The Question of Disposition and Virtue in ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī

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Abstract: The primary objective of this article is to investigate the reception of Avicennan psychology by ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī via a focus on his works like *al-Akhlāq al-ʿaḍudiyyah*, *al-Mawāqif*, and *Taḥqīq al-tafsīr;* his approach to the concept of disposition following the philosophical tradition; and especially his view of the lack of virtue (i.e., moral maladies). Following a detailed comparative approach on this issue, we will refer to the works of his predecessors, peers, and successors, and most certainly his commentators. By providing an appendix at the end, we seek to introduce the literature based on his *al-Akhlāq al-ʿaḍudiyyah* and the studies that have been conducted upon this literature.

Keywords: ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī, *al-Akhlāq al-ʿaḍudiyyah*, practical philosophy, commentary, soul, disposition, virtue.

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Introduction

Before 'Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756 / 1355), one of the pre-eminent figures of the later period of Islamic theology, scholars like Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. first quarter of the 5th / 11th century) and al-Ghazālī (d. 505 / 1111) attempted to interpret practical philosophy within the framework of religious texts (*naṣṣ*) and pioneered the reception of the theories and problematics of ethics for specific reasons. Al-Ījī, who followed this tradition, turned Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's (d. 672 / 1274) Persian *Akhlāq-i nāṣirī*, a most distinguished example of practical philosophy before him, into a comprehensive Arabic epistle based on his own style and with partial elaborations and deductions. The quintessential feature of his work was its succinct language so that a reader who was not very informed about the issues of ethics could hardly understand many sentences solely by referring to the epistle itself. Bearing in mind that Kınālīzāda treaded the same ground extensively in a more voluminous work like *Akhlāk-ı 'alā'ī*, it becomes clearer how concise *al-Akhlāq al-'aḍudiyyah*[1] was. In this respect, a considerable number of commentaries remained in Arabic and Turkish after this brief epistle.

It is noteworthy that, with respect to the author's conception of ethics, *al-Akhlāq al-'aḍudiyyah* comprised all of the sub-branches of practical philosophy and that he called ethics "the entirety of practical philosophy," just like Ṭūsī did. Practical philosophy studies the voluntary and intentional acts committed by a human being within the limits of his or her power, both as an individual and as a member of society. But this does not mean that these acts exhausted the concerns of practical philosophy solely by its nature and being a basis for application, for practical philosophy was also divided into "theoretical" and "applied." The first part of al-Ījī's four-part epistle on ethics, "Theoretical Ethics," analyzed the human faculties, their virtues and vices, and the nature of human disposition and whether it would change. On the other hand, although it was contested what practical philosophy corresponded to in al-Ījī's text and its commentaries, it can be supposed that the acquisition and keeping of the virtues, familial morality, and politics made up the practical side of ethics.[2]

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1   The name of the epistle was recorded as *al-Akhlāq al-shāhiyyah* or *al-Risālat al-shāhiyyah* in some manuscripts. For detailed information on the discussion of the epistle's title, cf. Mustakim Arıcı, "Adududdîn el-Îcî'nin Ahlâk Risalesi: Arapça Metni ve Tercümesi," *Kutadgubilig: Felsefe-Bilim Araştırmaları*, no. 15 (2009): 138-9, nn. 12-7. Another source for the same discussion, cf. Joep Lameer, *The Arabic Version of Ṭūsī's Nasirean Ethics: With an Introduction and Explanatory Notes* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2015), 3, n. 2.

2   Mustakim Arıcı, "Ahlâk Neyi Bilmektir? Bir İlim Olarak Ahlâk," in *İslâm Ahlâk Literatürünün Temel Sorunları*, eds. Ömer Türker and Kübra Bilgin (Ankara: Nobel Yayınları, 2015), 53-4.

The first part of the four-part epistle focused on issues of theoretical ethics. It opened by defining ethics and then dwelt on the mutability of dispositions, the virtues and vices of three human faculties, three basic virtues, and the sub-virtues of justice, which was taken to be the entirety of the three basic virtues. The second part, the acquisition and keeping of the virtues, explained how a person could keep a virtue that he or she possessed and what one afflicted by moral maladies should do in order to get rid of them. After going over the maladies afflicting each of the human faculties one by one, the mutual maladies of the faculty for thought, rage, and desire were defined, and how they should be treated was tackled. The third part, household government, was analyzed in four articles. The last part, which discussed the issues of political philosophy, government administration, and political ethics, bore the title "Tadbīr al-mudun."

This study analyzes one of the fundamental issues of al-Ījī's ethics: his view on the question of disposition and virtue. In this framework, we will refer principally to his *al-Akhlāq al-ʿaḍudiyyah* and several of his other works, among them *al-Mawāqif fī ʿilm al-kalām* and *Tahqīq al-tafsīr*, as well as the commentaries of *al-Akhlāq*. Given that understanding the issues of disposition and virtue also requires a familiarity with the psychologies of the philosophers, we will look at how their conception of the soul was adapted by al-Ījī and the theologians before him.

A. The Soul and Its Powers as the Source of Ethical Acts

In his *Tahdhīb al-akhlāq*, Ibn Miskawayh wrote that the knowledge of the issues concerning the soul preceded the knowledge of the acts that would spring from it.[3] It follows that the knowledge of virtue and vice depended upon the knowledge of the disposition, for knowledge of what the latter is requires that one have knowledge of the soul and the psychic powers. In a similar vein, in the first section of *Akhlāq-i nāṣirī*'s first chapter, Ṭūsī noted that there were the subject matter and the principles of ethics, just as there were the subject matter and the principles of theoretical sciences. According to him, the subject matter of ethics was "the human soul as a source of the voluntary acts that were good and praised or bad and despised." Like Ibn Miskawayh, Ṭūsī opined that the knowledge of the nature of the human soul, its objectives, powers, and distinction, established a basis for ethics.[4] Others partially deviated from his approach to the subject matter of ethics in this respect. For some

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3   Ibn Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb al-akhlāq wa taṭhīr al-aʿrāq*, ed. Ibn al-Khatīb (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿat al-miṣriyyah, 1977), 9-10.

4   Nasîrüddîn Tûsî, *Ahlâk-ı Nâsirî*, trans. Anar Gafarov and Zaur Şükürov (İstanbul: Litera Yayıncılık, 2007), 25-6.

scholars, among them Qāḍī al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685 / 1286) and Mollā Lutfī (d. 900 / 1495), the subject matter of ethics was the psychic capacities (*al-malakat al-nafsāniyyah*) or traits (*akhlāq*) springing from the human soul, rather than the soul itself.[5]

In spite of the relatively diverse approaches to the subject matter of ethics, the parties agreed on the precedence of the knowledge of the matters of the human soul over the basic issues of ethics. In this respect psychology, as discussed by philosophers like al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and Ibn Miskawayh in multifarious aspects of the various disciplines of the metaphysical and natural sciences, was also a firm ground for the justification of ethics. Just as it was consistent to establish the Aristotelian-Avicennan psychology, which had cosmological implications – after all, it was in the theory of issuance, epistemological implications as in the problematics like the nature of knowledge and the link to the active intellect, and eschatological ones as in the nature of afterlife and the attainment of happiness, as the threshold of ethics for Ibn Misakawayh and al-Ṭūsī from their own standpoints – it also permitted a transitivity between the different constituents of the philosophical systems to which they adhered. Moreover, it enabled Islamic philosophers to systematically explain the formative mechanism of behaviors and to consider the question of virtue from an Aristotelian perspective in the framework of the theory of moderation. But it was an interesting example with respect to the nature of post-Ghazālī-Rāzī speculative theology that, especially after al-Ghazālī, theologians like Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606 / 1210), al-Ījī, and Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816 / 1413) set psychology as the centerpiece of the ethical debates by partially refining it from its constituents, which were mentioned above.[6]

According to some theologians who accepted the approach of such philosophers as al-Ghazālī, Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī and al-Jurjānī, the human soul consisted of an incorporeal substance that emanated from the Active Intellect after the body had achieved a certain degree of maturity.[7] The first reflections of this state of affairs can be found in the works of Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī and al-Ghazālī. For example, the latter approached the debate of virtues based on the philosophers' psychology in his *Mīzān al-ʿamal*, the line of argument that al-Rāzī continued.[8] In *Mawāqif*, al-Ījī

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5   Arıcı, "Bir İlim Olarak Ahlâk," 58-60.

