way is called theory (*nazar*) or contemplation (*tafakkur*). The second one is the way of one’s striving to weaken his/her faculties of sense (*hiss*) and imagination (the soul) by means of various ascetic discipline (*riyadāt*) and spiritual struggles (*mujāhada*). When they are weakened, the intellectual faculty increases and the divine light in the substance of the intellect shines forth; a kind of knowledge takes place without the effort of contemplation and pondering, and the knowledge becomes perfect. And this is called the divine inspiration.²⁵

One of the scholars who put this theory on his agenda is Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), who holds that divine inspiration is the knowledge “that Allah manifested (*fath*) within the hearts of His reverent saints and sincere servants. The reason for bestowing this knowledge exclusively upon them is that the people who have this quality purify their hearts from what displeases Allah and do that which pleases Him.”²⁶ According to Ibn Taymiyya, inspiration, which is also called unveiling (*kashf*) and discernment (*firasa*), is a way of acquiring knowledge that enables one to hear what is not heard by another, to see what is not seen by another, and to know what is not known by another. This path “becomes manifest in one in the form of knowledge, speaking, assumption, belief, love, wish, and an act; thus, the heart is inclined to what is true, explicit, and intelligible.” But inspiration is not the most reliable way to true knowledge, for that type of knowledge might contain aspects that violate the Quran and Sunnah. If this is not the case with the knowledge that comes to the heart, then it is valid. Such knowledge does not allow one to go beyond the Islamic law (Sharia).²⁷ Some *‘abids* (worshippers) adopted

25 For al-Rāzī’s view and those that explain it, see al-Rāzī, *Tefsīr-i Kebir*, XV, 222-23.

26 Takıyyüddin İbn Teymiyye, “Zahir ve Bâtın İlmine Dair bir Risâle,” trans. Mustafa Öztürk-Ali Bolat, *Tasavvuf: İlmî ve Akademik Araştırma Dergisi* II/6 (2001), 283.

27 Emrah Kaya, “Tasavvufun ve Epistemolojik Bir Araç Olarak İlhamın İbn Teymiyye Düşüncesindeki Yeri,” *Cumhuriyet İlahiyat Dergisi* 20/1 (2016), 27-29.

the approaches of Bâtinîs, those who “argue that they might attain God without following the Holy Prophet” on certain matters. Their claims, which suggest that the lawfulness of Khidr’s going beyond the Sharia is also possible for the saints by citing the Khidr parable as a proof, is an explicit error because Khidr never did this. Moreover, this parable only denotes the fact that not everyone may know the proof. In this respect, neither the general public nor the spiritual elite has any choice but to follow and obey the Sharia both outwardly and inwardly.²⁸

Ibn Khaldûn (d. 1406) also mentions this theory in his *Shifâ’ al-sâ’il li-tahdhîb al-masâ’il*. After classifying knowledge as either “acquired” (*kasbî*) or “bestowed” (*wahbî*), he places divine inspiration in the second category by referring to the verse “We taught knowledge from Our presence” as if it were another version of al-Ghazzâlî’s aforementioned views.²⁹ He then writes about how inspiration comes and whether this path is reliable or not. According to these statements, confirming and affirming such knowledge is almost a matter of conscience. That which explicitly points to its reliability and witnesses its validity is the state of dream.

Although al-Ghazzâlî’s illustration of a pool, according to which knowledge approaches the spirit from two directions, and the illustration of Indian and Chinese artists are not powerful enough to be proof for everyone, “it is as a precise proof for those who have an unshaken delight, a profound discernment and commonsense.” However, the Sufis have no more explicit evidence than dream to prove the possibility of attaining knowledge through inspiration and the validity of its existence. Divine inspiration is a kind of knowledge “that emerges within the heart as a secret through an unusual cause in the outer world.” Numerous evidences indicate the possibility of this knowledge and “such matters were observed among many Companions, those who came after them (the Tâbi’ûn) and also among who came after them.”³⁰

These scholars follow the Sufis’ claims or agree with this theory’s basic elements, such as the existence of a kind of knowledge called “divine inspiration,” that this knowledge is based on the Khidr parable, is unique to the saints, and is attained by spiritual exercises (*riyadât*). Whether inspiration, which is defined as the arrival path of divine inspiration, is a source of knowledge, as well as the conditions according to which such knowledge is taken into consideration, disagreements

28 İbn Teymiyye, “Zahir ve Bâtın,” 300; cf. Kaya, “İbn Teymiyye,” 27-29.

29 Ibn Khaldûn’s definition differs from that of al-Ghazzâlî, for he says divine inspiration emerges by “blowing into the heart.”

30 İbn Haldun, *Tasavvufun Mahiyeti (Şifâ’-s-sâil li-tehzibi’l-mesâil ve Mukaddime’de Tasavvuf İlmi)*, ed. Süleyman Uludağ (Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 1998), 107-12.

occur between the Sufis and some of these scholars and between these scholars and others and/or the theologians.

The Sufis, who introduced the theory of divine inspiration, view it as the way to acquire divine inspiration in the form of a source of knowledge, provided that it is a separate argument (*hujja*) or has its proofs in the Quran and Sunnah. For example, the Ḥanafī jurist ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 1144) states that one group of Sufis regards inspiration as an argument in itself on the same level as “reflection” (*naẓar*) or “deduction” (*istidlāl*) concerning the judgments (*aḥkām*).³¹ By the same token, it is also stated that Ibn Taymiyya said “the authentic (*ṣaḥīḥ*) inspirations are accepted as proofs” by the people of delight and the ecstatic ones, as well as people of unveiling (*kashf*) and those of spiritual address (*mukhāṭaba*).³² Moreover, Sufis such as Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī, Dhu-l-nūn al-Miṣrī, Abū Yazīd al-Bistāmī, and Abū Sa’īd al-Kharrāz considered inspiration “the main source of knowledge beyond sense, received knowledge (*khabar*) and the intellect.”³³ According to Hacı Bayram Başer’s analysis concerning some works on Sufism, such as al-Qushayrī’s *al-Risāla*, al-Sarrāj’s *al-Luma’*, and Ḥakīm Tirmidhī’s *al-Bayān al-Farq*, Sufis divided the knowledge that emerged in the heart into various classes such as “*Lawā’ih-ṭawālī-lawāmī’*, *bawādih-hawājim*, *khawāṭir*, *‘awāriḍ*, *tawāriq*, *qadīh*, *wāqī’*. Because such knowledge might be angelic, pertain to the soul, or be satanic, they said the *wārid* that has no proof or witness from the Quran and the Sunnah, the most important principles, should be rejected.³⁴ It should be added to Başer’s statement that when the expressions used by al-Hujwīrī to differentiate gnosis (*ma’rifā*) from inspiration (*ilhām*) are taken into account, this principle set forth by the Sufis is meant not for the knowledge gained through the witnessing (*mushāhada*) method, which is said to be the “furthest level of unveiling,” but for the knowledge/inspiration that approaches the heart through the method of an unveiling at a lower level, like disclosure (*mukāshafa*).³⁵

31 Saçaklızāde, *Risālat al-jawāb*, 30ab. cf. Birsin, “Fıkıh Usûlünde İlham,” 252.

32 Aslan, “Kelâm’da İlham,” 31.

33 Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, “İlham,” *DİA* 22 (2000): 98.

34 Hacı Bayram Başer, *Şeriat ve Hakikat: Tasavvufun Teşekkül Süreci* (Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2017), 182-83, 207.

35 Reşat Öngören, “Bir Bilgi Kaynağı Olarak Tasavvufta Keşfin Değeri,” *Istanbul Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 5 (2002): 87. Concerning the Sufis’ denominations and classifications of the knowledge gained through unveiling and inspiration in various forms, according to their levels of clarity and certainty as well as their statements that the clarity, certainty, and reliability level each of them is different and the authority of each one is diverse, see Süleyman Uludağ, “Gaybın Bilinmesinde Keşf ve İlhamın Rolü,” in *Kur’ân ve Tefsir Araştırmaları-VI (İslâm Düşüncesinde Gayb Problemi-II)*, ed. Bedrettin Çetiner (Istanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 2004), 282.

Unlike these approaches, many theologians, among them the Mu'tazilite Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār (d. 1025), dismiss inspiration as a source of knowledge.³⁶ The Ash'arite theologian Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī (d. 935) states that objective knowledge cannot be attained through any source such as "inspiration, dream, narration (taḥdīth) and divine inspiration," whereas Ibn Fūrak (d. 1015) says that inspiration cannot be a certain source of knowledge.³⁷ Among the Māturidis, Imām Māturidī (d. 944) states that one can attain knowledge on some special occasions through inspiration, but that any claims made by those other than the prophets cannot be considered proofs of its validity because they might have originated from Satan. As a result, inspiration is far away from being a way of gaining knowledge. Abū al-Yusr al-Pazdawī (d. 1100) says that any claim made by such people is devoid of proof. Abū al-Mu'in al-Nasafi (d. 1114) states that inspiration cannot be a source of knowledge as regards Islam, because any inspiration that comes to someone does not bind another.³⁸ 'Umar al-Nasafi (d. 1142) argues that inspiration is not "a means of gaining knowledge on knowing the authenticity of something according to people of truth."³⁹ The Ottoman scholar Kamālpashazāda (d. 1534) states that one's knowledge of Allah's Existence and His Attributes is "reflective and deductive" knowledge, the inspiration of the saints cannot be considered a means of knowledge, and that this can be binding for the saints but cannot be a certain proof for others.⁴⁰

According to Mehmet Birsin's evaluations, the jurists considered the possibility that inspiration could arrive to those who are not prophets are principally admissible. However, there are two opinions as to whether inspiration is a proof or not. According to the first one, inspiration is a proof, but only for the person who

36 Aslan, "Kelām'da İlhâm," 33.

37 Ibid., 36. The Ash'arite scholar 'Abd al-Qādir al-Baghdādī admits that "inspiration contributes to direct the feelings concerning arts of the people who have special talents. According to Aslan, however, this "should not mean al-Baghdādī admits that the certain knowledge which can be used within the religious domain depend on the inspiration and he accepts the inspiration as an independent source of knowledge." Sayf al-Din al-Āmidī (d. 1233) does not consider the inspiration as one of the sources of knowledge. But he treats inspiration in view of *ma'rifatullah*/knowledge of God and says that knowledge is attained through it." Ibid., 37, 40.

38 Aslan, "Kelām'da İlhâm," 41-44.

39 According to al-Taftāzānī, who interprets al-Nasafi's remark to mean that inspiration "is not a means of gaining knowledge for everyone, it is not appropriate to be used as a proof against others," "there is no doubt that the knowledge emerges through inspiration. There are the sayings of the Prophet concerning this matter. There are anecdotes narrated from many of the salaf on this matter." See Taftāzānī, *Kelām İlmi ve İslām Akāidī (Şerhu'l-akāid)*, ed. Süleyman Uludağ (Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 1999), 121.

40 Sayın Dalkıran, *İbn Kemal ve Düşünce Tarihimiz* (Istanbul: OSAV Yayınları, 1997), 114.

is inspired. While his/her acting in accord with it is obligatory (*wājib*), he/she is prohibited from inviting others to it. According to ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī, this is the opinion of the majority of the scholars. Ibn Amīr Hāj states that some scholars such as al-Suhrawardī, al-Rāzī, and Ibn al-Ṣabbāgh hold this view. According to the second view, the inspiration is a proof neither for one who is inspired nor for any other person. Some Ḥanafī methodologists such as al-Jaṣṣās, al-Dabūsī, Ibn al-Humām and also Ibn Ḥazm are among those who hold this view. Ibn Amīr Hāj says that this view is the favoured one (*mukhtār*). These views show that the methodologists do not regard the inspiration as an absolute source of knowledge, attribute no function to it when determining and altering a legal judgement, and appropriate to it a function that affects the personal preference only in the domain of permissibility (*jawāz*).⁴¹

II. Saçaklızâde’s Views on Divine Inspiration and ‘Alamī’s Critiques

In *Tartīb al-‘ulūm*, where he deals with the classification of sciences, Saçaklızâde gives the following brief information on divine inspiration under the title of “the authority of the moral science”:

As for the divine inspiration- which, as you see, is something other than the science of Sufism- it is also called as the science of inward, unveiling, *mawhiba*, secrets, concealed, *warātha* and truth (*haqīqa*). This science is what al-Rāzī mentions in his *al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr* as follows: “The Sufis call the knowledge gained through unveiling as divine inspiration.” Al-Rāzī means that this naming is made on the basis of the following verse, “We had taught knowledge from Our Presence (min ladunnā).” Al-Kawāshī interprets this verse as follows: “It is the knowledge of the inward and it is the divine inspiration.” In *al-Madārik*, it is stated that “It is the knowledge of informing about the unseen.” And I say: It denotes what Allah taught Khidr; -as you will see later on- not about the knowledge of the inward in an absolute meaning. The science of unveiling cannot be acquired through learning and teaching; it is acquired through struggling (*mujāhada*) which is ordained by Allah to find the true path. Thus, Allah says “As for those who strive for Us. We shall surely guide them in our ways.” And in one Hadith, it is stated that “Allah will bestow the knowledge of what they know not for those who practice with what they know... On the opposite side of the divine inspiration exist the science of sharia, the science of the outward and the science of obligations (*mu‘amalāt*).”⁴²

41 Birsin, “Fıkıh Usûlünde İlham,” 253-55, 264.

42 Saçaklızâde, *Tartīb al-‘ulūm*, textual criticism and editing by Muhammad b. Ismā‘il al-Sayyid Ahmad (Beirut: Dār al-Bashā‘ir al-Islāmiyya, 1988), 171-172; cf. Saçaklızâde, *Tertibü'l-‘ulūm*, trans. Zekeriyâ Pak-M. Âkif Özdoğan (Kahramanmaraş: Ukde Kitaplığı, 2009), 203-04.