6   This approach was reflected in the exegetical works of the speculative theologians following the same line of thought. For instance, Qāḍī Bayḍāwī's Quranic exegesis mirrored the Avicennan psychology in many places. For example, the sixth and seventh verses of the opening chapter (*al-Fātiḥah*) of Quran can be consulted. The soul was considered in its both cognitive and moral functional aspects in the exegesis of these verses. Cf. Ḳonevī İsmāʿīl Efendi, *Hāshiyat al-Qūnawī ʿalā tafsīr al-Bayḍāwī* (İstanbul: Dersaadet Kitabevi, n.d.), I, 108-9, 132.

7   Ömer Türker, "Nefis," *DİA*, XXXII, 530.

8   Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, *al-Dharīah ilā makārim al-sharīʿah*, ed. Abū al-Yazīd Abū Zayd ʿAjamī (Cairo: Dār al-ṣaḥwah, 1985), 142-3, 288-373; Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *Mīzān al-ʿamal*, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo: Dār

also assented to the philosophers' approach with respect to the definition, sorts, and powers of the soul, particularly Avicenna's approach. Having defined the soul as the primary perfection of the organic body, al-Ījī analyzed it in three sorts, namely, vegetative, animal and intellectual, along with their respective powers.[9] Whereas the vegetative soul had the features of feeding, growth, and procreation, the animal soul exhibited an additional two features: sensation and intentional movement. The intellectual soul, on top of that, had the faculty of thought / reasoning / knowing. In all of its numerous definitions, the soul was registered as "ālī" (possessor of instrument / organ). Here, "register" meant that the soul undertook its acts via instruments, unlike elements and minerals. Again, this was one of distinctions among vegetative, animal, intellectual, and celestial souls.[10]

Unlike the other types of souls, human souls contained theoretical and practical faculties in addition to those found in the vegetative and animal souls. The unique powers of the human soul were called "rational capacity." It was also called "theoretical faculty" or "theoretical reason" with regard to its perception of universals and affirmative or negative judgment between them. With regard to its inference of the ideational arts and occupation with opinion and consultation on particular things that it should and should not do, it was termed "practical faculty" or "practical reason." The practical faculty or reason, which judges particular acts as good and bad or pleasant and unpleasant, was aided by the theoretical faculty, for the inference of particular judgments could only be made through a kind of cogitation and syllogism. Therefore, the practical faculty required a universal premise to indicate an act. For example, "This act is such and such, all such things are pleasant, and should be done, or unpleasant, and should not be done." Therefore, while the syllogism's minor premise was singular, the major premise was universal, and a conclusion among the contingents for a prospective particular condition was derived. Once the practical faculty judges with this particular conclusion, the movement of the social force to move the body followed in line with the judgment reached.[11] On the other hand, states of passion do occur in the human soul due to the practical-impulsive faculty, and the corporeal phases follow en suite. Such states were laughter, shame, fear, sorrow, spite, and other generic human passions.[12]

al-maʿārif, 1964), 264-87; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Nafs wa-al-rūḥ wa sharḥ quwāhumā'*, ed. Muḥammad Ṣaghīr Ḥasan Maʿṣūmī (Tehran: Maṭbūʿāt maʿhad al-abḥāth al-Islāmiyyah, 1985), 79ff.

9   ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī, *Kitāb al-Mawāqif*, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿUmayrah (Beirut: Dār al-jīl, 1997), II, 529; idem, "Kitāb jawāhir al-kalām," ed. Abū al-ʿAlā al-ʿAfīfī, *Majallah Kulliyyat al-Ādāb* 2, no. 2 (1934): 193-4.

10 Ömer Türker, "Kelâm ve Felsefe Geleneklerinin Kesişim Noktasında Seyyid Şerif Cürcânî," in *İslâm Düşüncesinde Süreklilik ve Değişim: Seyyid Şerif Cürcânî Örneği*, ed. M. Cüneyt Kaya (İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2015), 23.

11 al-Ījī, *al-Mawāqif*, II, 593; Türker, "Kelâm ve Felsefe Geleneklerinin Kesişim Noktasında," 26-7.

12 Seyyid Şerîf Cürcânî, *Şerhu'l-Mevâkıf: Mevâkıf Şerhi*, trans. Ömer Türker (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2015), II, 594.

Al-Ījī, however, established the direct relation of the powers of the human soul to ethics on the basis of three faculties, as was the case with philosophy. Thus, there were three powers in humans (*wa quwwah al-nafs al-insāniyyah thalāth*). Taşköprīzāda, the commentator of *al-Akhlāq al-ʿaḍudiyyah*, supposed that al-Ījī meant the faculties related to nothing but ethics, with the expression "the power of the soul." Thus he said there were three. If that power is a primary principle of perception, then it would be the intellect that distinguished humans from the rest, and its location would be the brain. It was also called the "angelic soul" or the "power of thought." If it were a preemptive principle, it would be the power of anger, its location would be the heart, and it would be called the "savage soul." If it were the principle to secure a utility, it would be desire, its location would be the liver, and it would be called the "bestial soul." The first of the powers was unique to the human soul, whereas the other two were common to both humans and animals.[13]

In his *Taḥqīq al-tafsīr*, al-Ījī interpreted the expression "the carnal soul" (*al-nafs al-ammārah*) (Qur'an 12:53) as those organs inclined to desire by their nature and the soul that strove only for them by means of its faculties. He then said that the human soul had many attributes. If the soul tends toward the divine world, then it would be at peace; if it inclined toward passion and anger, then it would be commanding evil (*ammārah bi-al-sūʾ*). In this case, virtue was an intellectual capacity, and the capacities of passion and anger, as distinct from reason, corresponded to desire.[14] On the other hand, it has to be noted that the conception of a triadic soul in al-Ījī's *al-Akhlāq al-ʿaḍudiyyah* was consistent with the passage from his seminal *al-Mawāqif*. Al-Jurjānī's comment on the same passage indicated that he assumed the same stance.[15] Therefore, it could be suggested that al-Ījī and al-Jurjānī justified the formative mechanism of ethical acts via the philosophers' conception of the soul.

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13   Taşköprîzâde Ahmed Efendi, *Şerhu'l-Ahlâki'l-Adudiyye: Ahlâk-ı Adudiyye Şerhi*, eds. Elzem İçöz and Mustakim Arıcı, trans. Mustakim Arıcı (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2014), 40-1. Müneccimbaşı elaborated on the discussion of the psychic powers with reference to several works of Avicenna, and he touched upon the employment of the concept of "power" (*quwwah*) and the relation between the spirit and the psychic powers. Cf. Müneccimbaşı Aḥmed Dede, *Sharḥ al-akhlāq al-ʿaḍudiyyah*, MS. Süleymaniye Library, Esad Efendi, no. 1868, ff. 17b-19b. İsmāʿīl Müfīd İstānbūlī also analyzed the topic with quotations from Müneccimbaşı. Cf. İsmail Müfîd İstanbulî, *Şerhu'l-Ahlâki'l-Adudiyye: Ahlâk-ı Adudiyye Şerhi*, trans. Selime Çınar (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2014), 42-3.

14   ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī, *Taḥqīq al-tafsīr*, MS. Süleymaniye Library, Yeni Cami, no. 38, ff. 233b-234a; for the same expressions, *cf.* Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, ff. 22b-24a.

15   Cürcânî, *Şerhu'l-Mevâkıf*, II, 529, 593-4.

B. The Nature of Disposition

Among the theoretical issues of ethics, we first dealt with the psychic powers of the human being. A further section of this inquiry was the traits (*akhlāq*) that were the ethical manifestations of the faculties (i.e., the virtues and vices).[16] But before this, it would be appropriate to explain the nature of virtue and vice, whether they are states or faculties, and thus that to which they ontologically correspond. Some of the acts springing from the psychic powers of the human being have ethical value. In this regard, it first has to be ascertained which of these were considered part and parcel of the field of ethics.

Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq (d. 260 / 873) translated e*thikos*, the term Aristotle employed for the behavior that is habitual in humans (i.e., the disposition), into Arabic as "state" (*ḥāl*), "aptitude" (*istiʿdād*), and "psychic makeup" (*hayʾat al-nafs*).[17] The first two terms were picked up in the literature later on in the explication of the disposition. Over time, a distinction appeared in the literature between human dispositions (i.e., those that are innate and underwritten by the temperament [state/s, talents, nature] and personal dispositions (i.e., those that are shaped by education, culture, and the social milieu [capacities]. While "state" as a concept might mean the temporary conditions not inhabiting the soul, Ibn Miskawayh defined it more comprehensively as incorporating the dispositions and classified them into two groups: those dependent on the temperament and *temporary* (e.g., fury, fear, excitement) and those dependent on the basis of thought. He therefore defined the traits (i.e., the dispositions) as a "state" of behavior springing from the human soul without reflection. He conceded that the latter were acquired through accustomation (*iʿtiyād*) and drill (*tadrīb*) and gradually turned into capacity and disposition.[18] This definition was a Galenic one, for this state, according to Galen (d. c. 200 or 216), who defined the disposition as a state of the soul, drove humans to commit acts concerning the soul without reflection or preference.[19]

Avicenna, however, preferred "capacity" to "state" and emphasized that the behaviors were acquired capacities.[20] Ṭūsī also defined the traits as "the capacities

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16   The singular form in Arabic for "dispositions" (*khūy*) is shown as "trait" (*khulq, khuluq*). Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, f. 11a. The word translates into Turkish as "*huy*," of Persian origin.