Under the title of “Is the science of Inward against the science of Outward?” he makes the following statements, which are related to his aforementioned words and certain parts of which are criticized by ‘Alamī:

(...) It should be said in this case that the unlawful things those appear as lawful for them is due to the emergence of a secret reason that would make them lawful. The law maker’s making something unlawful is provided that the reason which makes the thing lawful should appear. However, the law maker made that thing unlawful for his servants absolutely and did not speak of the mentioned condition in that its occurrence is rare. The example of this situation is the occurrence of reason which would render it lawful for Khiḍr to make a hole in the ship and slay the child. That these two things are lawful for Khiḍr is against the fact that the Prophet prohibited to give harm another one and slay an innocent child for his *umma* absolutely. However, in view of the law maker, there are conditions those would restraint these two prohibitions. Thus, the first prohibition is made bound by a condition and is peculiar to those who do not know that it would serve to eliminate a greater harm in view of the person who is harmed [gloss: concerning the words “is peculiar to those who do not know,” al-Bayḍāwī says “It is reported from Ibn ‘Abbās that Najda al-Ḥarūrī wrote to him and asked: How did Khiḍr slay the child? Did the Prophet (PBUH) forbid slaying the children?” and we wrote the following words in return: “If you know what Moses’ wise one knew concerning the situation of the children, you also have the right to slay them. (Saçaklızâde)] ...”⁴³

According to Saçaklızâde’s narrations in his *Risālat al-jawāb*, ‘Alamī made three fundamental critiques against these opinions quoted from *Tartīb al-‘ulūm*. The first critique is his aforementioned statement: “That these two things are lawful for Khiḍr is against the fact that the Prophet prohibited harming another one and slaying an innocent child for his *umma* absolutely. However, in view of the Lawmaker, there are conditions that would restrain these two prohibitions” ... “the restraint (*taqyīd*) of this absolute *naṣṣ* with the inspiration is not something uttered by anyone that we know among the people of truth as it is the case with the man from Mar‘ash who fabricated lie.”⁴⁴ According to this, it seems that ‘Alamī accused Saçaklızâde in his first critique by “restraining the absolute *naṣṣ* with inspiration.

‘Alamī’s second critique concerns Saçaklızâde’s approach to the precept (*ḥukm*) of acting in accord with inspiration. Probably he accused Saçaklızâde of claiming that doing so is determined by consensus (*ijmā’*) in his *Tartīb al-‘ulūm*-based on the Khiḍr parable.⁴⁵

43 Saçaklızâde, *Tartīb al-‘ulūm*, 174-75; cf. *Tertībü'l-‘ulūm*, 206.

44 Ibid., 35a.

45 Ibid., 35ab.

His third critique is about his sentence in *Tartīb al-'ulūm*: “The unlawful things those appear as lawful for them is due to the emergence of a secret reason that would make them lawful.” According to what Saçaklızâde stated, ‘Alamî understood “a secret reason that would make them lawful” as “it is appropriate to be a reason; however, the Lawmaker did not make it a reason (*'illa*) for the judgment (*hukm*) due to its secrecy.” He then rendered the following sharp judgement by mentioning the malice (*mafsada*) of this: “This is the sophistry of the Qarâmiṭa and opens the gate of blasphemy (*ilhād*)....”⁴⁶

Besides all of these, having examined Saçaklızâde’s need for answer, we concur that ‘Alamî launched another (but indirect) critique due to his inclusion of a narration from Imâm al-Yâfi’î.

Imâm al-Yâfi’î says in *Rawḍ al-Rayāhîn*: “Things those emanate from the Sufis and are against the outward knowledge is performed by them either during the state of spiritual ecstasy (*sakr*) and unintentionally – and in this case, they are not responsible – or there is an esoteric interpretation of their deeds which is known only by the esoteric scholars just as it is the case with the parable of Moses and Khiḍr.”⁴⁷

As Saçaklızâde stated, ‘Alamî objected to Imâm al-Yâfi’î’s approach of “attributing two options” in the aforementioned quotation (*'alā ḥaşri tardîd al-Yâfi’î*) by quoting the renowned salafî scholar Ibn Taymiyya: “To be inerrant or sinless is not a condition of being a saint; on the contrary, it is permissible (*jâ’iz*) for some religious knowledge to remain secret from him.”⁴⁸ Thus, it seems that ‘Alamî implied that Imâm al-Yâfi’î thought directly, and that Saçaklızâde thought indirectly, that a saint could not sin. He also implied that they wanted to legitimate all of the saints’ acts that violate the outward science through inspiration and called attention to this effort’s impropriety.

Saçaklızâde’s text contains critiques of ‘Alamî. At the beginning of his treatise, he stated that ‘Alamî criticized his words in *Tartīb al-'ulūm* “as if without thinking profoundly and precipitately at first glance (*fî awâ’il al-naẓar*), whereas he “contemplated over ‘Alamî’s treatise and wrote down answers to the objections.”⁴⁹

46 Ibid., 37ab.

47 Saçaklızâde, *Tertibü'l-'ulūm*, 207.

48 Saçaklızâde, *Risālat al-jawāb*, 37b-38b.

49 Ibid., 29b.

III. Saçaqlizāde's Answers to 'Alamī's Critiques

Before examining Saçaqlizāde's answers, we want to give an outline of the views he expressed in his *Risālat al-jawāb* concerning "divine inspiration" and "inspiration," as these views, which are not found in *Tartīb al-'ulūm*, will help readers understand what Saçaqlizāde thinks about the matter and better comprehend his answers.

According to what Saçaqlizāde said – based on the information contained in 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad bin Aḥmad al-Samarqandī's (d. 1144) *al-Mizān* – the inspiration called "the witnessing of the heart" is to the meaning into the heard (*ilqā'*) through effusion (*fayḍ*), namely, the creation of meaning in the heart. Allah creates inspiration without the intermediacy of the soul or Satan. This is the true and "real inspiration; it is called the secret revelation" for the prophets and *irshād* or *hidāya* for the rest. Or Allah creates it with the intermediacy of either the soul or Satan and it becomes "*bāṭil*" or "*ḍalāla*." In this case, it is called "*waswasa*, *ighwā*, *idlāl*." Although inspiration comprises both, according to the custom (*'urf*) it is specific to the former. Of course, the inspiration of the prophets is true and denotes the knowledge concerning what is inspired without reflection and deduction for them; it is called "the secret revelation." However, the inspiration for Muslims other than the prophets is controversial, for one group of Sufis regard it as a proof separate from the reflection and deduction concerning the judgment (*aḥkām*), whereas "according to those who are called Jāfariyya among the Rāfiḍīs," there is no proof other than inspiration. For "the people of the truth" (ahl-i Ḥaqq), the inspiration in question can be a proof only after reflection and deduction.⁵⁰

According to Saçaqlizāde, there are three proofs about the truth and falseness of the inspiration that comes: legal (*shar'ī*), intellectual (*'aqlī*), and ordinary (*'ādī*).⁵¹ The first two are well-known; the third one is the opening of the bosom (*ṣadr*) by eliminating any hesitation about the inspiration's truthfulness after contemplation for the inspiration to come, and the contraction (*inqibād*) of the bosom by the formation of the hesitation thereof. In other words, removing the doubt about the things that come to the mind, the soul's contentment with it, and the opening of the bosom for it testify the truth of that which comes (*wārid*); the opposite testifies its falseness (*bāṭil*), which is also called the ordinary proof (the *murāqaba* of the saints). In such a situation, opening the bosom would be possible only for the saints. The contentedness of the saint's soul marks the truth of what is placed into

50 Ibid., 30ab.

51 As far as we understand from his definition, what Saçaqlizāde meant by the ordinary (*'ādī*) proof might be 'Ubayd Allah al-Samarqandī's "the *murāqaba* of the saints."

his/her heart. If the soul is discontented with that which comes and the bosom is closed to it, it is not the real one (*ghayr-i şādiq*).⁵² But acting in accord with divine inspiration or inspiration denotes acting upon an inspiration for which a legal or intellectual proof does not attest, and it is attested by – the ordinary – proof. Such acting is of two kinds: the inspiration of the judgment of something pertaining to independent reasoning (*ijtihādī*) to the saint, concerning which no independent reasoning was fulfilled before, and the inspiration of legal reason to the saint for a judgment. One who falls into heedlessness about those inspirations that have no legal or intellectual proof knows the truth of the inspiration only through the ordinary proof (the *murāqaba* of the saints).⁵³ It is not permissible for the majority to act in accordance with the inspiration. According to the records narrated from Ibn Taymiyya's *al-Furqān bayna awliyā' al-Raḥmān wa awliyā' al-Shayṭān* in a collection copied by Shaykh Sulaymān, Ibn Taymiyya's path implies that the parable of Khiḍr is the law of Prophet Muhammad and indicates the "necessity" (*wujūb*) of acting in accordance with the inspiration.⁵⁴

Saçaklızāde expresses these opinions briefly in *Risālat al-jawāb*. We now move on to his answers to 'Alamī's critiques. Related to 'Alamī's first critique, Saçaklızāde states that he mentioned the first sentence as an explanation of Najda al-Ḥarūri's question, and the second one as the explanation of the dialogue between Najda al-Ḥarūri and Ibn 'Abbas, narrated from al-Bayḍawī, as the proof of this question and answer at the gloss (*hāshiya*) in *Tartīb al-'ulūm*. For him, it is quite surprising to be accused of "conditioning the absolute principles of the Quran and Sunnah (*naṣṣ*) with the inspiration" by 'Alamī due to the mentioned words. For, it is obvious that the conditioning in his word is with the parable of Khiḍr. In this respect, "this claim of 'Alamī is a 'slander.'"⁵⁵

Concerning 'Alamī's second critique, that he allegedly asserted consensus (*ijmā'*) has been reached to act in accord with the inspiration, Saçaklızāde says that to do so suggests that the parable of Khiḍr is based on – though against the minority among the Shafi'ites – the law of Prophet Muhammad, is the scholars' general opinion. He also states that he never made such a claim and thus 'Alamī's criticism, which is based on quoting the opinions of Shafi'ite scholars like al-Subkī and al-Bulqīnī, who disagree on the matter, is meaningless. For Saçaklızāde, the

52 Saçaklızāde, *Risāletü'l-cevāb*, 31ab.

53 Ibid., 32a-33a.

54 Ibid., 33b-34a.

55 Ibid., 34b-35a.

negative particular preposition is opposed to the positive universal preposition, not to the positive particular preposition; however, no such universality exists in his words.⁵⁶ That is to say, this specific critique is groundless because he never claimed that acting in accordance with inspiration has been proven via consensus.

As for Saçaklızâde's answer to the third critique, he says what he meant by "a secret reason" is "the legal-unseen reason that is not signified by any proof." The analogy he made by the Khidr parable is the strongest indication of this, for if Khidr is "prophet" – which is the most probable possibility – then the reason he mentions is certainly the "legal reason," in that he is law maker. If he is a "saint," then even mentioning his act as a reason, which is not acknowledged in his Prophet's law, would be very unlikely. In other words, what matters here is the "legal reason." Then the claims of 'Alamî, such as "The Qarmaṭī sophistry" and "the gate of heresy" are "grave slanders." Saçaklızâde even states that he would complain about 'Alamî in "the court of Hereafter" due to these slanders.⁵⁷

Apart from these answers, Saçaklızâde seems to have needed to reply to two of 'Alamî's expressions, which are in a sense indirect critiques, that seem to be proclaimed in the latter's *al-Ifhām fī al-ilhām*. In this respect, he first quoted the following statement in his treatise: "Inspiration is relied on only after one knows its correspondence to the intellectual and legal proof; thus, the knowledge concerning the truth of inspiration is either with the intellectual or legal proof. For this reason, the inspiration of the saints cannot be deemed divine inspiration." He continues: "It is quite surprising that in his treatise he narrated from *Sharḥ al-taḥrīr* [of Ibn Amīr Hāj] the signs according to which the opening of the bosom and an opponent belonging to another thought should not hinder – that is to say, the sign of the real, true inspiration." It appears that Saçaklızâde narrates these expressions as 'Alamî's statements and then presents his own evaluation of this matter. For him, the sign in question can be relied on only in the absence of a legal and intellectual proof for the inspiration. Furthermore, when inspiration becomes a proof for the saint in the absence of any legal and intellectual evidence concerning the inspiration, it is only with the "piety" (*diyāna*), not with the "outward" nature of the Sharia.⁵⁸

Second, Saçaklızâde answers 'Alamî's statements about his aforementioned quotes from Imām al-Yāfī'ī in his *Tartīb al-'ulūm* concerning the outward knowledge

56 Ibid., 35ab.

57 Ibid., 36b-37b.

58 Ibid., 32b-33a.

that emanates from the Sufis. According to him, Imām al-Yāfi‘ī’s approach depends on his good intentions for the Sufis. But these good intentions do not mean that they are sinless. Moreover, the saint must, of necessity, have good intentions, as stated in *al-Madārik*. In these expressions, Imām al-Yāfi‘ī meant those imams who are famous for their “sainthood,” such as Bāyazīd-i Bisṭāmī, Junayd al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Shibli, Ibrahim b. Adham, and those mentioned in al-Qushayrī’s *Risāla*. Al-Qushayrī also praised them at the beginning of this work due to the necessity for the Sufis to have good intentions.⁵⁹ In other words, he says that ‘Alamī’s claims on this matter are false because he claimed that a saint cannot sin. Saçaklızâde puts an end to his words with this last answer concerning ‘Alamī’s critiques.

IV. The Analysis of Their Claims, Opinions, and Sources of Those Opinions

The claims and opinions of Saçaklızâde and ‘Alamī portrayed so far should be analyzed, first of all, in view of their intellectual framework or mentality. The first thing to be said in this regard is that they basically disagree on two issues. The first one is whether the Khiḍr parable can be considered a proof. In his first critique of Saçaklızâde, ‘Alamī interprets Khiḍr’s making a hole in the ship and slaying the child, as narrated in the Quran, as acting in accord with inspiration and claims that the absolute doctrine or (*naṣṣ*), according to which the Prophet prohibits harming others and slaying an innocent child by means of inspiration for his *umma* absolutely,” cannot be conditioned. In response, Saçaklızâde claims that the “conditioning” here is not by inspiration, but by the parable. Thus, ‘Alamī points to inspiration as a proof deduced from the parable of Khiḍr, whereas Saçaklızâde refers to the parable itself, which denotes a proof that appears to be different but the same in nature for conditioning. In fact, one can say that they do not disagree on the basis of the proof by means of which some type of conditioning is made. So, from where does this disagreement emerge? To answer this question, we look at the details of Saçaklızâde’s opinions.