17   Arisṭūṭālis, *al-Akhlāq*, trans. Isḥaq b. Ḥunayn, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī (Kuwait: Wakālat al-maṭbūʿāt, 1979), 1107a 4-5, 1138b 30-5, 1139b 14, 1140a 4-5.

18   Mustafa Çağrıcı, *İslâm Düşüncesinde Ahlâk* (İstanbul: Dem Yayınları, 2006), 225-6.

19   Jālīnūs, "Mukhtaṣar min Kitāb al-Akhlāq li-Jālīnūs," in *Dirāsāt wa nuṣūṣ fī al-falsafah wa-al-ʿulūm ʿinda al-ʿArab*, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī (Beirut: al-Muʾassasat al-ʿarabiyyah li-l-dirāsāt wa-al-nashr, 1981), 190. For the appropriation of the definition by the mystical literature, cf. Kamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī, *Sharḥ Manāzil al-sāʾirīn*, ed. Muḥsin Bīdārfar (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-tārīkh al-ʿarabī, 2006), 194.

20   Kātibī imparted that Avicenna defined the "character" (*khulq*) by capacity. Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī, *al-Munaṣṣaṣ fī Sharḥ al-Mulakhkhaṣ*, MS. Süleymaniye Library, Şehid Ali Paşa, no. 1680, f. 330b.

that eased the rendering of acts and behaviors without a need for pondering." While both Ibn Miskawayh and al-Ṭūsī assumed the definition, which was Galenic in its origin, the latter stood closer to Avicenna and al-Ghazālī by employing the concept of "capacity," for "state" was used in the definition that appeared in the Arabic translation of Galen's relevant text. That the traits did not depart from the person promptly, but rather turned into a capacity, was an inspiration from al-Ghazālī.[21] After Ṭūsī, the definition remained in use in the literature.

In *al-Mawāqif*, al-Ījī defined disposition as "a capacity eliciting acts from the soul without any reflection." In his opinion, the psychic quality could not be deemed a disposition unless it turned into a capacity, and could only be deemed so if it turned into a principle of the dispensation of the act from the soul. Nonetheless, no act committed when the capacity became its principle by imposition or by reflection could be a disposition. According to him, when all elements of the set conditions were present, the psychic quality could be a disposition.[22] The expression of "without deliberation" or "without reflection" (*min ghayr rawiyyah*) was phrased as an allusion to the emergence of the disposition with ease in the commentaries of *al-Akhlāq al-ʿaḍudiyyah*. In other words, it did not mean the human's unconscious performance of a behavior because there was a consciousness (*shuʿūr*) inherent in the "psychic" in the expression "psychic acts" in the definition of the disposition.

But we should also note that this state of consciousness did not contradict the expression "without deliberation," because "indeliberation" meant the affirmation of the objective of the act committed as the goal and taking for granted that the goal required the initiation of the act.[23] Moreover, this indicated the performance of the act to be committed with a sort of resignation from the start. Müneccimbaşı, one of the commentators of al-Ījī, suggested that one could not speak of a state of unawareness or absence of consciousness (*ʿadam al-shuʿūr*) in behavior, for it was in the transition of the soul from one state to the other, or from one disposition to another, for the soul is, eo ipso, self-cognizant. However, there was a situation that appeared as "unconsciousness" due to the manifold labors of the soul. Müneccimbaşı did not call it the "absence of consciousness in deeds" (*ʿadam al-shuʿūr*), but rather the "absence of the awareness of consciousness" (*ʿadam al-shuʿūr bi-al-shuʿūr*).[24]

The concept of capacity in the definition of disposition was a significant and central concept in ethics. That it was a psychological accident in the manner of a

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21   Anar Gafarov, *Nasîrüddîn Tûsî'nin Ahlâk Felsefesi* (İstanbul: İSAM, 2011), 120-1.

22   al-Ījī, *al-Mawāqif*, II, 158-9. al-Jurjānī, the commentator of *al-Mawāqif*, repeated this generally accepted definition in *al-Taʿrīfāt*. Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī, *al-Taʿrīfāt* (Istanbul: Esʿad Efendi Maṭbaʿası, 1883), art. "khulq."

23   Alâüddin el-Kâzerûnî, *Şerhu'l-Ahlâki'l-Adudiyye: Ahlâk-ı Adudiyye Şerhi*, ed. Mehmet Aktaş, trans. Mehmet Demir and Güvenç Şensoy (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2014), 34-5; İstanbulî, *Şerhu*, 34-5.

24   Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, f. 55b.

quality inhabiting the soul, the phase prior to capacity's habituation in humans was "state." Capacity emerged as a result of the human's performance of a voluntary and intentional behavior and acquired a customary form due to the repetition of this act and deed. In *al-Mawāqif*, al-Ījī explained how a psychic quality was turned into a capacity by means of an example imparted in Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī's (d. 675 / 1277) *al-Munaṣṣaṣ fī Sharh al-Mulakhkhaṣ*.[25] Accordingly, capacity was the state of writing without considering each and every letter, or beating the drum without thinking the each note or beat,[26] that is, the habituation and internalization of the relevant act within the person. Al-Ījī defined "disposition as the capacity that the psychic acts sprang from itself with ease" in *al-Akhlāq al-'aḍudiyya*, just like in *al-Mawāqif*, where Taşköprīzāda concurred in his comment on the proposition that the concepts of state, capacity, and trait differed in meaning, and clarified why al-Ījī defined the term of "disposition" by "capacity":

> If human actions materialize in different manners and there is a consciousness (*shu'ūr*) of their principles, then they are called *psychic acts*. If these actions are in a single manner without a consciousness (*bilā' shu'ūr*) of the principles, then they are called *natural acts*. Among the former, the ones that vanish promptly and are impermanent in the soul are called *state*s. If these acts gain permanence by means of frequent repetition by the soul and thus obeying its rule, and their fading is rather slow, then they are called *capacity*. If these acts ooze out without forcing or urging, but on the contrary with ease and without deliberation, then *capacity* would be called *disposition* (trait).[27]

Where capacity and disposition stood ontologically was an issue that preceded the ethical debates concerning them. According to philosophers like Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 663 / 1265), one of the sources of al-Ījī, and al-Kātibī, dispositions were to be studied in metaphysics under the category of "accidents."[28] Belonging to the quality under accidents, according to such speculative theologians as al-Rāzī, dispositions were studied under the section of "substances and accidents," following the content he provided in *al-Mabāhith al-mashriqiyya* and *al-Mulakhkhaṣ*.[29] According to this classification, which al-Ījī also followed in *al-Mawāqif*, there were four subsets of the accident of quality. This was also attested in *Hidāyat al-hikmah* and *Hikmat al-'ayn*. These were the sensible, psychic, quantitative, and potential qualities.[30]

25   al-Kātibī, *al-Munaṣṣaṣ*, f. 330b.

26   al-Ījī, *al-Mawāqif*, II, 158-9.

27   Taşköprîzâde, *Şerhu*, 34-5.

28   Jamāl al-Dīn al-Ḥasan b. Yūsuf Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Īḍāḥ al-maqāṣid min ḥikmah 'ayn al-qawā'id*, ed. 'Alīnaqī Munzavī (Tehran: Chāpkhānah-i Dānishgāh, 1959), 180; Abdullah Yormaz, "Mevlânâzâde'nin Hidâyetü'l-Hikme Şerhi: Tahkik ve Tahlil" (PhD diss., Marmara University, 2010), 252.

29   al-Kātibī, *al-Munaṣṣaṣ*, f. 274a et passim.

30   al-Ījī, *al-Mawāqif*, I, 582.

The commentators of al-Abharī and al-Kātibī further divided the psychic qualities into two: those permanent qualities in the soul were "capacities," and the impermanent ones were "states."[31] Al-Ījī, however, following the works of post-Rāzī theology like *Tawāli' al-anwār* and *Tajrīd al-'aqā'id*[32] but also diverting from them conceptually, divided these psychic qualities into five: life, knowledge, will, power, pleasure and pain. According to his classification, the dispositions were discussed as a subsection related to power.