According to what Saçaklızâde said, the renowned scholar al-Bayḍāwī based Khiḍr’s acts on the universal precept that “it is necessary to be ascribed the lesser (*ahwan*) one in case of the encounter (*ta’āruḍ*) of two harms.” This precept is acknowledged in Prophet Muhammad’s laws, regardless of this parable, as well as

59 Ibid., 37b-38b.

in the other laws. However, there is a nuance concerning the universal precept: When the encounter of two harms is known by sensual (*hissī*), intellectual (*aqli*) or legal (*shar'ī*) proof, there is no dissent between the laws concerning the necessity of choosing the lesser harm. However, when the encounter is known through inspiration and unveiling, as it is the case with this parable, the necessity choosing the lesser harm is acknowledged in the law of Khiḍr through the parable's proof, based on the principle that "when Allah or His Messengers tell about the law of the previous ones without disclaiming, it is the law of our own Prophet according to the majority of the Ḥanafis and the Shafī'is" in the methodology. In this respect, a majority of the scholars say that inspiration is a proof by the evidence of the parable of Khiḍr, for whom inspiration comes; however, the minority states that it is not lawful to act in accord with it.⁶⁰

Although it is clear from these statements that what Saḥāḥlīzāde meant by the expression of "the proof of the Khiḍr parable" in the context of the universal precept of "the necessity of being ascribed the lesser one (*ahwan*) in case of the encounter (*ta'arūḍ*) of two harms," the knowledge of the situation mentioned in this precept seems to be inspiration that, in the final analysis, is gained by "the inspiration and unveiling." They also differ over deducing inspiration as a proof from this parable. As a matter of fact, their dispute might have been about the authenticity level of the proof of inspiration. However, if we act prudently and think of the "proof of the parable of Khiḍr" expression separately from inspiration, as Saḥāḥlīzāde proclaimed, then it would be related to "the authenticity level of the proof of the parable of Khiḍr." As stated earlier, Saḥāḥlīzāde's approach is that the proof of this parable or inspiration as a proof is also valid in the law of Prophet Muhammad. However, 'Alamī's approach seems to state that inspiration and act (or the proof of this parable) in the parable is specific to the event, namely, to Khiḍr himself, and thus cannot be used as a proof to condition an absolute *naṣṣ*. In this respect, Saḥāḥlīzāde states in another critique that 'Alamī brings the views of some Shafī'ī scholars, such as al-Subkī and al-Bulqīnī, into question concerning the impossibility of acting in accord with this parable. If 'Alamī does not share this opinion, then the only possibility is that he either thinks it is improbable to deduce the conclusion of "conditioning the doctrine" from the dialogue between Ibn 'Abbās and Najda, unlike the claim of Saḥāḥlīzāde, or thinks that Saḥāḥlīzāde's opinion concerning inspiration is so broad to reach to the point of "conditioning the *naṣṣ*" (i.e., he sees inspiration as a proof that would condition the *naṣṣ*).

60 Ibid., 33b-34a.

The second difference is in which circumstances one can act in accord with inspiration as a proof within the framework of proofs as to whether the [particular] inspiration is right or wrong.

In fact, both the parable and the different approaches to inspiration's degree of authenticity is, in one respect, nothing other than the exteriorization of the different ideas. In other words, these scholars' conflicts depend on which circumstances one can act in accord with inspiration as a proof or even what divine inspiration and inspiration mean. Saçaklızâde claims that there are three proofs concerning the inspiration whether it is true or false; to act in accord with divine inspiration means to act in accord with an inspiration which no legal and intellectual proofs attest, but is attained by an ordinary proof (the *murâqaba* of the saints); it is attested by the ordinary proof and the usage of this proof as evidence is unique to the saints. However, the statements narrated by Saçaklızâde, presumably from 'Alamî, indicate that one can rely on inspiration only after knowing its correspondence with a legal and intellectual proof, that knowledge concerning the inspiration's truth can be gained only through one of these proofs, and the inspiration of the saints cannot be counted as divine inspiration. In other words, 'Alamî does not consider ordinary proof as one of the proofs that determine the value of the information or the inspiration and thus excludes the authority gained through inspiration by the saints, who are considered as the sole users of this proof. Although Saçaklızâde implies that 'Alamî accepts this proof by stating that he conveyed the sign of real inspiration (i.e., the characteristics of inspiration known by ordinary proof by means of quoting from 'Alamî's *Sharḥ al-Taḥrîr*), the clear statements above show that this is not incisive. Therefore, one can say that these scholars differed over the meaning of inspiration: Saçaklızâde considers real inspiration as something whose information value can be measured by ordinary proof, whereas 'Alamî thinks it can be measured only by legal and intellectual proofs.

This differentiation is certainly an important indication with regard to Saçaklızâde and 'Alamî's intellectual structure. What conclusions can be drawn from this if one takes this indication as a starting point? In other words, what do their different views correspond to in the history of Islamic thought?

Answering this question requires an analysis of the opinions of Sufis and scholars on which conditions one can rely on the knowledge gained through inspiration. According to some information found in the literature, those Sufis who view inspiration as a separate proof – a natural result of the divine inspiration theory – think that its validity is determined by the saints who are, possibly, its

object,⁶¹ whereas some think that it can be determined according to whether a proof or a witness from the Quran or Sunna (the legal proof) exists.⁶²

The scholars have different perspectives. For example, the Mâturîdî theologian Abū al-Mu‘în al-Nasafî (d. 1114) states that parts of inspiration can be authentic (ṣaḥîḥ) or invalid (fâsîd); thus, one must appeal to proofs other than inspiration in order to consider the knowledge acquired through inspiration as valid. If the proofs support this knowledge, then it can be considered accurate; if not, then it must be considered inaccurate.⁶³ ‘Alâ’ al-Dîn al-Samarqandî (d. 1144), the author of *Mizân al-uşûl fî natâ’ij al-‘uqûl*, from which Saçaklızâde benefitted greatly in his treatise, states that one can understand which inspiration is true and which is false only by intellectual proofs (deduction).⁶⁴ The famous Ash‘ârîte theologian Sayyid Sharîf al-Jurjânî (d. 1413) says that one can know whether inspiration is from Allah or another source only by reflection; otherwise, inspiration without intellection is void.⁶⁵ The Shâfi‘î jurist Sam‘anî states any inspiration that agrees with the Quran or Sunna is acceptable, whereas those that do not must be rejected.⁶⁶

Ibn Taymiyya says that if the knowledge that comes through inspiration is not negated by these two sources after being tested with them, then it can be considered valid.⁶⁷ The Mâturîdî scholar ‘Ubayd Allah al-Samarqandî (d. 1301), who is also connected with Sufism, argues that any inspiration coming to the saint would be a proof only for that saint in case it comes from an angel or Allah. The inspiration that comes to people who are not prophets or saints is rejected as a means of gaining knowledge because it is difficult to distinguish the knowledge that comes from Allah or an angel to the heart from the solicitude given by the soul and the devil. Such distinguishing is possible only by the *murâqaba* of the saints.⁶⁸ Some scholars, it is said, who think that inspiration is proof only for the person so inspired, claim that the heart’s feeling broadness/comfort, as well as the existence

61 As Ismâ‘îl Ḥaqqî Bursawî stated, it is quite natural to assume that the Sufis, who consider the inward science as knowledge “gained through tasting, divine unveiling, inspiration and placing into the heart (*ilqâ*) rather than letter and sound” and think that “all inward knowledge is attained only by tasting, intuition (*wijdân*), witnessing, examining (*‘iyân*) rather than proof and evidence, adopt the view that the validity of inspiration can be determined by the saints.” For the mentioned views of Bursawî, see Öztürk, “Bilge Kul-Musa Kıssası,” 275.

62 For these matters, see the works mentioned in footnotes 34-38.

63 Ak, “Mâturîdî Âlimlere Göre,” 136-37.

64 Ibid., 138-40.

65 Aslan, “Kelâm’da İlhâm,” 35-40.

66 Birsin, “Fıkıh Usûlünde İlhâm,” 255.

67 Kaya, “İbn Teymiyye,” 27-29.

68 Ak, “Mâturîdî Âlimlere Göre,” 142.

of no feeling (*khātir*) that is inconsistent with it, proves that the specific inspiration is from Allah.⁶⁹

In light of this information, the Sufis and scholars appear to have developed three basic approaches to inspiration's validity. Saçaklızâde, who also holds this view, lists them as legal, intellectual, and ordinary. The identities of those who adopt these approaches, which can be explained as confirming to the Quran and Sunnah or not being contrary to the law, reflection and deduction, and the *murâqaba* of the saints, are important in terms of the answer for which we are looking. When the intellectual-scholarly identities of their adherents are evaluated roughly, putting aside the first approach because it has a quality that cannot be attributed to a certain intellectual-scholarly circle, it appears as if the theologians have adopted the second approach and the Sufis, as well as those scholars who deal with Sufism (e.g., 'Ubayd Allah al-Samarqandî), have adopted the third one.

If we turn to our question within the frame of this inference, we think that the two scholars' difference over the meaning of inspiration indicates that Saçaklızâde agrees with the scholars who adopt the theory of divine inspiration in a way that aligns with the Sufi discourse, whereas 'Alamî treats it as do the jurists and theologians who approach this theory via the law and the proofs of reasoning. Moreover, Saçaklızâde seems to follow those scholars, particularly al-Ghazzâlî, who consider the Sufi epistemology acceptable.⁷⁰

Another aspect of Saçaklızâde and 'Alamî's opinions and claims on inspiration that should be analyzed is the sources of their opinions within the framework of the scholars and works that Saçaklızâde benefited from, referred to, or mentioned in his *Risâlat al-jawâb*, as well as what this means in view of the tradition of Ottoman scholarship and thought. When we assess *Risâlat al-jawâb* in regard to this matter, one can say that these works were *Sharḥ al-'Aqâ'id* and *al-Mizân* in the treatise's first section ("the definition of inspiration"); from *al-Mizân* and al-Nasafi

69 Birsin, "Fıkıh Usûlünde İllâm," 253-54.

70 As understood from *Tartib al-'ulûm*, Saçaklızâde was influenced seriously by al-Ghazzâlî. His references to al-Ghazzâlî's views as he deals with the divine inspiration in this work, and that he dealt with Sufism through the rites of Qâdiriyya and Naqshbandiyya by favor of Shaykh Abd al-Ghani al-Nablusi (stated in *Waqâyi' al-fuḍalâ'*) all support our opinion that he followed the Sufi discourse or the line of scholars such as al-Ghazzâlî as regards divine inspiration and inspiration. And Saçaklızâde's dealing with matter by relying on the literature of jurisprudence-theology rather than *Risâlat al-jawâb* does not falsify this opinion. Saçaklızâde naturally had to appeal the former type of literature as he answered critiques based on the jurisprudential-theological perspective in order to justify himself. Moreover, he did not restrict himself to the views within the literature in question while mentioning the ordinary proof, which is his main opinion on inspiration.

in the second section (“the inspired thing’s being knowledge”); from al-Bayḍāwī and *al-Madārik* in the third section (“the definition of the proof concerning the inspired thing’s being real and unreal”); from Ibn Nujaym’s *al-Ashbāh* in the third section (“the definition of acting in accordance with divine inspiration”); from al-Bayḍāwī, *al-Mizān* and Ibn Taymiyya’s *al-Furqān bayna awliyā’ al-Raḥmān wa awliyā’ al-Shayṭān* by means of a treatise belonging Shaykh Sulaymān (“the shaykh of Ayasofya”), in the fifth section (“the interpretation of the parable of Khidr”; from *al-Manār* and its expositor, al-Bayḍāwī and al-Zamakhsharī, in the sixth section, in which he replied to several of ‘Alamī’s claims; and from al-Quashayrī’s *al-Risāla* in the seventh section, in which he replied again to one of ‘Alamī’s claims. Saçaklızāde mentions *Sharḥ al-Taḥrīr*, al-Subkī, al-Bulqīnī, and Ibn Taymiyya as the scholars from whom ‘Alamī benefited or referred to.

Among these jurisprudential works, *al-Mizān* (*Mizān al-uṣūl fī natā’ij al-‘uqūl*) was written by the Ḥanafī jurist ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 1144),⁷¹ *al-Manār* (*Manār al-anwār*) by the Ḥanafī scholar Abū al-Barakāt al-Nasafī (d. 1310),⁷² and *al-Ashbāh* (*al-Ashbāh wa al-Naẓā’ir*) by the Ḥanafī jurist Ibn Nujaym (d. 1563).⁷³ *Al-Mizān*, to which Saçaklızāde referred most often, is viewed as “an original book on the principles of jurisprudence written with a content and methodology that differs from the classical Ḥanafī *uṣūl* tradition and, instead, conforms to the methodology of compilation belonging to the works of the theologians, and is the most important text that reflects the jurisprudential-theological approaches of Samarqand Ḥanafī-Māturidī branch, notably the views of Abū Mansur al-Māturidī.”⁷⁴ Saçaklızāde’s references to al-Bayḍāwī, al-Zamakhsharī, and *al-Madārik* refer, respectively, to the exegesis of *Anwār al-tanzīl wa asrār al-ta’wīl* of the Ash‘arite theologian and Shafī‘ī jurist Qāḍī al-Bayḍāwī (d. 1286),⁷⁵ *al-Kashshāf* of the Mu’tazilite scholar al-Zamakhsharī (d. 1144),⁷⁶ and *Madārik al-tanzīl wa asrār al-ta’wīl* of the Ḥanafī scholar Abū al-Barakāt al-Nasafī (d. 1310).⁷⁷ His references to al-Nasafī and *Sharḥ al-‘aqā’id* indicate that he consulted such theological works as the *‘Aqā’id al-Nasafī* of the Ḥanafī-Māturidī scholar Najm al-Dīn ‘Umar al-Nasafī (d. 1142)⁷⁸ and one

71 Hacı Mehmet Günay, “Semerkandī, Alaeddin,” *DİA* 36 (2009): 470-71.

72 Ferhat Koca, “Menārü’l-Envār,” *DİA* 29 (2004): 118.

73 Mustafa Baktır, “el-Eşbah ve’n-nezair,” *DİA* 2 (1995): 458-59.

74 Günay, “Semerkandī, Alaeddin,” 471.

75 Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, “Beyzâvî,” *DİA* 6 (1992): 100-01.