1. The accident of quality and its kinds according to the philosophers

2. The accident of quality and its kinds according to Baydāwī

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31   al-Ḥillī, *Īḍāḥ al-maqāṣid*, 181; Yormaz, "Mevlânâzâde'nin Hidâyetü'l-Hikme Şerhi," 257.

32   Shams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī, *Maṭāli' al-anẓār 'alā Ṭawāli' al-anwār* (Istanbul: Şirket-i 'ilmiyye, 1305 / 1888), 188, 203.

3. The accident of quality and its kinds according to al-Ījī

However, it has to be noted that the theological literature placed particular emphasis on the difference of disposition from power, because ethics took the spontaneous and facile performance of acts into account. But this did not apply to power. Furthermore, while the concomitance of the disposition and the act was not necessary,[33] it was necessary for the power and the act according to the Ash'arite opinion, which held that the disposition had to be present in the actor prior to the action. However, it was not compatible with Ash'arite thought, which supposed the presence of the capability to act at the moment of the execution. Moreover, whereas the relation of the power to both options (e.g., to do or not to do the deed) was equivalent, such equivalence to both options could not be supposed in ethics because it had to be manifest in one of the options, hence, one of two opposites. Therefore, the disposition comes into existence as virtue or vice.[34]

Another topical issue concerning the dispositions was how many kinds existed. In al-Ījī's opinion, dispositions were divided into three, namely, virtues, vices, and the extra. Whereas virtue was the principle of distinction, vice was the principle of want, and the extra was the principle to things that belonged to neither one nor the other.[35] Ergo, a cross section between virtue and vice under the category of "disposition" was noted but not exemplified. Those dispositions manifesting as virtue and vice corresponded to the three conditions (i.e., two opposites and a middle) of each of the three powers of the human soul concerning the ethical act, namely, reason, passion, and anger. Virtue was the condition of moderation and equilibrium at these powers, whereas vice was the condition at the opposites.[36]

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33   al-Kātibī, *al-Munaṣṣaṣ*, ff. 328b-330b.
34   al-Ījī, *al-Mawāqif*, II, 155; Cürcânî, *Şerhu'l-Mevâkıf*, II, 155-8.
35   al-Ījī, *al-Mawāqif*, II, 158-9; Cürcânî, *Şerhu'l-Mevâkıf*, II, 159-61.
36   Cürcânî, *Şerhu'l-Mevâkıf*, II, 159-61.

The dispositions were treated as virtue and vice in the books of ethics, and the condition of polarity between them was discussed as an ontological topic. In the opinion of al-Ṭūsī, who pointed out this condition, the two opposites of virtue (i.e., excess and lack) could not be contrary to virtue when polarity was taken in a literal sense, for the two opposites had to be the furthest away from each other by location in order for it to be considered a literal polarity. Thus, what was contrary to each other was, in fact, the vices in excess and lack. For instance, valiance (*shajāʻah*) could not be contrary to temerity (*tahawwur*) and cowardice, but temerity and cowardice were.[37] *Al-Akhlāq al-ʻaḍudiyyah* did not mention what kind of polarity existed between virtue and vice that were sorts of dispositions; however, al-Ījī discussed this issue in *al-Mawāqif*.

According to him, polarity occurred only between the sorts of a proximate kind. For example, for whiteness and blackness the proximate kind was color, and thus there was a polarity between them. Therefore there were not two real opposites to valiance (i.e, temerity and cowardice), for valiance fell under the kind of virtue while the other two fell under vice. Hence, a false polarity between the sorts of two different kinds would be projected. Indeed, real polarity could only occur between opposites of the same kind, like temerity and cowardice or wiliness and dullness, that is, the kind of vice.[38] However, al-Ījī conceded that the polarity concerning the dispositions, that is, between virtue and vice, were not regarded as such. In his opinion, there was a polarity between virtue and vice in the form of the correspondence between non-existence and potentiality, as was the case between good and evil, or that the polarity between them was accidental. The correspondence of non-existence and potentiality meant this: Vice was the absence of virtue, and evil was the absence of good. The polarity between them was accidental, that is, these four things were attributions relative to others, and none were of the sub-kinds.

In this second sense of polarity, something being a virtue was opposite to its being a vice, as well as its goodness to evilness. In that case, polarity was not between the kinds but between the accidents, and thus each opposite of an accident could be located under a single kind.[39] Kınālīzāda suggested that the position of opposites as furthest (*kemāl-i tebāʻud*) from each other, as in black and white, was required for a real polarity (*teḍādd-ı hakīkī*); however, such a requirement was not required for a common polarity (*teḍādd-ı meşhūrī*). According to him, the opposition between virtue and vice was not a relation of real polarity, but rather one of common polarity.

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37   Tûsî, *Ahlâk-ı Nâsırî*, 98.

38   Cürcânî, *Şerhu'l-Mevâkıf*, I, 415-6.

39   Ibid., I, 416-9.

Therefore, the absence of an ontologically real polarity and contrariety between virtue and vice notwithstanding, there was a relation of accidental polarity and contrariety.[40] What was intended with virtue being the middle was not the middle equidistant in relation with the two opposites, like the number four was to two and six, but rather the middle relative to them.[41] Thanks to the relation of accidental contrariety, virtue was regarded as moderation and vice as excess and lack.

Al-Ījī also explained virtue as being located between excess and lack, following the dominant opinion among his predecessors. It was a quality also attested for al-Ījī that the thinkers of a philosophical bent like al-Ghazālī assented to the moderationist theory of virtue, and even occasionally interpreted the theory in congruence with the Qur'anic text. In his *Tahqīq al-tafsīr*, al-Ījī referred to the conception of virtue as middle while interpreting the expression "the straight path" in the opening chapter of the Qur'an (Quran 1:6). Each disposition had two opposites condemned after excess and lack. In that context, staying true and in the middle for dispositions was also a straight path (*wa-al-haqq al-wasat fa-al-ṣirāt al-mustaqīm*).[42] In addition, his exegesis of the "middle / moderate community" (*ummah wasatā*) (Qur'an 2:143) was a significant cue to his notion of virtue. Corresponding to the senses of justice, moderation, and mediation, in his opinion the term "middle" (*wasat*) in the verse was also used for "praised dispositions" (*al-khiṣāl al-hamīdah*) vis-à-vis its in-betweenness as regards excess and lack. Al-Ījī furnished it with the example of the in-betweenness of valience for temerity and cowardice.[43] His notion of moderation was also in play on the verse "Do not be tight-fisted, nor lavish" (Qur'an 17:29). Suggesting that the verse commanded one to remain in between extravagance and parsimony (*al-iqtiṣād*), he turned toward a synthesis between the Aristotelian conception of virtue and the Qur'anic text.[44]

Virtue Ethics and the Treatment of Moral Maladies

The first article of what al-Ījī called "theoretical ethics" dwelt, for the most part, on what virtues and vices actually were by trying to define and demarcate them. These ethical concepts, articulated with quite concise definitions, were expounded

40 Kınalızâde Ali Çelebi, *Ahlâk-ı Alâ'î*, ed. Mustafa Koç (İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2012), 169-70.
41 el-Kâzerûnî, *Şerhu*, 50-1. For the debate on the virtue constituting the middle, cf. Mustakim Arıcı, "Erdemlerin Tasavvuru ve Tanımı: Taşköprizade'nin Erdem Şemaları," *Dîvân: Disiplinlerarası Çalışmalar Dergisi* 20, no. 38 (2015): 5-6.
42 al-Ījī, *Taḥqīq al-tafsīr*, f. 4b.
43 Ibid., f. 43b.
44 Ibid., f. 273a. Taşköprîzâde's interpretation of the said verse also in the same context was noteworthy. Cf. Taşköprîzâde, *Şerhu*, 48-9.

and exemplified by the commentators of *al-Akhlāq al-'aḍudiyyah*. Al-Ījī mostly embraced the schema of virtues developed by his predecessors, among them Ibn Miskawayh and Ṭūsī, based upon the equilibrium of the three faculties. Thus the three fundamental virtues corresponding to the status of the three powers of the soul in equilibrium, as well as the virtue of justice as an outcome thereof, were regarded as primary virtues. When the three powers of the soul were in equilibrium, a virtuous act emerged from the relevant power, and in the absence of that equilibrium, acts classified as vices emerged. Accordingly, the power of reason in equilibrium was wisdom (*hikmah*); its excess was wiliness and its lack dullness. The power of anger in equilibrium was valiance (*shajā'ah*), its excess was temerity, and its lack was cowardice. The power of passion in equilibrium was chastity (*'iffah*), its excess was lasciviousness, and its lack was frigidity. Considering that each of these primary virtues was the kind of several sub-virtues, we get a rather comprehensive chart of virtues. For instance, al-Ījī enumerated seven virtues under wisdom: (i) lucidity, (ii) discernment, (iii) intelligence, (iv) sagacity, (v) alertness, (vi) retentiveness, and (vii) recollection. In Taşköprīzāda's opinion, the classification and enumeration of these sub-virtues followed a particular logic:

> As a comprehensive statement on the seven virtues of wisdom, such can be said: First of all, in order to perceive the percepts as they are, the soundness of the instrument that would undertake it and the optimal acquisition of the objective is required. The first of them is the primary virtue, and stated next, if the acquisition of the object is at a conceptual level, it is the secondary virtue; if at an attestative level, it is the tertiary virtue. If the objectives are greater than these two, it would occur by the specification of an objective and its being distinguished from the rest, which would be the quaternary virtue, or the facile acquisition of the objective, which would be the quinary virtue; or the retention of the image perceived, which would be the senary virtue; or the pertinence to all images, which would be the septenary virtue.[45]

Similarly, al-Ījī also articulated the sub-virtues of valiance, chastity, and justice and gave a definition for each. The sub-virtues of valiance were: (i) magnanimity, (ii) munificence, (iii) patience, (iv) equanimity, (v) mildness, (vi) temperance, (vii) modesty, (viii) assiduity, (ix) liability, (x) dignity, and (xi) meekness. The subsidiary virtues of chastity were: (i) shame, (ii) patience, (iii) abstinence, (iv) cleanliness, (v) abstemiousness, (vi) earnestness, (vii) accommodativeness, (viii) decency, (ix) deference, (x) neatness, and (xi) generosity.

Taşköprīzāda dealt with the interrelation of wisdom, chastity and valiance with justice in the framework of genus-species. Thus, while the primary virtues were the

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45   Taşköprîzâde, *Şerhu*, 72-3.

ones that corresponded to the three powers of the soul in the state of equilibrium and in the status of kind, justice was a sort of the three powers altogether. The sub-virtues of justice were innumerable and of infinite quantity; hence, one could only count the ones well known. In this vein, al-Ījī mentioned fourteen sub-virtues.[46] Since justice was a compound of wisdom, valiance, and chastity, the excess and lack for the sub-virtues of justice were the polar opposites of the virtues, meaning that there were no vices unique to justice. This discussion was turned into a more detailed conceptual chart by Taşköprîzāda, the commentator of al-Ījī.[47] But perusing the literature would lead one to conclude that there were no extensive or numerous discussions about the opposites of the subsidiary virtues.

According to the distinction made in the literature following Ṭūsī, al-Ījī took the vices corresponding to the virtues as his subject matter in two regards. The virtues were first of all taken into account by quantity (kammiyyah), because the classification system developed along the lines of the moderationist conception of virtue. The condition expressed in terms of excess and lack corresponded to the two opposites of being the middle mentioned in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. Ishaq b. Hunayn, who translated this work into Arabic, defined these two opposites as increase (ziyādah) and decrease (naqṣ), following the mathematical terminology.

The second aspect concerning the vices was quality (kayfiyyah). Hence, there would be three vices of any power of the soul, a derivative state of which two were qualitative in the manner of excess and lack and one was quantitative, and it was in effect applying only to a single power. Thus, the deviation of the virtue of wisdom by quality would be the acquisition of learning for the sake of vainglory and disputation. The deviation of the virtue of valiance by quality would be putting one's life on the line for the sake of glory and booty. The deviation of the virtue of chastity by quality would be forsaking the desires deemed permissible by reason and religion for the sake of greater recompense in the world and the hereafter.[48] But the aforementioned deviations were virtues in one regard, and thus they were considered to be "virtue-like vices," which belonged to a separate category in the literature. For instance, what made the said condition a vice for wisdom was the acquisition of learning, which was a virtue in fact, but with an evil purpose.[49]

On the other hand, similar to Ṭūsī, Kınālīzāda provided different examples for the qualitative deviation of each virtue. For example, eating things like dirt that

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46   Ibid., 94-5.
47   Arıcı, "Erdemlerin Tasavvuru ve Tanımı," 30-3.
48   Taşköprîzâde, *Şerhu*, 54-9.
49   Kınalızâde, *Ahlâk-ı Alâ'î*, 119-27.

should not be eaten or types of sexual deviation were provided for the qualitative deviation of the power of passion.[50] The qualitative deviation was investigated through various other maladies in literature. Thus, the qualitative deviation of wisdom was bewilderment, of valiance was cowardice, and of chastity was dejection. In this context, the qualitative deviation of the primary virtue of a capacity was furnished with three different examples.

Let's follow the instance of chastity: (i) its qualitative deviation in the form virtue-like vice was to abstain from the desired, deemed permissible by reason and religion, in order to get more recompense in this world and the hereafter. (ii) Another qualitative deviation of chastity was the consumption of things, like dirt, that should not be eaten or the types of sexual deviation. (iii) Yet another qualitative deviation was dejection. However, having gone through the literature, including al-Ījī's epistle, what sort of relation was in-between the examples given in the various sections of the relevant works was never mentioned, and a lenient language was used. Especially, it would be impossible to find the answers for questions like: "Does the qualitative deviation take one form or several? If several, how could they be explained?"[51]

It would be hard to disagree with the remark made by Kāzarūnī, a commentator of al-Ījī, that a loose manner of expression was commonplace in practical philosophy, that this reality might lead to systemic problems when subjected to critique, and even that practical philosophy was founded upon such an idiom (*wa bi-al-jumlah al-hikmat al-'amaliyyah mabniyyah 'alā al-musāmahah*). He specified his claim by stating that the secondary virtues counted among the sorts of the virtue of wisdom, like intelligence and alertness, were, in fact, the causes of wisdom.[52] In our mind, the authors were not quite aware of the problems that we have already mentioned with respect to the "qualitative deviation" that entered the literature after Tūsī.

Following al-Ṭūsī, al-Ījī broached a wider ground for the vices and drew a detailed chart for the vices of the each power of the soul. According to his classification, psychological maladies originated from the power of reason, anger, or passion. Three psychological maladies arose from the power of reasoning: *bewilderment,* the state of excess that included wiliness; plain *ignorance,* the state of lack; and *benightedness,* the state of qualitative deviation.[53] Thus there were three maladies for the power of

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50   Ibid., 166.

51   While processing the data set for the chart below, we did not cover all these various qualitative deviations, hence the virtue-like vices were omitted.

52   el-Kâzerûnî, *Şerhu*, 44-5.

53   Sayf al-Dīn al-Abharī, *Sharḥ al-mukhtaṣar fī 'ilm al-akhlāq*, MS. Çorum Hasan Pasha Public Library, no. 2131/3, f. 226; Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ,* f. 56b.

anger: *wrath* as excess,[54] *cowardice* as lack, and *timidity* as the qualitative deviation. Similarly, there were three maladies for the power of passion: *greed* corresponded to excess, *sloth* to lack, and *dejection* to qualitative deviation.[55] There were also secondary maladies arising from these, other than the maladies of the three powers of the soul.[56] Al-Ījī spared the most extended chapter for wrath, which he viewed as the excess of the power of anger. He pointed out ten articles that he believed served as its cause: conceit (*'ujb*), arrogance (*takabbur*), boasting (*iftikhār*), quarrel (*mirā'*), fray (*lijāj*), jest (*mizāh*), ridicule (*istihzā'*), perfidy (*ghadr*), unfairness (*daym*), and avarice.

4. Psychological maladies in al-Ījī

It is plausible to state that the soul was regarded as a holistic structure in the formulation of these moral maladies and was treated with respect to psychological health. The references to the interrelations of the powers of the soul, along with the proposal of the treatment of the maladies at the same footing, formed the aspect of those ethical texts that evolved into classical psychology. In this context, considering vice a psychological malady, the struggle against it as treatment, the

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54   The concept of *ghaḍab* that we translated as wrath was glossed in Quran exegesis as the uproar of the soul with a desire for vengeance when indicated a human being. Cf. Nāṣir al-Dīn Qāḍī al-Bayḍāwī, *Anwār al-tanzīl wa-asrār al-ta'wīl* (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-'ilmiyyah, 2003), I, 11.