76 Ali Özek, “el-Keşşâf,” *DİA* 25 (2002): 329-30.

77 Mustafa Öztürk, “Medârikü’t-Tenzil ve Hakâikü’t-Te’vîl,” *DİA* 28 (2003): 292-93.

78 Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, “Akaidü’n-Nesefî,” *DİA* 2 (1989): 218-19.

of its commentaries, the *Sharḥ al-'aqqā'id*, written by the Ash'arite theologian Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 1142).⁷⁹ Al-Qushayrī's famous *al-Risāla* deals with *taṣawwuf*. And Ibn Taymiyya's *al-Furqān bayna awliyā' al-Raḥmān wa awliyā' al-Shayṭān*, which Saçaklızâde referred to by means of a text written by "the Shaykh of Ayasofya" Shaykh Sulaymān, as its title and writer clearly show, is a work on theology written by the famous salafī scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328).⁸⁰

In this data, some aspects need to be pointed out in the context of Saçaklızâde's sources of ideas and the structure of the tradition of Ottoman scholarship and thought. First, he preferred the Ḥanafīyya's jurisprudential literature and the Māturīdiyya's theological literature while explaining inspiration in his *Risālat al-jawāb*. This might be a natural result of the general structure pertaining to the tradition of Ottoman scholarship and thought; it might have originated from the fact that Saçaklızâde thought he could propound or argue his own attitude better in this manner. Another one is that most of the books on jurisprudence, theology, and exegesis that appealed to him are those known and used within the Ottoman scholarly circles.⁸¹

Another interesting aspect that draws our attention is Saçaklızâde's reference to an opinion of Ibn Taymiyya in his *al-Furqān bayna awliyā' al-Raḥmān wa awliyā' al-Shayṭān*. In our opinion, this reference points out that he is acquainted not only with Ibn Taymiyya's opinions, but also appeals to the latter's views as the occasion arises or when needed. Hence, Saçaklızâde also quoted one of his views in *Tartīb al-'ulūm*,⁸² along with those of Ibn al-Qayyim, a student of Ibn Taymiyya, when he speaks of philosophy in *Tartīb al-'ulūm*.⁸³ This situation is of great importance in view of both Saçaklızâde's intellectual structure and the structure of the tradition of Ottoman scholarship and thought, because it constitutes a circumstantial evidence concerning some important problematics: whether Ibn Taymiyya in particular and

79 Şükrü Özen, "Teftāzānī," *DİA* 40 (2011): 299-303.

80 Ferhat Koca, "İbn Taymiyye, Takıyyüddin," *DİA* 20 (1999): 395.

81 For more information concerning the books read within the Ottoman scholarly circles on jurisprudence, theology, and exegesis, see Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, "Dini Bilimler ve Ulema," in *Osmanlı Uygarlığı*, ed. Halil İnalçık-Günsel Renda (Istanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2003), I, 256-63; M. Hulüsi Lekesiz, "Osmanlı İlmî Zihniyetinde Değişme (Teşekkül-Gelişme-Çözülme: XV-XVII. Yüzyıllar)" (Master's thesis: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 1989), 39-47; Hasan Akgündüz, *Klasik Dönem Osmanlı Medrese Sistemi: Amaç-Yapı-İşleyiş* (Istanbul: Ulusal Yayınları, 1997), 168-70, 177, 554 (footnote 344), 555 (footnotes 352 and 363), and 556 footnote 366).

82 Mehmet Gel, "XVIII. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Osmanlı İlim Geleneğindeki 'Hâkim Çizgi'ye 'Felsefe' Odaklı Bir Eleştiri: Saçaklızâde Muhammed el-Mar'âşî," in *Ötekilerin Peşinde: Ahmet Yaşar Ocak'a Armağan*, ed. Mehmet Öz-Fatih Yeşil (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2015), 652.

83 Gel, "XVIII. Yüzyılın," 651-653.

salafi thought in general influenced the tradition of Ottoman scholarship and thought, in what ways (if any) this influence occurs, which Ottoman scholar were influenced by Ibn Taymiyya and his students, and in which domains and on which levels these influences occur.

There is a striking indication on how or through which medium these views were transmitted into Saçaklızâde's abovementioned reference and thus into the tradition of Ottoman scholarship and thought. As stated above, he mentions Ibn Taymiyya's opinion on this matter in his *Risâlat al-jawâb* and says that he saw it in a collection compiled from the writings of Shaykh Sulaymân, whom he praises as "the virtuous, the light of his time." In other words, Shaykh Sulaymân is Saçaklızâde's source concerning Ibn Taymiyya's view on the matter. Given the fact that one of this article's goals is to provide information about the structures of the tradition of Ottoman scholarship and thought during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, one must explain who Shaykh Sulaymân was or his intellectual identity to realize it.

According to the information given by Shaykhî Mehmed Efendi (d. 1732-33), who authored the biographies of scholars, the shaykhs (*mashâyikh*) and poets (*shu'arâ*) of this specific time period, three points in particular draw our attention to Shaykh Sulaymân Efendi's (d. 1722) life story. First, he set out in 1669, aged nineteen, after completing his education in Istanbul with the intention of travelling, pursuing his education, making the pilgrimage, and visiting the "Rawḍa of the Prophet." During this journey, he graduated and was authorized to teach hadith science and read the *kutub-i sitta* in Damascus from the hadith scholar Shaykh Muḥammad al-Balbâni; he received an *ijâza* from Shaykh Nûr al-Dîn 'Alî b. 'Alî Shabrâmallisî in Cairo; he graduated and received an *ijâza* from one of the hadith scholars (*mashâyikh-i ḥadîth*) Shaykh Ḥusayn 'Ajami/'Ujami in Ḥaramayn-i Sharîfayn and from Shaykh 'Abd al-Qâdir al-Safûrî, Shaykh Muḥammad b. Sulaymân al-Maghribî, Shaykh Ibrâhîm al-Kurdî, and Shaykh 'Abd Allah b. Sâlim al-Başrî; he received *ijâza* from Shaykh 'Abd al-Qâdir al-Maqdisî in Quds; and received the *ijâza* for "narration (*riwâya*) of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) from the author of *Fatâwâ-yi Khayriyya*, Shaykh Khayr al-Dîn al-Ramlî, in Ramla after reading part of *Hidâya*, his book on jurisprudence.⁸⁴ As for as we can determine, except for the Shafi'ite jurist and scholar of Quranic recitation al-Shabrâmallisî (d. 1676),⁸⁵ the preeminent Ḥanafî jurist of his time al-Ramlî (d. 1671)⁸⁶ and Shaykh 'Abd al-Qâdir al-Maqdisî, those who are said to receive *ijâza* from Shaykh Sulaymân Efendi are

84 Şeyhî, *Vekâyi'ü'l-fudalâ*, II-III, 678-79.

85 Abdullah Karaman, "Şebrâmallisî," *DİA* 38 (2000): 395-96.

86 Ali Pekcan, "Remlî, Hayreddin b. Ahmed," *DİA* 34 (2007): 563-64.

the scholars of hadith; as John Voll states, especially ‘Ajami/‘Ujami (Ḥasan b. ‘Alī al-Ujaymī (d. 1702),⁸⁷ al-Maghribī (d. 1682-83), al-Kurdī (Ibrāhīm b. Ḥasan al-Kūrānī d. 1690) and al-Başrı (d. 1722) are preeminent members of the Ḥaramayn-based scholar network of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁸⁸ According to Voll, the characteristic of this scholarly network is combining hadith science and Sufism “in a different manner” by concentrating on the hadith and by scholars belonging to the network who were initiated into some “activist” Sufi orders of the time like the Naqshbandiyya. It played a role in the development of revivification and renewal ideas and movements in the Islamic world during the eighteenth century.⁸⁹ According to Khaled el-Rouayheb, whose important and extensive book on the seventeenth-century history of Islamic intellectuality was published a few years ago, one of these scholars, Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī, is an ardent follower of Ibn al-‘Arabī and a Sufi who adopts the idea of the Oneness of Being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*) but also – it seems as a paradox though – a scholar who tries to find and read the works of Ibn Taymiyya as well as those of his student Ibn al-Qayyim, and who sometimes defends these two “Hanbalite puritan scholars” against accusations of anthropomorphism and played an important role in improving their thoughts.⁹⁰

Second, Shaykh Sulaymān Efendi returned to Anatolia after the mentioned journey, participated in Sultan Mehmed IV’s military campaign against Lahistān (present-day Poland) in April 1674, and gradually began taking part in scholarly debates together with approximately ten other people to attend the lessons in the sultan’s council. Following the campaign, he studied astronomy, geometry,

- 87 When the hadith scholar mentioned as Ḥusayn ‘Ajami/‘Ujami in *Waḡāyī’ al-fuḡalā* is taken into consideration with the Ḥaramayn hadith scholars mentioned at the same place in this book, it is quite probable that he is Ḥasan al-‘Ujaymī. About this scholar, see John Obert Voll, “Abdullah B. Sâlim el-Basrı ve 18.Yüzyılda Hadis İlimi,” trans. Nail Okuyucu, in *Batı Gözüyle Tecdid: İslâm Dünyasında Tecdid Hareketleri 1750-1850*, ed. Nail Okuyucu (Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2014), 223; Casim Avcı, “Uceymi,” *DİA* 42 (2012): 37-38.
- 88 For further information concerning these scholars, see Voll, “Abdullah b. Sâlim el-Basrı,” 217-30; John Obert Voll, “Hadis Âlimleri ve Tarikatlar: 18. Yüzyıl Haremeyn Ulemâsı ve İslâm Dünyasındaki Etkileri,” trans. Sümeyye Onuk, in *Batı Gözüyle Tecdid*, 63-74; John Obert Voll, “Muhammed Hayyât es-Sindî ve Muhammed b. Abdülvehhâb: 18. Yüzyıl Medine’sinde Bir Entelektüel Grubun Tahlili,” trans. Mustafa Demiray, *Batı Gözüyle Tecdid* içinde, 53-61.
- 89 Voll, “Hadis Âlimleri ve Tarikatlar,” 63-74; Voll, “Abdullah b. Sâlim el-Basrı,” 229-30. Some researchers have criticized Voll’s claim. For these critiques and an evaluation of the entire matter, see Eyyüp Said Kaya, “Batılı Gözüyle Modernleşme Arifesinde Tecdid,” in *Batı Gözüyle Tecdid*, 13-35.
- 90 For matters such as Ibrāhīm Kūrānī’s being a Sufi who adopts the idea of the Oneness of Being, the role of the commentators of Ibn al-‘Arabī, such as Şadr al-Din al-Qunawī and Jāmi, who disseminated Sufi perspectives over the Arab lands, his critiques on the established Ash’arite theology, his affinity with the views of fourteenth-century Hanbalite traditionalists such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim, his role in improving the views of these two scholars, his relations with some contemporary Ḥanbalite scholars, see Khaled el-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 271-346, 350-52.

arithmetic, and mathematics from Shaykh al-Sayyid Maḥmūd al-Wānī Efendi in Edirne, where Mehmed IV resided.⁹¹ Although one should approach warily his statement that he studied with Maḥmūd al-Wānī (d. 1713), the son of Wānī Mehmed Efendi (d. 1685) who was Mehmed IV's teacher,⁹² this information implies that Shaykh Sulaymān Efendi belonged to the circle of Wānī Mehmed Efendi, who is said to be the leader of the third phase of the famous Qāḍizādali preachers who were influenced by some of Ibn Taymiyya's views,⁹³ for Wānī Mehmed Efendi also participated in the Lehistān campaign.⁹⁴

Third, Shaykh Sulaymān Efendi also functioned as a preacher, like Wānī Mehmed Efendi, and was promoted to the rank of preaching in Ayasofya-yi Kabīr Mosque during his service. Moreover, while working as a teacher in Saray-i Jadid-i Sulṭānī, to which he was appointed in 1781, he caused a social problem by claiming that the reciters (*qurrā'*) and memorizers of the Quran (*ḥuffāz*) do not recite the letter *zād/ḍād* properly.⁹⁵ In other words, just as the Qāḍizādali preachers, Shaykh Sulaymān Efendi gives the impression of a preacher who can look from different points of view or behave marginally in the context of religious life in Ottoman society. Given all of this, we can say that some Arabic scholarly circles, especially that of the Ḥaramayn hadith scholars, played a role through personalities such as Shaykh Sulaymān Efendi for Ibn Taymiyya's ideas being rooted in Saçaklızāde's thought in particular, as well as the tradition of Ottoman scholarship and thought in general.

As for analyzing the names Saçaklızāde mentioned in his *Risālat al-jawāb* as the scholars and works to whom 'Alamī referred, the *Sharḥ al-tahrīr*, the name given by Saçaklızāde in this context, must be the commentary *al-Taqrīr wa al-Taḥbīr*, written by the Ḥanafī jurist Ibn Amīr Hāc (d. 1474) on his teacher Ibn al-Humam's *al-Tahrīr*,

91 Şeyhî, *Vekâyi'ü'l-fudalâ*, II-III, 679. For Mehmed IV's military campaign against Lahistan, see İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi* (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1995), III/1, 426-27.

92 Shayhî writes that Maḥmūd al-Wānī was appointed to preach at the Valide-i Sultan Mehmed Han Mosque after his father in 1685. He began his education in 1688 and became the intern (*mulâzim*) of Shaykh al-Islām Dabbaghzāda. When this information is taken as the basis, it seems rather unreasonable that he studied sciences such as astronomy, geometry, arithmetic, and mathematics under Shaykh al-Sayyid Maḥmūd al-Wānī Efendi, for it is understood that Shaykh Sulaymān Efendi had not yet begun preaching or was working as a *mudarris* in 1685. For Maḥmūd al-Wānī's biography, see Şeyhî, *Vekâyi'ü'l-fudalâ*, II-III, 355.

93 For Wānī Mehmed Efendi's biography, see Şeyhî, *Vekâyi'ü'l-fudalâ*, I, 580-81. For the Qāḍizādali leadership, see Madeline C. Zilfi, "Kadıızâdeliler: Onyedinci Yüzyıl İstanbul'unda Dinde İhya Hareketleri," trans. M. Hulusi Lekesiz, *Türkiye Günlüğü* 58 (1999): 74-76; Marc David Baer, *IV Mehmed Döneminde Osmanlı Avrupası'nda İhtida ve Fetih*, trans. Ahmet Fethi (Istanbul: Hil Yayın, 2010), 174-91.

94 Baer, *IV Mehmed Döneminde*, 182.

95 Şeyhî, *Vekâyi'ü'l-fudalâ*, II-III, 679-80.

on jurisprudence.⁹⁶ Al-Subkî⁹⁷ and al-Bulqîni (Shaykh Sirāj al-Dīn al-Bulqîni d.1402) are Shafī'i scholars.⁹⁸ On the other hand, Ibn Taymiyya is a salafī scholar. Of all of 'Alamī's references, he is the most striking figure and, as far as we are concerned, some of his views were used without mentioning him explicitly within the Ottoman scholarly circles between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For example, Shaykh al-Islām Chiwizāda (d. 1547)⁹⁹ and probably a member of Qāḏizādali circle¹⁰⁰ Aḥmad al-Rūmī al-Aqḥiṣārī (d. 1631-32)¹⁰¹ are among this path's followers.¹⁰² Moreover, figures such as the leader of the Qāḏizādali Movement's second phase who appeal to Ibn Taymiyya's views by referring explicitly to Ustuwānī Mehmed Efendi (d. 1661),¹⁰³ Ṭariqatçı Amīr,¹⁰⁴ and Saçaklızāde are not among those who

96 Saffet Köse, "İbn Emīru Hâc," *DİA* 19 (1999): 476-77.

97 This scholar should either be Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 1355) or one of his sons: Tāj al-Dīn (d. 1370) and Bahā al-Dīn Subkī (d. 1372). For these scholars, see Bilal Aybakan, "Sübki, Takiyyüddin," *DİA* 38 (2000): 14-15; Bilal Aybakan-Çağfer Karadaş, "Sübki, Tâceddin," *DİA* 38 (2000): 11-14; Recep Cici, "Sübki, Bahâeddin," *DİA* 38 (2000): 11.

98 Saçaklızāde, *Risālat al-jawāb*, 35ab.

99 For the claim that some of Chiwizāda's views about Ibn al-'Arabī and the idea of Oneness of Being depend on those of Ibn Taymiyya, although not explicitly, see Mehmet Gel, "A XVIth Century Ottoman Scholar in the Footsteps of Ibn Taymiyya and and Opponent of Ibn Arabi: Civizade Muhyiddin Sheikh Mehmed Efendi," *İlahiyat Studies: A Journal on Islamic and Religious Studies*, IV/2 (2013), 183-208.

100 It is claimed that Aqḥiṣārī is a student of Qāḏizāda due to his statements in one of his treatises: "*Hādhihi risālatun li al-fāḏil al-Rūmī ṣāḥib al-majālis tilmidh al-Mawla Qāḏizāda raḥimahullāhu ta'ālā raḥmatan wa'si'atan*" Qāḏizāda, who is mentioned here, might be Qāḏizāda Mehmed Efendi (d. 1635). See the Sulaymāniye Library: Reşid Efendi, no. 985, 77b. For some remarks on the connection between al-Aqḥiṣārī and Qāḏizādelis, see Mustapha Sheikh, *Ottoman Puritanism and Its Discontents: Aḥmad al-Rūmī al-Aqḥiṣārī and Qāḏizādelis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

101 For the idea that Aqḥiṣārī narrated some passages from Ibn Taymiyya's *Iqtida' al-şirāt al-mustaqīm li-mukhālafati aşḥāb al-jaḥīm* without mentioning ibn Taymiyya's name in his *Majālis al-abrār*, see Mustapha Sheikh, "Taymiyyan Influences in an Ottoman-Ḥanafī Milieu: The Case of Aḥmad al-Rūmī al-Aqḥiṣārī," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* XXV/1 (2015), 1-20.

102 Her, we should state, in view of the references for Ibn Taymiyya, that Dede Cöngi (d. 1567) referred to him explicitly and 'Ashiq Chalabi translated his *Siyāsa al-shar'iyya* into Turkish. For further information about this and the Khalwati shaykh and preacher Qāḏizāda Mehmed 'İlmi Efendi's appropriation of 'Ashiq Chalabi's translation, see Derin Terzioğlu, "Bir Tercüme ve Bir İntihal Vakası: Ya da İbn Teymiyye'nin Siyasetü's-Şer'iyye'sini Osmanlıcaya Kim(ler), Nasıl Aktardı?" *Türklük Bilgisi Araştırmaları (TUBA)* 31/II (2007), 247-75. For another study on the last matter, see Ahmet Hamdi Furat, "Selefilğin Osmanlı'ya Etkisi Bağlamında Kullanılan Bir Argüman: İbn Teymiyye'nin es-Siyasetü's-Şer'iyye İsmi Eserinin Osmanlı Dünyasında XVI. ve XVII. Asırdaki Tercümelere," *Marife*, IX/3 (2009), 215-26.

103 For the Ustuwānī's appeal to an opinion of Ibn Taymiyya on *raqs*, see Hüseyin Yurdaydın, "Üstüvānī Risalesi," *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* X (1962), 75.

104 Ṭariqatçı Amīr, who introduces himself in one of his treatises as "*Ebu'l-Feth Sultan Mehmed Cāmii'nde Ders-i âm Tarikatçı Emir dimekle ma'rūf bu fakir Şeyh Mustafa*," refers to Ibn Taymiyya in the addendum of his translation of Birgivi Mehmed Efendi's *Tariqāt-i Muḥammadiyya*. For these matters, see Mustafa b. Abdullah el-Osmancıkı (Tarikatçı Emir), *Şerhu Tebyini'l-Meram* (Sulaymāniye Library, Hacı Maḥmūd Efendi, no. 954), 1b-2a; Vedadi (Mustafa b. Abdullah/Tarikatçı Emir), *Tekmile-i Terceme-i Tarikat-i Muhammediyye* (1308), 343.

served as *mudarris* or *qāḏī* within the central hierarchy of the Ottoman scholarship organization.

However, ‘Alamī was a central scholar in the Ottoman Empire in his capacity as a *mudarris* at Şahn-i Thamān. Bearing this in mind, his explicit reference to Ibn Taymiyya is of great importance in view of the necessity to accentuate the latter’s influence and place in the tradition Ottoman scholarship and thought during the eighteenth century. ‘Alamī’s references to al-Subkī and al-Bulqīnī are significant because they are Shafī’is. We think that he might have felt a need to refer to the because their view supports his thesis.

Finally, one must ask why ‘Alamī feels a need to write a refutation concerning Saçaklızāde’s opinions on divine inspiration, although he was the one who started the debate. Which factors led him to behave as such? Clearly, his views on divine inspiration and inspiration differed from those of Saçaklızāde and he was sensitive to its Sufism-related dimension. As far as we can inferred from his expressions in the *Risālat al-jawāb*’s introduction, as Saçaklızāde became famous for his *Tartīb al-ulūm* and influential at least over *madrasa* students, ‘Alamī should have decided to write his refusal to eliminate “the danger.” Of course, this is the personal reason of the debate on micro level.

However, there ought to be a reason or dynamic(s) that supports or prompts this reason on the macro level, one that should be searched for within the social, religious, and intellectual setting of both scholars’ time. Since no detailed or sufficient research has been undertaken on this setting,¹⁰⁵ it is difficult for us to make any concrete statement concerning these dynamics. Although several factors come to mind within this framework, such as the antagonism between the intellectual-ideological inclinations adopted by ‘Alamī and Saçaklızāde among the Ottoman scholarly circles of the time¹⁰⁶ or the reaction against the Naqshibandiyya

105 For some remarks on the Islamic world and the characteristics of Ottoman scholarly life, see el-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century*, 235-71; İhsan Fazlıoğlu, “Muhasebe Döneminde Nazarî İlimler,” *İslam Düşünce Atlası*, III/1043-58; İbrahim Halil Üçer, “İslam Düşünce Tarihi için Bir Dönemlendirme Önerisi,” *İslam Düşünce Atlası*, I/35-37. For another study published after this article, one that includes important remarks related to this period, see Aḥmad S. Dallal, *Islam Without Europe: Traditions of Reform in Eighteenth-Century Islamic Thought* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2018).

106 Given that ‘Alamī was among the central scholars and that Saçaklızāde was among the provincial scholars, the competition in question can be related to the influences of the intellectual-scholarly dynamism stated by İhsan Fazlıoğlu as “the transmission of the new developments by Ottoman scholars in the East and South-East those who had relations with the scholarly circles in Iran to the capital of Ottoman Empire through Iraq and Syria at the end of 17th century” and as the pilgrimage “continues to be the center in which different ideas are gathered and blended, and disseminated again thereof.” For further information, see İhsan Fazlıoğlu, “Muhasebe Dönemi,” *İslam Düşünce Atlası*, III/1022-43.

on the line of Aḥmad al-Sarhandī or the Khalwatiyya, and thus Sufi thought¹⁰⁷ as a possibility, to what extent these factors are eligible or if any other dynamics were influential during that period will have to be clarified by further studies.

Conclusion

According to *Risālat al-jawāb*, Saçaqlizāde and ‘Alamī’s dispute over divine inspiration and inspiration centered on whether the proof, which is firstly based on the Quran’s Khiḍr parable and expressed by the former as “the proof of the Khiḍr parable” and by the latter as “inspiration,” is valid according to Islamic law or to what extent it is valid. As we could not find ‘Alamī’s treatise, we can state that behind this dispute lie their differing views on inspiration’s validity. For example, Saçaqlizāde (although he describes it as the proof of the Khiḍr parable) thinks that the proof of inspiration deduced from this parable is also valid in the law of Prophet Muhammad without being unique to Khiḍr in the context of the universal precept “the necessity of being ascribed the lesser one at the confrontation of two harms.” On the other hand, ‘Alamī seems to think that acting in accord with the inspiration defined in the parable cannot be used to condition the *naṣṣ* or in similar situations to express a certain opinion. We must first find and study ‘Alamī’s treatise in order to make this clear.

These two scholars, who seem to agree on deducing inspiration from the Khiḍr parable as a proof, differ on which circumstances can one act in accord with this proof or what divine inspiration and inspiration mean in one respect. Saçaqlizāde argues that divine inspiration means to act in accord with an inspiration to which nothing from legal and intellectual proofs attest, and with the opening or contraction of the bosom (the *murāqaba* of the saints). In this context, the inspiration’s validity is something determined by the opening or contraction of the bosom only after the saints contemplate the information that comes to the heart or the mind, namely, ordinary proof. However, it seems that the inspiration’s validity can only be determined by intellectual or legal proof according to ‘Alamī, and the inspiration of the saints is not part of divine inspiration.

Based on these remarks, whose main differentiation point is how inspiration gained its quality as the source of knowledge peculiar to the saints, Saçaqlizāde

107 For further information, see el-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century*, 235-71.

seems to follow the approach of those scholars, like al-Ghazzālī, who adopt the theory of divine inspiration. ‘Alamī seems to follow the jurisprudential-theological approach, which conditions the theory of divine inspiration with the criteria of law and the intellect. Their approaches can be explained as the exteriorizations of two different approaches such as, for example, “the methodological integration pursuit” that is said to exist among the scholars at that period influenced by al-Ghazzālī or within some Sufi circles in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as well as “subjecting this pursuit to a critical analysis in relation to the ancient legacy.” This important fact needs to be studied separately based on comprehensive research data.

When presenting their different views, these two scholars also distinguished themselves from each other in view of the sources they used. As we have not seen ‘Alamī’s treatise, we have no idea if there is a meaningful situation within this differentiation. However, it is remarkable that these two scholars referred to the views of the famous salafī scholar Ibn Taymiyya – in favor of their own views, of course – within the scope of this particular debate. These references have the characteristics of data that need to be taken into consideration in view of their intellectual disposition and the problematic of “whether ibn Taymiyya (and the salafi thought in general) was influential on the tradition of Ottoman scholarship and thought or to what extent they were influential.”

Another important fact here is that Saçaklızâde referred to a view of Ibn Taymiyya not directly through the latter’s *al-Furqān bayna awliyā’ al-Rahmān wa awliyā’ al-Shayṭān*, but to a collection consisting of the writings belonging to Shaykh Sulaymān Efendi, the preacher at Istanbul’s Ayasofya-yi Kabir Mosque between 1708-18. This indicates that this figure is one of those who helped Ibn Taymiyya’s views become popular or influential in the Ottoman scholarship and the intellectual life of the eighteenth century. Shaykh Sulaymān Efendi’s relations with various Arabic scholars and with the Ḥaramayn hadith scholars in particular leads us to a series of important matters, among them the influence of Arabic intellectual circles over Ottoman scholarship and intellectual life during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the nature of this influence; and its relation and results concerning the ideas and movements of revivification, reform, and renewal that began crystallizing in the Islamic world especially during that period. Future studies and research on these matters would, of course, enable us to better understand Ottoman scholarship and thought.

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Appendix: The Critical Edition of Risālat al-jawāb by Saçaqlizāde

Orkhan Musakhanov*

A. Manuscripts of Saçaqlizāde's *Risālat al-jawāb*

1. Süleymaniye Library, MS Murad Molla 1835: 29b–38a.

This copy, which includes the glosses of the author, was reproduced by Yūsuf al-Mar'aşī in 1142 AH during the lifetime of Saçaqlizāde. While only one of the glosses is at a different hand, the notice of the authorship concludes with “idem” (*minhu*). There are two possibilities: first, Saçaqlizāde reviewed the text after penning the glosses and added a further gloss. Second, someone other than the copyist added the author's gloss from another manuscript for augmentation. I added a note for the difference at hand at the end of the aforementioned gloss.

This is an important copy for being reproduced during the author's lifetime, the inclusion of author's glosses, and the absence of correction and corruption.

2. Süleymaniye Library, MS Hasan Hüsnü Paşa 631: 50b–56b.

This text, which is missing the copy date and the identification of the copyist, does not include the author's glosses of the epistle. Compared to MS Murad Molla 1835, this copy is almost identical to it except for four minor deviations. This fact lends credence to the care taken by the copyists of the two manuscripts.