55   Kınalızâde, *Ahlâk-ı Alâ'î*, 170-4.

56   Taşköprîzâde, *Şerhu*, 118-9, 124-5, 152-3.

methods administered as medicine, and of those searching for remedies as doctors of psychology turned the *Akhlāq-i nāṣirī*, *al-Akhlāq al-ʿaḍudiyyah*, *Akhlāk-ı ʿalāʾī,* and similar texts into the quintessential sources of classical psychology. The said texts, in which vices were called "psychological maladies" (viz., *al-amrād al-nafsāniyyah*, *al-aʿrād al-nafsāniyyah*, *al-amrād al-rūhāniyyah*, *al-ʿilal al-nafsāniyyah*) employed the same idiom in this regard with Abū Bakr al-Rāzī's *al-Tibb al-rūhānī* and Abū Zayd al-Balkhī's (d. 322 / 934) *Maṣālih al-abdān wa-al-anfus,* which were the canonical works of the school of spiritual medicine.

In the Galenic theory of medicine, any malady was essentially regarded as a somatic condition. In this respect, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī and Avicenna, two great representatives of this theory in Islam, considered somatic diseases in their works' "chapter for maladies." It is possible to name only maladies such as amnesia, nightmare, and melancholia in their works as real psychological maladies, even though they also had physical causes. Basically, after one checks these philosophers' definitions of medicine and malady and attentively examines their views of malady, it becomes clear why they did not incorporate psychological disorders into these works. For instance, Avicenna defined the medicine as follows:

> *Inna al-tibb ʿilm yutaʿarraf minhu ahwāl al-badan al-insān min jihah mā yaṣihh wa-yazulu ʿanhā li-yahfaḍa al-ṣihhah hāṣilah wa-yastaridduhā zāʾilah.*

> Medicine is a science that is concerned with the conditions of the human body from the perspective of how to be healthy, to remove diseases in order to keep it, and to return it to health once its health has been lost.[57]

In other words, a malady is an abnormal condition that has emerged in the human body.[58] As a follow-up, bodily maladies were examined in such medical texts as *al-Hāwī fī al-ṭibb* and *al-Qānūn fī al-ṭibb,* according to the anatomical structure of the human body from the head to the toe. In other words, maladies of the organs at the level of the head came first, after which those maladies that emerged in the organs below were reckoned. In al-Rāzī's opinion, this was the way followed by the great masters of the medical arts.[59] Aware of this state of affairs, al-Balkhī conveyed that doctors did not examine what he dubbed "psychological syndromes" (*al-aʿrād al-nafsāniyyah*) in the medical books and texts on bodily health and the relevant maladies because the term did not belong with the sort of art (*li-anna al-qawl laysa huwa min jins*

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57 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Qānūn fī al-ṭibb*, ed. Idwār al-Qashsh, intro. ʿAlī Zayʿūr (Beirut: Muʾassasah ʿIzz al-dīn, 1993), I, 13; Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *al-Manṣūrī fī al-ṭibb*, ed. Ḥāzim al-Bakrī al-Ṣiddīqī (Kuwait: Jāmiʿat al-duwal al-ʿarabiyyah, 1987), 29.

58 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Qānūn*, I, 101.

59 Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, *al-Ṭibb al-mulūkī*, ed. Muḥammad Yāsir Zakkūr (Jeddah: Dār al-minhāj, 2009), 102.

ṣan'ātihim).[60] However, since the organization of the affairs of the souls was similar to that of bodies, even to the extent that their conditions of health and illness were mutually reinforcing, it was necessary to establish a link between the two.

In this respect, al-Balkhī opened a new chapter for psychological health, maladies, and their treatment in his *Maṣālih al-abdān wa-al-anfus*[61] and deserves credit for the originality of his remarks. In fact, he seems to have been the first one to treat this topic through such a perspective in a holistic manner.[62] Besides, even though we cannot determine the exact sources of the statements made by Abū al-Hasan Thābit b. Sinān b. Thābit b. Qurrah al-Ṣābī (d. 365 / 975-6), it is plausible to suggest that his views did not remain behind those of al-Balkhī and that he even furthered the approach of spiritual medicine. Thābit b. Sinān's *Tahdhīb al-akhlāq*, introduced to the scholarly community by Muhammad 'Ābid al-Jābirī[63] and still unedited,[64] is one of the most foundational works written in the field of spiritual medicine. Like al-Balkhī, Thābit b. Sinān also established a similarity between the condition of the health of the body and the soul. Thus, protecting the healthy state of the soul (i.e., virtues) before the maladies strike the soul, and the struggle with the maladies (i.e., vices) once struck by them, formed the basis of keeping the soul healthy.[65] This outlook comprised an approach that was acceptable to al-Ījī.

At the point of gaining happiness or freedom from worry, the main struggle of the philosophical understanding of ethics with a penchant for consequentialism manifested itself in the form of (i) acquiring virtues and (ii) avoiding vices. Both of these were coupled with the objectives of self-discipline (*tarbiyyah*), moral refinement (*tahdhīb*), and perfection (*istikmāl*), and the objectives themselves were achieved by means of adorning the soul with virtues (*tahliyyah*), forgoing bad habits (*takhliyyah*), and purifying (*taṣfiyyah*), all of which resulted in reforming the self.[66] In the literature

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60 Ebû Zeyd el-Belhî, *Mesâlihu'l-ebdân ve'l-enfüs*, eds. Nail Okuyucu and Zahit Tiryaki (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2012), 422-3.

61 Ibid., 416-559.

62 al-Balkhī mentioned the possibility that the information he gathered in the chapter of "Maṣāliḥ al-anfus" could be present in the books of philosophers and mystics (*min kutub al-ḥukamā' wa-ahl al-maw'iẓah wa-al-tabṣīr*) in scattered form. Ibid., 424-5.

63 Muḥammad 'Ābid al-Jābirī, *al-Aql al-akhlāqī al-'Arabī: Dirāsah taḥlīliyyah naqdiyyah li-nuẓum al-qiyam fī al-thaqāfat al-'arabiyyah* (Beirut: Markaz dirāsāt al-waḥdat al-'arabiyyah, 2001), 305-14.

64 The text is prepared for publication by Ömer Türker. I thank him for informing me about the text and facilitating my access to the manuscript copy.

65 Abū al-Ḥasan Thābit b. Sinān Ibn Qurrah al-Ṣābī, *Kitāb Tahdhīb al-akhlāq*, MS. al-Khizānat al-'ammah bi-al-Ribāṭ, Makhṭūṭāt al-awqāf, no. 954, § 5, f. 102ff., § 6, f. 133ff.

66 For the use of some of these concepts in this context, cf. the exegesis of the verse (Quran 1:6). al-Bayḍāwī, *Anwār al-tanzīl*, I, 11; Ḳonevī, *Hāshiyat al-Qūnawī*, I, 120.

of ethics, vices were generally regarded as ethical and psychological maladies (*al-amrād al-nafsaniyyah*), and the methods for struggling (*mujāhadah*) with and the consequent treatment (*mu'ālajah*, *mudāwāt*) of these maladies were demonstrated. As stated in the previous paragraph, the "spiritual medicine" (*al-ṭibb al-rūḥānī*) ethical canon argued that the human soul or spirit could be afflicted by certain maladies, just like the body was, and that it could only be cured by the prescription of a proficient doctor. While the recommendations and methods used by the mystics and the philosophers to wage this struggle with psychological maladies were mainly the same, there were points of divergence. We will consider herein the recommendations and treatment methods of al-Ījī, a follower of the philosophical school.

Al-Ījī's text, just like the *Akhlāq-ı 'alā'ī* later on,[67] had elements that would qualify it as a text of spiritual medicine. It can be suggested that the soul was viewed as an integral entity in the malady descriptions and that he examined these maladies on the basis of spiritual health. Hence, as will be explained below, he reckoned four means of keeping virtues and, similarly, four methods necessary for avoiding psychological disorders (i.e, vices). Under this inspirational and motivational influence of the source text, the commentators interpreted the aspect of acquiring virtues and avoiding vices, which formed the practical branch of ethics in particular, as the science of spiritual medicine and therefore commented along these lines. For example, Kāzarūnī's commentary was replete with the accentuation of spiritual medicine, for in his introductory chapter he made important statements about the domain and the content of ethics as a discipline. In his opinion, the discipline of ethics was verily the noblest rational science and the most eminent religious sciences. Due to its eminence, philosophers sometimes called it the "highest of spirits" and viewed it as spiritual medicine, even referring to practical philosophy itself as spiritual medicine.[68]

Kāzarūnī ascribed this emphasis on spiritual medicine to the philosophers with these sentences and made similar statements elsewhere.[69] The commentator attempted to explain what he meant by "spiritual medicine" with Galen's invocation to Jesus Christ when, in the beginning of the second section, he called out to him as "from the doctor of bodies to the doctor of souls."[70] According to the commentator, this implied the matching of spiritual medicine with prophetic teaching. Similar emphases were also present in Taşköprîzâde, İstānbūlī, and Müneccimbaşı.[71]

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67   Kınalızâde, *Ahlâk-ı Alâ'î*, 163, 168-70.

68   el-Kâzerûnî, *Şerhu*, 16-7, 32-3.

69   Ibid., 84-5, 88-9, 96-7.

70   Ibid., 82-3.

71   Taşköprîzâde, *Şerhu*, 116-7; İstanbulî, *Şerhu*, 94-5; Müneccimbaşı, *Sharḥ*, f. 3a, 49a, 53a.

The avoidance of vices was consequent upon the safeguarding of the virtues possessed. Therefore, those who wanted to maintain the health of their temperament had to do the things that would bring this about and avoid those that would not, a point upon which the doctors agreed. In other words, those people who wanted to maintain their virtues had to do the things that were proper to these virtues and to avoid the opposite, which meant taking heed of the "soul doctors" (*atibbāʾ al-nufūs*), meaning those sages and philosophers who had reached the degree of certitude.[72] Al-Ījī listed four means to maintain these virtues: (i.i) Hold steadfastly to virtuous people. The soul's turning toward that which bestowed upon it grace, joy, and form at the divine threshold, and turning away from evil, would keep it healthy. Hence, meeting with virtuous people and spending time with those whom one should emulate, either because they were already virtuous or were progressing toward this state, as well as listening to them, becoming a part of their lives, and following their example would benefit them. However, this was contingent upon not befriending the ill-tempered wretches, avoiding the malicious and the vulgar, and especially shunning those who ran after amusement, buffoonery, ridicule, and derision, or befriending such folk. One also had to refrain from adopting their habits and lifestyle, ignore their loose and rude talk, and shun their errant and rowdy ways. (i.ii) Train the mind with exercises of learning and opinion in order to accommodate thought. (i.iii) Pick friends who will reprove you in case you err or misbehave, because one's faults are invisible to oneself. Although the mind of the person who committed the faults remains unmoved, a real friend will cause you to notice those of which you were oblivious. (i.iv) Subdue the ego with ascetic exercises if you detect any degree of neglect in his soul, namely, if one is lethargic and sloppy when it comes to conquering and then freeing oneself from one's internal evils. In other words, one should discipline the soul sternly, even to the point of subordinating it by forceful and severe means, if necessary.[73]

Philosophers also spent a lot of time on how to recover from psychological disorders (i.e., vices). Those people afflicted with a psychological malady underwent treatment via participating in four procedures, and those who administered the respective treatment of body eased the malady with its opposite via for means. These were herbs, if possible; if not, effective nutritional or proper medicine; if ineffective, antidote; and, if still upset, cautery and dissection. Likewise, in the treatment of the psychological malady, (ii.i) the virtue contrary to the vice found in the soul was performed, like treating stinginess with its opposite, generosity. (ii.ii)

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72   Taşköprîzâde, *Şerhu*, 106-7.
73   Ibid., 108-15.

Standing sharp against the malady, that it involved forcing the self to quit the vice in case the performance of counter-vice did not work, and additionally covert and overt condemnation and rebuke. This was the counterpart of drug therapy. (ii.iii) If neither of these worked, then commit the vice that is opposite to the chronic vice. For instance, if one wanted to abandon stinginess but was still unable to do so, that person was expected to desist from the disposition via squandering and spending. Although this was a risky therapy, it was hoped that turning to squandering might facilitate the preference of generosity in due course. But a vice must be committed insofar as eliminating the chronic vice, otherwise it would become habitual and thus double the burden. (ii.iv) If all else fails, one should adopt a stricter regimen, namely, arduous exercise and more bitter pills like taking a binding oath to either follow through or be burdened with onerous tasks, and the like. Thus, the soul took after the most facile with grace and ease, and obeyed it.[74]

It must be said that al-Ghazālī had a great influence on Islamic thought in terms of diagnosing and treating psychological disorders, for many later moralists like Taşköprīzāda, Kınālīzāda, Imām Birgivī, and Khādimī followed the framework drawn in his *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn* on the matter of vices (i.e., psychological maladies) in their works. Al-Ghazālī elaborated on them in the subsections of the section titled "Wonders of the heart" (*'Ajā'ib al-qalb*) of his work. In fact, he gave considerable space to the moral maladies of rage, envy, pride, hypocrisy, ambition, greed, and stinginess. Furthermore, he also analyzed verbal abuses (e.g., disputation, polemics, verbal adversity, damnation, jest, mockery, lie, false promise, gossip, suspecting evil, conveying rumor, hypocrisy, and adulation) in great detail.[75]

The one who followed him in this regard was Kınālīzāda, who reserved one-third of his *Akhlāk-ı 'alā'ī* for psychological maladies. Considering that the work consisted of ethics, household government, and politics, this reveals just how much importance was attached to the said section. He first described the psychological maladies and then dealt with the maladies of the powers of reason, anger, and passion. Charting them through the philosophical vista sketched by al-Ṭūsī and al-Ījī, he relied considerably upon al-Ghazālī while tackling the issue.[76] A similar approach can be seen in Taşköprīzāda who, under the section of "Ground of perdition" (*Muhlikāt*) at the part of esoteric sciences in *Miftāḥ al-sa'ādah*, opened the heading "Wonders of the heart" in the same manner as al-Ghazālī had[77] and

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74   Ibid., 116-9.

75   Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*, 2nd ed. (Aleppo: Dār al-wa'y, 2004), III, 57-435.

76   Kınalızâde, *Ahlâk-ı Alâ'î*, 166ff.

77   Aḥmad b. Muṣṭafā Ṭaşköprīzāḍa, *Miftāḥ al-sa'ādah wa miṣbāḥ al-siyādah fī mawḍū'āt al-'ulūm* (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-'ilmiyyah, 1985), III, 323.

then analyzed the psychological maladies under the sub-heading "Self-discipline and moral refinement" (*Riyāḍat al-nafs wa tahdhīb al-akhlāq*).[78] Due to this approach the aforementioned literature, including al-Ījī's epistle, corresponded to a tradition in Islamic thought that treated the fundamental issues of classical psychiatry.

Appendix: The Literature on *al-Akhlāq al-'aḍudiyyah*

'Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī's concise epistle *al-Akhlāq al-'aḍudiyyah* provided the general principles of practical philosophy as a follow-up to the current that took shape with al-Fārābī (d. 339 / 950), Avicenna (d. 428 / 1037), Ibn Miskawayh (d. 421 / 1030), al-Ghazālī, and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. Due to the said feature, this brief Arabic-language epistle was the spark that initiated a considerable literature of commentary afterward. His work was furnished with a commentary by many scholars, first and foremost his disciples Shams al-Dīn al-Kirmānī (d. 786 / 1384) and Sayf al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 800 / 1397). Other than the Arabic commentaries of Abū al-Fadl Muhammad al-Kāzarūnī, Taşköprīzāda Ahmed Efendi (d. 968 / 1561), Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede (d. 1113 / 1702), and Ismā'īl Mufīd al-Istānbūlī (d. 1217 / 1803), as well as a Turkish one by Mehmed Emīn al-Istānbūlī, there was also an Arabic commentary by an unknown author and another one, again by an unknown author, presented to the Timurid prince Ghiyāth al-Dīn Bāysunghur (d. 837 / 1434). One should also add to the list the Turkish commentary of the late Ottoman era entitled *Risāle-i Kashfıyyah* by Yozghādī Keşfī Muṣṭafā Efendi (d. 1308 / 1890). There was also a text (MS. Selimiye, no. 6120) attributed to Najm al-Dīn al-Kubrā by the manuscript and library records; however, it belonged to Taşköprīzāda.

In addition to the approximately thirty manuscript copies of *al-Akhlāq al-'aḍudiyyah* discovered in Turkish libraries, there are also about twenty additional copies in Iranian libraries.[79] First edited by myself on the basis of three copies from Turkish libraries and published with a Turkish translation in 2009,[80] the text of *al-Akhlāq al-'aḍudiyyah* was re-edited by Süleyman Küçük and submitted as a master's thesis.[81] Unaware of the two, Muhsin Jāhid and Majīd Mollā Yūsufī published the text based on two copies from the Iranian libraries in 2010.[82]

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78   Ibid., 338ff.