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B. The Method of Critical Edition

The critical edition of the epistle is based on the ISAM Handbook of Critical Editions. MS Murad Molla 1835 is taken as the primary copy, abbreviated as M. All the author's glosses on the epistle are included. The main text is compared to MS Hasan Hüsnu Paşa 631, abbreviated as H. The recto of the folio is indicated by the letter W (*wajh*) and verso by Z (*zahr*). Quranic verses are shown in square brackets. The sources of the main text and the glosses are identified. The quotations are shown in “ ”, and the quotes in quotations are put in « ».

رسالة الجواب

محمد بن أبي بكر المرعشي الشهير بساجقلي زاده (ت. ١١٤٥هـ/ ١٧٣٢م)

تحقيق: أورخان موسى خان أوو

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الحمد لله وسلام على عباده الذي اصطفى، وبعد؛ فيقول البائس الفقير محمد المرعشي الملقب بساجقلي زاده أكرم الله بالسعادة لَمَّا أنشأتُ رسالةً ترتيب العلوم واشتهرتُ بعضَ الاشتهار رأيتُ رسالةً للمولى الفاضل أحمد المعروف بين الأنام بالعلمي^١ أنشأها للرد على بعض مقالاتنا في بيان العلم اللدنيّ فيها،^٢ ذكر أنه أنشأها لثلاثين ضعفاً الطلبة بكلام الرجل المرعشي فيؤدّي بهم إلى الطغيان، وقال: «كتبتها عجالاً.»

أقول: فكأنه لم يتأمل في كلامنا حقّ التأمل وكتب اعتراضاته في أوائل النظر، لكنني تأملتُ في رسالته حقّ التأمل، وكتبْتُ أجوبةً اعتراضاته ليظهر الصوابُ لأولي الألباب، وسميتها رسالة الجواب، فإن كنتُ أنا^٣ المخطئُ فأنا حقيق بذلك وما أبرئ نفسي، وإن كان هو المخطئُ فلا يبعد ذلك؛ إذ الجوادُ قد يكبو.^٤ وجعلتُ رسالتي / [٣٠ و] فصلاً وكما ذكرتُ الميزانَ فالمراد الكتاب المؤلف في الأصول الحنفية المسمّى بالميزان لعلاء الدين محمد بن أحمد السمرقندي.

١ م: بالغلمي.

٢ في هامش م: أي في رسالة ترتيب العلوم. «منه.»

٣ م: هو. | ح: هو. ولكن ناسخ ح حذف «هو» وكتب فوقه «أنا». والصحيح ما أثبتته.

٤ كَبَا يَكْبُو كَبْوًا وَكَبُوًّا وَكَبُوَّةً. كَبَا الشَّخْصُ أَوْ الْحَيَوَانُ: سَقَطَ عَلَى وَجْهِهِ، عَثَرَ، فَقَدَ تَوَازُنَهُ فِي سِيرِهِ، زَلَّ.

الفصل الأول في بيان الإلهام

ويسمى بشهادة القلب هو «إلقاء معنى في القلب بطريق الفيض»،^٥ كذا في شرح العقائد،^٦ ومعنى إلقائه خلقه في القلب، والخالق هو الله تعالى^٧ إما بلا واسطة النفس والشيطان وهو الإلهام الحق، ولا يكون إلا صواباً وحقاً ويُسمى وحياً خفياً في حق الأنبياء، ويُسمى إرشاداً وهداية في حق غيرهم، أو بواسطة أحدهما، وهو لا يكون إلا باطلاً وضلالاً ويُسمى وسوسة وإغواءً وإضلالاً، والإلهام لغة يُعَمُّ هذين القسمين لقوله تعالى: ﴿فَاللَّهُمَّ فَجُورَهَا وَتَقْوَاهَا﴾ [الشمس، ٨/٩١]، وأما عرفاً فهو يخصّ بالأول كذا في الميزان.^٨

الفصل الثاني في إفادة الإلهام العلم بالشيء الذي أُلهم

أما إلهام الأنبياء فهو حق البتة، ويفيد لهم العلم بالملهم / [٣٠ظ] بدون نظرٍ واستدلالٍ ويسمى وحياً خفياً، وأما إلهام غيرهم من المسلمين فلا يفيد له العلم إلا بعد نظرٍ واستدلالٍ لما قال في الميزان: «إن شهادة القلب فلا يكون بالإلهام من الله تعالى وقد يكون من النفس وقد يكون من الشيطان، فإن كان من الله تعالى يكون حجّةً وإن كان من النفس أو الشيطان فهو ليس بحجة فلا يكون حجّةً مع الاحتمال، ولن يقع التمييزُ بين هذه الأنواع إلا بعد نظرٍ واستدلالٍ». انتهى.^٩ يعني فإن وافق الدليل فهو حقٌ وإلا فلا، فقول النسفي: «الإلهام ليس من أسباب المعرفة بصحة الشيء

- ٥ في هامش م: قوله: «بطريق الفيض» يعني لا بطريق الكسب، فالعلم بالنتيجة عقيب العلم بالدليل؛ ليس بالإلهام. «منه».
- ٦ شرح العقائد للسعد التفتزاني (مع حاشية زكريا الأنصاري)، ص ٢٤٨.
- ٧ في هامش م: قوله: «والخالق هو الله تعالى» لما قال في الميزان [ص ٦٧٨] بعد قوله: «والإلهام يتنوع، وخالق كل ذلك هو الله تعالى وإن كان شراً وفساداً، ووسوسة الشيطان وهو النفس سبب ذلك على جريان العادة». انتهى. أقول: هذا على رأي أهل السنة، وأما عند المعتزلة فخالق الإلهام الباطل هو النفس أو الشيطان. فقوله: «ووسوسة الشيطان» مبتدأ، خبره «سبب ذلك». (في هامش م: «بسبب ذلك» ولكن الصحيح ما أثبتناه) «منه».
- ٨ ميزان الأصول في نتائج العقول لعلاء الدين السمرقندي، ص ٢٧٨.
- ٩ في هامش م: قوله: «فلا يكون حجّة مع الاحتمال، ولن يقع التمييزُ إلى آخره» وبعد تميّز كونه حقاً من الله تعالى لمطابقته الدليل الدال على أن المُلهَم حقٌ فهو حجّةٌ لما سيحيى في الفصل الخامس نقلاً عن الميزان: «قال عامة العلماء: "الإلهام الحق يجب العملُ به في حق الملهم، وليس بحجة في حق الغير، ولا يجوز له أن يدعو غيره إليه." انتهى». [ميزان الأصول في نتائج العقول لعلاء الدين السمرقندي، ص ٦٧٩] «منه».
- ١٠ ميزان الأصول في نتائج العقول لعلاء الدين السمرقندي، ص ٢٧٩.

عند أهل الحق^{١١} «إمّا سلبٌ كلّيٌّ، فالمراد إلهامٌ غير الأنبياء قبل نظر واستدلالٍ، وهو ما قال في الميزان: «قال قوم من الصوفية: "الإلهام حجة في حقّ الأحكام بغير نظر واستدلالٍ"، وقال قوم من الروافض لُقّبوا بالجعفرية: "لا حجة سوى الإلهام"، وقال أهل الحقّ: "إنه ليس بحجة إلا بعد نظيرٍ واستدلالٍ». انتهى مختصراً^{١٢}. يعني إلا بعد مطابقتها الدليل الدالّ / [٣١ و] على أن ذلك الملهّم حقّ وصوابٌ، ومعنى النظر التفكّر. وإمّا رفعٌ للإيجاب الكلّي وهو الذي ذهب إليه شارحه^{١٣}.

الفصل الثالث في بيان الدليل على حقيقة^{١٤} الملهّم وبطلانه

وهو ثلاث؛ شرعيّ وعقليّ وعاديّ، والأولان معلومان، وأما الثالث فهو إنشراح الصدر للملهّم^{١٥} وزوال التردّد في حقيّته^{١٦} بعد التفكّر فيه عند كون الملهّم حقّاً وانقباضه عنه وتردّده في

١١ عقائد النسفي (مع شرح سعد الدين التفتزاني وحاشية زكريا الأنصاري)، ص ٢٤٩.

١٢ ميزان الأصول في نتائج العقول لعلاء الدين السمرقندي، ص ٢٨٢.

١٣ في هامش م: قوله: «وهو الذي ذهب إليه شارحه» وهو سعد الدين. قال: «الظاهر أنه -أي النسفي- أراد أن الإلهام ليس سبباً يحصل به العلمُ لعامة الخلق ويصلح للإلزام على الغير، وإلا فلا شك أنه قد يحصل به العلمُ، وقد ورد في الخبر نحو قوله عليه السلام: «ألهمني ربّي»، وحكي عن كثير من السلف. انتهى. [شرح العقائد للسعد التفتزاني (مع حاشية زكريا الأنصاري)، ص ٢٤٩-٢٥٠].

قوله: «قد يحصل به العلمُ» يعني يحصل به العلمُ بدون النظر والاستدلال للنبيّ ويحصل للإلزام على الغير؛ لأن إلهام النبيّ وحي حفيّ يجب العملُ به للنبيّ ولغيره، ويحصل أيضاً بالإلهام العلمُ للوليّ بالنظر والاستدلال كما سيأتي بيانه. فيجب العملُ به للوليّ في قول عامة العلماء، ولا يكون حجة على الغير بالاتفاق، فلا يجوز له أن يدعوا غيره ليعمل بإلهامه كما سيأتي بيانه. قوله: «لعامة الخلق»؛ أي لجميعهم فيكون رفعاً للإيجاب الكلّي، وأما إذا أريد بالعامة خلاف الخاصّة؛ أي خلاف النبيّ والوليّ فهو سلب كلّي. «منه». هذا الهامش فقط بخط آخر ويختلف من خطّ المتن والحواشي الباقية كلّها.

١٤ ح: حقيقة.

١٥ في هامش م: قوله: «فهو إنشراح الصدر للملهّم» قال السيد في شرح المواقف في مقصد وجوب النظر في معرفة الله تعالى جواباً عمّن منع توفّف معرفة الله تعالى على النظر مُستنبذاً بأنه قد تحصّل المعرفة بالإلهام: «الإلهام على تقدير ثبوته لا يأمن صاحبه أنه من الله تعالى فيكون حقّاً أو من غيره فيكون باطلاً إلا بعد النظر وإن لم يقدر على تقريره وتحريه». انتهى. [شرح المواقف للسيد الشريف الجرجاني (مع حاشية السيلالكوتي وحسن جلبي)، ١/ ٢٥٨]. أقول: قوله: «وإن لم يقدر على تقريره وتحريه» إشارة إلى إنشراح الصدر وزوال التردّد؛ لأن الدليل الشرعيّ والعقليّ لا معنى لعدم القدرة على تحريه وتقريره. «منه».

١٦ ح: في حقيقته.

حَقِيَّتِهِ^{١٧} بعد التَّفَكُّر فيه عند كون المَلَهَم باطلاً، وهو ما قال الله تعالى في الأنفال: ﴿إِنْ تَتَّقُوا اللَّهَ يَجْعَلْ لَكُمْ فُرْقَانًا﴾ [٢٩/٨]. قال البيضاوي: «هدايةً في قلوبكم تفرقون بها بين الحق والباطل». انتهى^{١٨}. يعني عند عدم دليل شرعي وعقلي على الحقبة والبطلان. وقال في المدارك: «مخرجاً من الشبهات وشرحاً للصدر». انتهى^{١٩}. يعني إخراجاً من الشبهة فيما ورد على خاطر واطمئنان النفس به وشرح الصدر له وعدم انقباضه عنه، فهو دليل على أن الوارد حق وضده دليل على أنه باطل. دلت الآية بمفهومها على أن من لم يتق الله لا يجعل له / [٣١ظ] فرقاناً، والمتقي هو الولي لقوله تعالى: ﴿أَلَا إِنَّ أَوْلِيَاءَ اللَّهِ لَا خَوْفَ عَلَيْهِمْ وَلَا هُمْ يَحْزَنُونَ﴾^{٢٠} الَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا وَكَانُوا يَتَّقُونَ﴾ [يونس، ١٠/٦٢-٦٣]، فلا يكون انشراح صدر غير الولي واطمئنان نفسه علامةً لحقبة ما أُلقي في قلبه ولا يكون ضده علامةً لبطلان ما أُلقي؛ فإن العاصي ينشرح صدره للمعصية ويطمئن بها نفسه وينقبض صدره عن الطاعة ولا يطمئن بها نفسه.

والوارد إما الحكم مثل الحِلِّ والحُرمة والوجوب والصحة والفساد، وإما سببه، وإما غيرهما كقدوم أحد وموته، ومعنى الآية جرت عادة الله تعالى بخلق العلامة في قلب الولي على صدق الوارد فيه بعد التأمل في الوارد وهي^{٢٠} طمأنينة النفس به وانشراح الصدر له، وذلك كتروية الخليل عليه السلام في رؤيا ذبح ولده^{٢١} إلى أن يطمئن به نفسه؛ فإن لم يطمئن النفس به^{٢٢} ولم ينشرح له الصدر فهو غير صادق. / [٣٢و].

الفصل الرابع في بيان العمل بالعلم اللدني وهو العمل بالإلهام

اعلم أن العمل بملهم دل عليه دليل شرعي أو عقلي فهو ليس بعمل بالعلم اللدني؛ لأن العمل حينئذ في الحقيقة عملٌ بدليل شرعي أو عقلي، والعمل بالعلم اللدني ليس إلا العمل

١٧ ح: في حقيقته.

١٨ تفسير البيضاوي، ١٧/٢.

١٩ مدارك التنزيل وحقائق التأويل لأبي البركات النسفي، ١/٦٤١.

٢٠ في هامش م: قوله: «وهي» أي العلامة. «منه».

٢١ في هامش م: قوله: «كتروية الخليل عليه السلام في رؤيا ذبح ولده» تنظير للنظر والتأمل في صدق الإلهام لا تمثيل له؛ لأن رؤيا الخليل ما كانت إلهاماً؛ إذ لو كانت إلهاماً لما احتاج إلى النظر؛ لأنه وحي خفي. «منه».