79   Muṣṭafā Dirāyatī, *Fihristvārah-i dastnivisht 'hā-yi İrān (Dinā)* (Tehran: Kitābkhānah, Mūzih va Markaz-i Asnād-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī, 2010), I, 454.

80   Arıcı, "Adududdîn el-Îcî'nin Ahlâk Risalesi," 135-72.

81   Süleyman Küçük, "Die Ethik des Adud ad-Dîn al-Îgî. Eine Edition und Analyse des Textes" (MA thesis, Freie Universität Berlin, 2010).

82   Muḥsin Jāhid and Majīd Mollā Yūsufī, "Risālah-i dar akhlāq az 'Aḍududdīn Ījī," *Āyinah-i Mīrāş*, no. 47 (1389 / 2010): 87-107.

Besides the publication of the text of *al-Akhlāq al-ʿaḍudiyyah*, some of its commentaries were taken as topics for graduate theses. Three full and one partial rendering of the aforementioned commentaries were submitted as graduate theses; their records are provided below. Furthermore, Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede's commentary, being the most extensive one, was also edited as part of a PhD dissertation.[83] Aside from providing the critical editions of the Arabic texts, these theses on the commentaries contributed to the literature by introducing the authors of the relevant texts, identifying the manuscripts, and discussing the conception of practical philosophy in the commentaries.

The literature of *al-Akhlāq al-ʿaḍudiyyah* once more became topical for the scholarly community in 2013 due to a project backed by the Society of Learned Studies (*İlmî Etüdler Derneği*) in Istanbul. At this juncture, three of the aforementioned commentaries, namely, those by Kāzarūnī, Taşköprīzāda, and Ismāʿīl Mufīd al-Istānbūlī, were published by the Directorate of Turkish Manuscript Association (*Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı*) with Arabic texts and Turkish translations.[84] Moreover, the commentaries of al-Kirmānī and al-Abharī, the anonymous commentary presented to Ghiyāth al-Dīn Bāysunghur, and Mehmed Emīn al-Istānbūlī's text, entitled *Melzemetü'l-akhlāk* and written in Ottoman Turkish and its Latinized form, are being prepared for publication as part of the same project. A recent addition to the literature on *al-Akhlāq al-ʿaḍudiyyah* was the publication of the late Ottoman scholar Yozghādī Keşfī Muṣṭafā Efendi's translation, including his commentary in Turkish.

On the other hand, one can see that the definitions of virtues and some of the concepts present in *al-Akhlāq al-ʿaḍudiyyah* were reproduced in Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī's (d. 816 / 1413) *al-Taʿrīfāt* and Mehmed Şāh Fenārī's (d. 886 / 1481) *Anmūzaj al-ʿulūm*. Thus, the influence of the text beyond its commentaries could be cited.

We now list the editions of *al-Akhlāq al-ʿaḍudiyyah*, its commentaries, and the studies.

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83 Mustakim Arıcı, "Giriş," in *Şerhu'l-Ahlâki'l-Adudiyye: Ahlâk-ı Adudiyye Şerhi*, by Taşköprîzâde Ahmed Efendi, eds. Elzem İçöz and Mustakim Arıcı (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2014), 15-6. Aside from these commentaries, Aḥmed Remzī Efendi versified the first section of the epistle into 100 couplets in Arabic. Cf. Hüsamettin Erdem, "Ahlâk-ı Adudiyye," *DİA*, II, 14.

84 Ömer Türker and Kübra Bilgin spent quite a bit of effort for the project's take-off. The researchers who contributed to the publication of the commentaries facilitated the discovery of the literature formed around a text and its dissemination to the readers. I would like to express my appreciation and gratitude. I would like to thank the directors of the Society of Learned Studies for their support of the project and the staff of the Directorate of Turkish Manuscript Association for publishing three commentaries of al-Ījī's text.

A. Text:

i. Mustakim Arıcı, "Aḍududdîn el-Îcî'nin Ahlâk Risalesi: Arapça Metni ve Tercümesi," *Kutadgubilig: Felsefe-Bilim Araştırmaları*, no. 15 (2009): 135-172.

ii. Süleyman Küçük, "Die Ethik des Aḍud ad-Dîn al-Îgî. Eine Edition und Analyse des Textes" (MA thesis, Freie Universität Berlin, 2010).

iii. Muhsin Jāhid and Majīd Mollā Yūsufī, "Risālah-i dar akhlāq az 'Aḍududdīn Ījī," *Āyinah-i Mīrās*, no. 47 (1389 / 2010): 87-107.

B. Commentaries:

i. Shams al-Dīn al-Kirmānī, *Sharh al-akhlāq al-'aḍudiyyah*

Derya Topalcık, "Kirmânî'nin Şerh-u Ahlâk-ı Adûdiyye Adlı Eseri" (MA thesis, Sakarya University, 2007).

Şemseddin el-Kirmânî, *Şerhu'l-Ahlâki'l-Adudiyye*, ed. and trans. Merve Nur Yılmaz (Ankara: Nobel Yayınları İlem Kitaplığı, 2016).

ii. Sayf al-Dīn al-Abharī, *Sharh al-mukhtaṣar fī 'ilm al-akhlāq*, MS. Çorum Hasan Pasha Public Library, no. 2131/3, ff. 14b-22b.

Seyfeddin el-Ebherî, *Şerhu'l-Ahlâki'l-Adudiyye*, ed. and trans. Ömer Türker (Ankara: Nobel Yayınları İlem Kitaplığı, 2016).

iii. Alâüddin el-Kâzerûnî, *Şerhu'l-Ahlâki'l-Adudiyye: Ahlâk-ı Adudiyye Şerhi*, ed. Mehmet Aktaş, trans. Mehmet Demir and Güvenç Şensoy (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2014).

iv. Taşköprīzāda Ahmed Efendi, *Sharh al-Akhlāq al-'aḍudiyyah*

Elzem İçöz, "Taşköprîzâde'nin Şerhü Ahlâkı Adudiyye Adlı Eseri" (MA thesis, Sakarya University, 2007).

Taşköprîzâde Ahmed Efendi, *Şerhu'l-Ahlâki'l-Adudiyye: Ahlâk-ı Adudiyye Şerhi*, eds. Elzem İçöz and Mustakim Arıcı, trans. Mustakim Arıcı (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2014).

v. Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede, *Sharh al-Akhlāq al-'aḍudiyyah*

Asiye Şen Aykıt, "Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede'nin Şerhu Ahlâk-ı Adûd Adlı Eseri: Metin Tahkiki ve Değerlendirme" (PhD diss., Marmara University, 2013).

vi. Ismā'īl Mufīd al-Istānbūlī, *Sharh al-Akhlāq al-'aḍudiyyah*

Kevser Kösem, "İsmail Müfit b. Ali el-İstanbuli'nin Şerhu Ahlâk-ı Adudiyye Adlı Eseri" (MA thesis, Sakarya University, 2008).

İsmail Müfîd İstanbulî, *Şerhu'l-Ahlâki'l-Adudiyye: Ahlâk-ı Adudiyye Şerhi*, trans. Selime Çınar (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2014).

vii. The anonymous manuscript presented to Ghiyās al-Dīn Bāysunghur

Kübra Bilgin, "Şerhu Ahlâkı Adudiyye: Metin ve Değerlendirme," (MA thesis, Marmara University, 2013).

Şerhu'l-Ahlâki'l-adudiyye: Ahlâk-ı Adudiyye Şerhi, Müellifi meçhul (XVI. yy.), ed. Kübra Bilgin Tiryaki (Ankara: Nobel Yayınları İlem Kitaplığı, 2016).

viii. Anonymous, *Kitāb Sharh al-akhlāq min kutub al-taṣawwuf*, MS. Süleymaniye Library, Şehid Ali Paşa, no. 1546. We conjecture that it was penned around the 16th century or later by a scholar from the Ottoman domain, probably with connections to Istanbul, due to its references to figures like Ibn Kemāl.[85]

ix. Mehmed Emīn Istānbūlī, *Melzemetü'l-akhlāk* (Istanbul: Matba'a-i 'Āmire, 1281 / 1864), 147 p.

Melzemetü'l-ahlâk, eds. Melek Yıldız Güneş and Aliye Güler (Ankara: Nobel Yayınları İlem Kitaplığı, 2016).

x. Yozghādī Keşfī Muṣṭafā Efendi, *Risāle-i Keşfiyye*, ed. İrfan Görkaş (İstanbul: Büyüyen Ay Yayınları, 2016).

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85   E.g., ibid., f. 15a.

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