٢٢ في هامش م: قوله: «فإن لم يطمئن النفس به» مقابل لقوله السابق: «وهي طمأنينة النفس به وانشراح الصدر له». «منه».

بملهم لم يدل عليه شيء منهما، وإنما دل عليه الدليل العادي المذكور سابقاً، والعمل بالإلهام والعلم اللدني نوعان؛ أحدهما: أن يلهم إلى الولي حكم شيء اجتهادي^{٢٣} لم يسبق فيه اجتهاداً، وقد ذكر ذلك ابن نجيم في الأشباه وأفتا فيه برأيه، وهذا ما قال في الميزان: «الحلّ الثابت بدليله لا يجوز تحريمه بشهادة القلب والحُرمة الثابتة بدليلها لا تزول بشهادة القلب، وأما عند عدم الدلائل الأربعة فالإلهام يكون حجةً في حقّ الملهم إليه لا في حقّ غيره». انتهى^{٢٤}. يريد الإلهام الحقّ لغير الأنبياء^{٢٥} كما صرح به في أوائل كلامه، فالإلهام الحقّ الذي لم يدل على حقيقته دليل شرعيّ وعقليّ هو ما دلّ / [٣٢٢] على حقيقته الدليل العاديّ المذكور سابقاً، أفاد هذا المنقول أن الحكم الملهم ثابتٌ بدليله عند وجود دليله لا بالإلهام.

والنوع الآخر أن يلهم إلى الولي حدوث سبب شرعيّ لحكم نحو أن يلهم إليه حدوث الهلال ليلة الشكّ واطمئنّ به نفسه فيجب عليه الصوم لا على غيره وكما ألهم إلى الخضر عليه السلام^{٢٦} حدوث سبب حلّ الخرق والقتل ووجوبهما^{٢٧} كما ستعرفه في الفصل الآتي، وحدث هذه الأسباب لا يدلّ عليه دليل شرعيّ ولا عقليّ، وإنما يدلّ عليها الإلهام بعد اطمئنان النفس به وانسراح الصدر له.

ومن غفل عن أن بعض الملهم لا يدلّ عليه دليل شرعيّ ولا عقليّ فلا يعرف حقيقة إلهامه إلا بدليل عاديّ قال: «لا يُعتمد على الإلهام إلا بعد معرفة مطابقته بدليل عقليّ أو شرعيّ، فالعلم بحقيقة الملهم إنما هو بأحدهما، فلا يكون إلهام الأولياء من العلم اللدني». انتهى مختصراً.

٢٣ في هامش م: قوله: «اجتهادي» أي لم يكن ثابتاً بنصّ الكتاب والسنة. قوله: «لم يسبق فيه اجتهاد»، فلا يكون مُجمَعاً عليه بالطريق الأولى فيكون خالياً عن القياس فيكون خالياً عن الأدلة الأربعة. «منه».

٢٤ ميزان الأصول في نتائج العقول لعلاء الدين السمرقندي، ص ٢٨٤.

٢٥ في هامش م: قوله: «يريد الإلهام الحقّ لغير الأنبياء» إذ إلهام الأنبياء حجة لهم ولغيرهم. «منه».

٢٦ في هامش م: قوله: «وكما ألهم إلى الخضر» فإن كان وليّاً فهو حجة له لا لغيره وإن كان نبياً فهو حجة له ولغيره، والتمثيل مبنيّ على الاحتمال الأول. «منه».

٢٧ في هامش م: قوله: «حدوث سبب حلّ الخرق والقتل ووجوبهما» أي سبب وجوبهما، والجلّ أعمّ من الوجوب، وهذا تخصيص بعد تعميم، والمراد السبب الشرعي وهو تعارض الضررين لما أن الكلام فيه، فسببُهُ تعارض الضررين لِحُلِّهما ووجوبهما شرعيّ كما سيأتي في الفصل الآتي، وأما حدوث ذلك السبب فهو ليس بشرعي ولا عقلي، وإنما علم بالإلهام. «منه».

قوله: «ووجوبهما» بالجرّ عطفٌ على حلّ الخرق والقتل؛ أي وسبب وجوبهما. «منه».

والعجب / [٣٣] أنه نقل في رسالته عن شرح التحرير: «من علامته أن ينشرح له الصدر ولا يعارضه معارضٌ من خاطرٍ آخر». انتهى.^{٢٨} يعني من علامة الإلهام الحق. ولا شك أن هذه العلامة لا تُعتبر إلا عند فقد الدليل الشرعي والعقلي.

ثم اعلم أن كون الإلهام حجةً للولي عند فقد الدليل الشرعي والعقلي على الملهم إنما هو في الديانة لا في ظاهر الشرع، ولذا لم يكن حجةً على غيره^{٢٩} فلو خرق السفينة أو قتل الصبي لمعرفة سببهما المحلل كما عرفه الخضر عليه السلام يضمّنه ويُقتص منه ولا ينفعه ادعاؤه انكشاف سببه المحلل له؛ لكن لا يؤخذ به في الآخرة كما هو شأن الأحكام الثابتة ديانةً لا في ظاهر الشرع. منها: أن من تزى^{٣٠} بزى الكافر بدون اعتقاد الكفر يُكفر في الظاهر ويجري عليه أحكام المرتد، وليس بكافر ديانةً.

الفصل الخامس في شرح قصة الخضر

قال البيضاوي بعد تمامها: «ومبنى ذلك على أنه / [٣٣]ظ متى تعارض ضرران^{٣١} يجب تحمّل أھونھما لدفع أعظمھما، وهو أصل مُمھد^{٣٢} غير أن الشرائع في تفاصيله مختلفة». انتهى.^{٣٣} يعني بناءً أفاعيل الخضر على هذه الشرطية الكلية، قوله: "وهو أصل مُمھد"، معناه أن هذا الكلام قاعدة كلية مبسطة في الشرائع كلها معتبرة فيها، فهي معتبرة في شرعنا أيضًا مع قطع النظر عن قصة الخضر؛ لكن فيها^{٣٤} تفصيل وهو أن تعارض الضررين إذا عُلِمَ بالحس أو بدليل شرعي أو عقلي فلا اختلاف للشرائع في وجوب تحمّل أھونھما، وأما إذا عُلِمَ بالإلهام والكشف كما في

٢٨ شرح التحرير لابن أمير حاج، ٣/ ٢٩٦.

٢٩ في هامش م: قوله: «ولذا لم يكن حجةً على غيره» كما صرح به في الميزان. [ميزان الأصول في نتائج العقول لعلاء الدين السمرقندي، ص ٦٧٩]. وقد نقلناه عنه قُبيل هذا. «منه».

٣٠ في هامش م: قوله: «أن من تزى إلى آخره» فإن عدم كفره وبقائه على إيمانه ثابت ديانةً لا في ظاهر الشرع. «منه».

٣١ في هامش م: قوله: «متى تعارض ضرران» أي كلما تعارض ضرران، ومعنى تعارضهما أن لا يجتمعا ولا يرتفعا؛ بل لا بد من أحدهما وعدم الآخر في عادة الله تعالى؛ فإن الخرق والغضب لا يجتمعان، وكذا قتل الصبي وطغيانه، وذا ظاهر لا يرتفعان، وذا ظاهر أيضًا؛ بل لا بد من وجود أحدهما وعدم الآخر. «منه».

٣٢ في هامش م: قوله: «وهو أصل مُمھد» قال في التلويح: «الأصل في اللغة ما يُبتنى عليه شيء من حيث يُبتنى عليه، ثم يُقَل في العرف إلى معانٍ آخر مثل الراجح والقاعدة الكلية والدليل». انتهى. [التلويح على التوضيح للسعد التفتزاني، ١/ ١٣]. «منه».

٣٣ تفسير البيضاوي، ٢/ ٣٥٢.

٣٤ في هامش م: قوله: «لكن فيها» أي في هذه القاعدة الكلية. «منه».

قصة الخضر فوجوب تحمّل أھونھما معتبر في شريعة الخضر بدليل القصة، وأما في شریعتنا فمعتبر أيضاً لهما في الأصول أن شریعة من قبلنا إذا قصه الله تعالى أو رسوله علينا من غير إنكار فهو شریعة لنبينا عليه السلام عند الحنفية وأكثر الشافعية خلافاً لبعض منهم، فعند الجمهور حجة للملهم / [٣٤ و] إليه بدليل قصة الخضر وعند الأقلين لا يجوز العمل بتلك القصة، فلا يجوز العمل بالإلهام، فالمراد من عامة العلماء في قول الميزان: «قال عامة العلماء: "الإلهام الحق يجب العمل به في حق الملهم، وليس بحجة في حق الغير، ولا يجوز له أن يدعو غيره إليه."» انتهى. ٣٥ هو [رأى] الحنفية وأكثر الشافعية.

ورأيت في مجموعة انتسخ مما كتبه الفاضل نور زمانه الشيخ سليمان شيخ أياصوفية نقلاً عن ابن التيمية في كتابه المسمى بالفرقان بين أولياء الرحمن وأولياء الشيطان: «يجوز قتل الصائل وإن كان صبيّاً ومن لا يندفع تكفيره لأبويه إلا بقتله يجوز قتله، ٣٦ ولذا كتب ابن عباس جواباً عن نجدة: «إن علمت من حال الولدان ما علمه عالم موسى فلك أن تقتل، فليس في شيء مما فعله الخضر ما يخالف شرع الله. ٣٧»» انتهى مختصراً. ٣٨ فظهر أن مذهبه كون قصة الخضر شریعة لنبينا عليه السلام ووجوب العمل بالإلهام، وهذا مذهب ابن عباس رضي الله عنهما حيث كتب إليه نجدة: «كيف قتل الخضر الغلام؟ ٣٩ / [ظ ٣٤] وقد نهى النبي عليه السلام عن قتل الولدان.» فكتب إليه: «إن علمت من حال الولدان ما علمه عالم موسى فلك أن تقتل.» انتهى. ٤٠

٣٥ ميزان الأصول في نتائج العقول لعلاء الدين السمرقندي، ص ٦٧٩.

٣٦ في هامش م: قوله: «يجوز قتله»؛ يعني وإن كان صبيّاً كما في قصة الخضر، ويدل عليه قوله: «ولذا كتب ابن عباس.» «منه.»

٣٧ في هامش م: قوله: «شرع الله» الظاهر المتبادر من شرع الله هنا شرع نبينا صلى الله عليه وسلم، إنما حكم بذلك لأن مذهبه أن شرع من قبلنا شرع لنبينا صلى الله عليه وسلم إذا قصه الله تعالى علينا من غير إنكار، وإنما أنكره السبكي الشافعي؛ لأن مذهبه أن شرع من قبلنا ليس شرعاً لنا. «منه.»

٣٨ الفرقان بين أولياء الرحمن وأولياء الشيطان لابن تيمية، ص ١٤٢.

٣٩ في هامش م: قوله: «كيف قتل الخضر الغلام» كذا نقله البيضاوي. [تفسير البيضاوي، ٢ / ٣٥١] ولفظ «قتل» يحتمل أن يكون بسكون التاء على أنه مصدر [يعني: «كيف قتل الخضر الغلام؟»]، وأن يكون بفتحها على أنه فعل ماضٍ، [يعني: «كيف قتل الخضر الغلام؟!»، وعلى الأول فالمعنى كيف شأن قتله؟! لأنه معارض لإطلاق نهييه عليه السلام عنه، وقتله شرع لنبينا عليه السلام؛ لأنه تعالى قصه عليه. فأجاب عنه ابن عباس رضي الله عنهما بدفع المعارضة بتقييد عموم نهييه عليه السلام، وعلى الثاني فالمعنى كيف اجترأ الخضر عليه السلام على قتل الغلام، وقد نهى النبي عليه السلام عنه، وهذا السؤال لا يرد؛ لأن الخضر عليه السلام لا يلزمه شرعاً؛ لأنه مقدّم، وذلك ظاهر. «منه.»

٤٠ صحيح مسلم، الجهاد والسير ٤٨؛ تفسير البيضاوي، ٢ / ٣٥١.

فحاصل سؤال نجدة تعارض الدليلين^{٤١} بناء على أن شريعة الخضر شريعة لنبينا عليه السلام، وحاصل جواب ابن عباس تقييد العام وهو نهى النبي عليه السلام عن قتل الغلام بمن لم يعلم أنه سيصير طاعياً كافراً. قال في الميزان في فصل معارضة الأدلة: «إن كان أحدهما عاماً والآخر خاصاً يُبنى العام^{٤٢} على الخاص، وهذا بلا خلاف؛ لأنه لا يندفع التعارض إلا بهذا الطريق.» انتهى.^{٤٣}

وقد اقتصر نجدة السؤال على القتل وهو وارد على خرق السفينة أيضاً؛ فإنه معارض لعموم قوله عليه السلام: «لا ضرر...»^{٤٤} فقولنا في بيان العلم اللدني: «وحلّهما له مخالف لإطلاق نهى النبي عليه السلام أمته عن الضرر وعن قتل الصبي»^{٤٥} تقرير سؤال نجدة. وقولنا: «لكنهما مقيدان عند الشارع / [٣٥] إلى آخره»^{٤٦} تقرير جواب ابن عباس. وقد كتبنا في حاشية الرسالة [المسمى بترتيب العلوم]^{٤٧} هناك سؤال نجدة وجواب ابن عباس نقلاً عن البيضاوي إثباتاً للسؤال والجواب اللذين كتبناهما في الرسالة [المسمى بترتيب العلوم].

فمن قال اعتراضاً على قولنا: «لكنهما مقيدان إلى آخره...» وتقييد ذلك النص المطلق بالإلهام كما اجترأ على تقوله ذلك الرجل المرعشي مما لم يقل به أحد من أهل الحق فيما عرفناه. انتهى. فقد أتى بأعجب العجب؛ لأن كلامي أظهر في أن تقييده بقصة الخضر، فهذا افتراء على الرجل المرعشي والله مولاه.

واعلم أن العمل بالإلهام بناء على كون قصة الخضر شريعة لنبينا عليه السلام إنما هو قول عامة العلماء خلافاً للأقلين من الشافعية كما عرفت. ولم ندع في رسالة ترتيب العلوم أنه بالإجماع، فمن

- ٤١ في هامش م: قوله: «تعارض الدليلين» أحدهما نهى عليه السلام عن قتل الولدان مطلقاً، والآخر قتل الخضر الولد؛ وهو شريعة لنا؛ لأن الله تعالى قصه علينا. «منه»
- ٤٢ في هامش م: قوله: «يبنى العام» - على صيغة المجهول - أي يختص العام بما سوى الخاص المعارض له. «منه»
- ٤٣ ميزان الأصول في نتائج العقول لعلاء الدين السمرقندي، ص ٦٨٩.
- ٤٤ سنن ابن ماجه، الأحكام ١٧. الحديث كاملاً: «لا ضرر ولا ضرار.»
- ٤٥ ترتيب العلوم لساجقلي زاده، ص ١٧٤.
- ٤٦ ترتيب العلوم لساجقلي زاده، ص ١٧٤-١٧٥.
- ٤٧ متن حاشية ترتيب العلوم الذي أشار إليه ساجقلي زاده: «قوله: «مخصوص بمن لم يعرف» قال البيضاوي [٣٥١/٢]: «وعن ابن عباس رضي الله عنهما أن نجدة الحروي كتب إليه: كيف قتل الغلام وقد نهى النبي عليه السلام عن قتل الولدان؟ فكتب إليه: إن علمت من حال الولدان ما علمه عالم موسى فلك أن تقتل. منه» هامس ترتيب العلوم لساجقلي زاده، ص ١٧٥.

نقل كلام بعض المخالفين معارضة لنا كالسبكي الشافعي حيث قال: «قصة الخضر مخصوصة به، فلا يجوز قتل الغلام وإن عُلِمَ / [٣٥ ظ] بالكشف^{٤٨}، أنه سيصير طاعياً كافراً»^{٤٩}، وكالبليغيني وأظنه شافعيّاً أيضاً حيث قال: «لا يجوز العمل بالإلهام»^{٥٠}، فكأنه^{٥١} ظنّ أنّا ندعي الإجماعَ على العمل بالإلهام وعلى كون شريعة من قبلنا شريعة لنبينا عليه السلام، فلو ادعينا الإجماعَ تصحّ معارضته بذكر خلاف البعض ولم ندع ذلك، غاية الأمر أننا سكتنا عن أنه مبنيّ على قول عامة العلماء، ويجب حمل الكلام على المحمل الصحيح مهما أمكن.

وملخص جوابي هنا أن السالبة الجزئية لا تعارض الموجبة الجزئية؛ بل تعارض الموجبة الكلية، وليس في كلامي تلك الكلية فاعرف ذلك.

الفصل السادس [في بيان أسباب الأحكام]

قال في المنار: «للاحكام أسباب» وقال شارحه: «المراد بالأسباب العلل الشرعية مجازاً إلى آخر ما قال»^{٥٢}، والمراد بالأحكام مثل الحلّ والحرمة والوجوب وبأسبابها ما جعله الشارع سبباً

٤٨ في هامش م: قوله: «فلا يجوز قتل الغلام وإن عُلِمَ بالكشف إلى آخره» وأجاب عما كتبه ابن عباس بأنه دفعٌ لحاجة نجدة، وإحاطته على شيء لم يُمكن. أقول: وفيه نظر؛ لأنه إن أراد الإمكان العقلي فلا يصحّ وقد وقع للخضر عليه السلام، وإن أراد العادي فأَيّ دليل دلّ عليه؟ والظاهر في الجواب عنه ما ذهب إليه الشافعيّ: «قولُ الصحابي ليس بحجة إلا إذا شاع مذهبه وسكت عنه الصحابةُ مسلمين إياه». وشيوع قول ابن عباس وسكوت الصحابة عنه لم يثبت، والسبكي شافعيّ. «منه».

٤٩ أسند الألويسي وجمال الدين القاسمي هذا الرأي إلى السبكي في تفسيريهما؛ ولكن لم يذكر اسم كتاب السبكي. انظر روح المعاني للألويسي ٨/ ٣٣٩-٣٤٠؛ محاسن التأويل لجمال الدين القاسمي، ٧/ ٥٦-٥٧.

٥٠ ولم أجد قول البليغيني الشافعي بهذا اللفظ ولكن أبو زرعة ولي الدين أحمد بن عبد الرحيم بن الحسين العراقي -تلميذ البليغيني- نقل عن تقويم الأدلة (ص ٣٩٢) لأبي زيد الدبوسي في كتابه المسمى الغيث الهامع شرح جمع الجوامع (ص ٦٥٦): «والذي عليه جمهور العلماء أنه [يعني الإلهام] خيال لا يجوز العمل به إلا عند فقد الحجج كلها...» وبعد ذلك قال: «وكان شيخنا الإمام البليغيني يقول: «إن الفتوحات التي يُفتح بها على العلماء في الاهتداء إلى استنباط المسائل المشكّلة من الأدلة أعم نفعاً وأكثر فائدة مما يُفتح به على الأولياء من الاطلاع على بعض الغيوب؛ فإن ذلك لا يحصل به من النفع مثل ما يحصل بهذا وأيضاً هذا موثوق به لرجوعه إلى أصل شرعي، وذلك قد يضطرب.»

٥١ في هامش م: قوله: «فكأنه» أي فكأن ناقل كلام بعض المخالفين معارضة لنا. «منه».

٥٢ شرح المنار لابن ملك (مع حاشية الرهاوي وعزمي زاده وأنوار الحلك)، ٣/ ١٥٧٢-١٥٨٦. اقتبس ساجقلي زاده من منار الأنوار وشرحه معني لا لفظاً.

لها مؤثراً فيها كالوقت لوجوب الصلاة والشهر لوجوب الصوم / [٣٦و] والزنا لوجوب الحدّ والملك لحلّ التصرف والنكاح لحلّ الوطئ إلى غير ذلك. والمؤثر في الحقيقة هو حكمه تعالى، فالأسباب المذكورة علل ومؤثرة مجازاً، فمتى ذكر السبب في كتب الأصول يراد به العلة الشرعية؛ لكن سبب الحكم قد يكون محسوساً وذا كثير، وقد يكون غائباً دلّ عليه دليل؛ فإن ولادة غير المنكوحه دليل على زناها، وقد يكون غائباً لم يدلّ عليه دليل، وإنما يُعلم بإعلامه تعالى بالوحي أو الإلهام كوجود الهلال ليلة الشكّ وكسبب وجود الحرق والقتل في قصة الخضر عليه السلام وهو تعارض الضررين. قال البيضاوي في أوائل البقرة: «الغيب الخفي الذي لا يدركه الحس ولا يقتضيه بدهة العقل وهو قسمان؛ قسم لا دليل عليه، وقسم نُصب عليه دليل.» انتهى.^{٥٣} وقال الزمخشري: «هناك المراد بالغيب الخفي الذي لا ينفذ فيه ابتداء إلا علم اللطيف الخبير، وإنما نعلم منه ما أعلمناه، أو نصّب لنا دليلاً عليه.» انتهى.^{٥٤} / [٣٦ط]

فالمراد من السبب الخفي في قولنا في بيان العلم اللدني: «إنما انكشف حلّه لهم لما انكشف لهم من سبب خفي يُحلّله لهم»^{٥٥} هو السبب الشرعيّ الغائب الذي لم يدلّ عليه دليل، وإنما يُعلم بالكشف كدخول الشهر ليلة الشكّ وتعارض الضررين في قصة الخضر عليه السلام؛ فإنه سبب شرعيّ غائب لم يدلّ عليه دليل، وإنما علمه الخضر عليه السلام بالكشف، إنما قلنا: «فإنه سبب شرعيّ؛ لأن الخضر إن كان نبياً وهو الراجح فهو شارع فما ذكره سبباً للحرق والقتل سبب شرعيّ البتة، وإن كان ولياً فيبعد كلّ البعد أن يذكر لفعله سبباً غير معتبر في شرع نبيّه، فتمثيلنا بقصة الخضر أقوى دليل^{٥٦} على أن مرادنا من السبب الشرعيّ.

اعلم أنه قد يجعل الشارع شيئاً سبباً لحكم كالسفر لحلّ الإفطار، وتجدد ملك الأمة لوجوب الاستبراء، والبلوغ لتوجه الخطاب مع أن العقل يحكم بأن المناسبات للسببية هنا شيء / [٣٧و] يغلب وجوده عند وجود ما جعله الشارع سبباً، وهو المشقة عند السفر، واختلاط الماء عند تجدد ملك الأمة، وكمال العقل عند البلوغ؛ لكن الشارع لم يجعل هذه الأمور أسباباً للأحكام لخفائها

٥٣ تفسير البيضاوي، ١/ ٣٤.

٥٤ الكشف للزمخشري، ١/ ٣٩.

٥٥ ترتيب العلوم للساجقالي زاده، ص ١٧٤.

٥٦ في هامش م: قوله: «أقوى دليل» يعني أن عليه دليلاً آخر وهو كون المراد من السبب في كتب الأصول العلة الشرعية؛ لكن ليس في قوة هذا التمثيل. «منه.»

وعدم انضباطها؛ بل جعل أسباب الأحكام أمورًا ظاهرةً مضبوطةً يغلب عندها وجودٌ ما يناسب أن يكون علّةً للأحكام كما عُرف في الأصول.

فمن فهم من السبب الخفيّ المحلّل في قولنا في بيان العلم اللدنيّ: «إنما انكشف^{٥٧} حلّه لهم لما انكشف لهم من سبب خفيّ يحلّله لهم»^{٥٨} ما يناسب أن يكون سببًا؛ ولكن الشارع لم يجعله سببًا لخفائه كالمشقة واختلاط الماء وكمال العقل وغفل عن أن بعض السبب الشرعيّ غائب لم يدلّ عليه دليلٌ، وكلُّ غائبٍ يسمّى خفيًّا كما نقلناه عن البيضاوي والزمخشري، وتمثيلنا بقصّة الخضر أقوى قرينة على أن المراد من السبب الخفيّ السبب الشرعيّ الغائب؛ / [٣٧ظ] لأن ما ذكره الخضر سبب شرعيّ كما عرفت. ثم ذكر مفاصد لما فهمه، ثم قال: «هذا سفسطة في قرمطة وفتح لباب الإلحاد؛ بل هو مروقٌ من الدين مروق السهم من رمي الصياد إلى آخر ما قال»، فقد زلّق وافترى علينا افتراء عظيمًا، فلا أرافعه إلا في محكمة القيامة يوم لا تنفعه الرياسة، وأفوض أمري إلى الله، عليه توكلتُ وهو حسبي ونعم الوكيل.

الفصل السابع [في بيان رأي الإمام اليافعي عما ورد من الصوفية]

إن قلت: كيف قال اليافعي كما قلناه عنه:^{٥٩} «إن ما جاء من الصوفية مما يخالف العلم الظاهر؛ إما أنهم فعلوه في حال السكر والغيبية عن إحساسهم فهم غير مكلفين في ذلك الحال، أو له تأويل في الباطن يعرفه علماء الباطن كما في قصّة موسى والخضر عليهما السلام.» انتهى.^{٦٠} مع أن هذا التريد غير حاصر؛ إذ يحتمل أن يعتمدوا الذنب لما قال القشيري في رسالته المشهورة: «لا تجب العصمة في الولي فيحتمل أن يصدر منه / [٣٨و] الذنب بلا إصرار عليه، وقد قيل للجنيدي: "الولي هل يزني"، فقال: ﴿وَكَانَ أَمْرُ اللَّهِ قَدَرًا مَّقْدُورًا﴾ [الأحزاب، ٣٣ / ٣٨].» انتهى.^{٦١} ويحتمل أن يشبهه عليه بعضُ أمور الدين فيحسب الحرام حلالًا فيفعله.

٥٧ ح: ينكشف.

٥٨ ترتيب العلوم للساجقالي زاده، ص ١٧٤.

٥٩ ترتيب العلوم للساجقالي زاده، ص ١٧٥-١٧٦.

٦٠ روض الرياحين في حكايا الصالحين للإمام اليافعي ص. ٤٥٢.

٦١ رسالة القشيري، ص ٧٠٤-٧٠٥.

قلت: ترديده ذلك مبني على حسن الظن بهم، وحسن الظن لا يمنع احتمال صدور الذنب منهم، وحسن الظن بالولي واجب كما قال في المدارك في قوله تعالى: ﴿أَجْتَنِبُوا كَثِيرًا مِّنَ الظَّنِّ إِنَّ بَعْضَ الظَّنِّ إِثْمٌ﴾ [الحجرات، ١٢/٤٩]، قال الزجاج: "هو ظنك بأهل الخير سوءاً، وأما أهل الفسق قلنا: أن نظن فيهم مثل الذي ظهر منهم." انتهى ما في المدارك.^{٦٢}

فنقول: مراد اليافعي من الصوفية هم الذين اشتهروا بين الأمة بالولاية كأبي يزيد وجنيد والشبلي وابن أدهم وغيرهم المذكورين في رسالة القشيري، وقد أثنى القشيري عليهم في أول رسالته بما يوجب حسن الظن بهم،^{٦٣} فمن نقل عن ابن تيمية: «ليس من شرط الولي أن يكون معصوماً لا يغلط ولا يخطئ؛ بل يجوز أن [٣٨ظ] يخفى عليه بعض علوم الشريعة إلى آخر ما قال.»^{٦٤} فكانه يريد الاعتراض على حصر ترديد اليافعي وقد عرفت جوابه.

وليكن آخر الرسالة: الحمد لله الذي بعزته وجلاله تتم الصالحات، وسبحان ربنا رب العزة عما يصفون، وسلام على المرسلين، والحمد لله رب العالمين.^{٦٥}

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٦٢ مدارك التنزيل وحقائق التأويل لأبي البركات النسفي، ٣/٣٣٥.

٦٣ رسالة القشيري، ص ٨٢.

٦٤ الفرقان بين أولياء الرحمن وأولياء الشيطان لابن تيمية، ص ١٤٢.

٦٥ م + تمّ التبييض في شوال سنة حادية وأربعين بعد مائة وألف. الفقير الداعي يوسف سنة ١١٤٢ في أوائل ذي الحجة.

تقويم الأدلة في أصول الفقه؛

أبو زيد عبد الله (عبيد الله) بن محمد بن عمر بن عيسى (ت. ١٠٣٩هـ / ١٤٣٠م).
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