

Critical Edition, Translation, and Analysis of Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī's *al-Risāla al-Sharīfa [fī al-Kalām]*

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Abstract: Shams al-Dīn Muhammad b. Ashraf al-Ḥusaynī al-Samarqandī was an important Turkish Islamic scholar who lived in Turkistan at the end of the 7th/13th century and the first quarter of the 8th/14th century, passing away on 22 Shawwal 722 (November 3, 1322). His works proved his expertise in the rational and natural sciences, to which he made significant contributions. Biographical books provide limited information about Samarqandī's life and make no mention of his treatise on theology (*kalām*). After examining the language, content, and copies of the relevant manuscripts, however, he is concluded to have written a treatise on theology. We analyze the content of the treatise in question here and put forward Samarqandī's theological views in the context of his treatise. We have access to three copies of the treatise in question. Based on various presumptions, we have taken the copy in Suleymaniye Library registered under Laleli 2432, which we think was dictated by al-Samarqandī, as the basis of our analysis. We have indicated the differences this manuscript has with the one in Suleymaniye Library registered under Cârullah 1247 and the other copies in Suleymaniye Library registered under Ayasofya 4800 in the footnotes. To preserve the technical terms of the treatise, we have translated it as faithfully as possible and paid attention to expressing the issues in understandable [English]. In his treatise, al-Samarqandī analyzes the views of the Ahl al-Sunna regarding whether God has the same or different attributes as His essence, the identity of the names (*ism*) and the named (*musammā*), and the existence of the atom (*al-jawhar al-fard*). By analyzing these issues, al-Samarqandī reduces the disagreements about the relationship between essence and attribute and between the names and the named to a literal dispute. In addition, he acknowledges the existence of the atom in the context of theoretical physics and in accordance with the general theological understanding and presents his original evidence.

Keywords: Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī, *al-Risāla al-Sharīfa [fī al-Kalām]*, Divine Essence, Divine Attributes, *ism*, *musammā*, atom, *al-jawhar al-fard*.

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Introduction

The full name of the author of the treatise discussed herein is Shams al-din Muḥammad b. Ashraf al-Ḥusaynī al-Samarqandī, and he is more commonly referred to as Shams al-din al-Samarqandī. He was an eminent Turkish Islamic scholar who lived in Turkistan in the late 7th/13th and first quarter of the 8th/14th centuries. The sources provide no information about his date of birth. The addition of the epithets al-Ḥusaynī and al-Ḥasanī to his name, as well as the title of al-Sayyid at the beginning, prove his lineage to the Prophet.¹ Epithets such as *al-ḥakīm*, *al-muḥaqqiq*, and *al-muhandis* are mentioned in different sources and additionally indicate his knowledge of the rational and natural sciences.²

Biographical books do not provide much information about the author's life. Taşköprizâda stated in his *Mawḍū'at al-'ulūm* that he was unfamiliar with Samarqandī's biography,³ and some recent biographical authors have provided limited information about Samarqandī. He is stated to have been engaged in science in Turkistan and to have been a highly qualified scholar in the rational and *shar'ī* [religious] sciences. He did not live long enough to complete his work titled *al-Şaḥā'if fī al-Tafsīr*, which was published in 971 AH and reported to have been completed by Aḥmad b. Maḥmūd al-Kirmānī al-Aşamm.⁴ Various books have been attributed to him that emphasize his skills as a geometrician and mathematician.⁵ Hence, he was an influential Islamic scholar who had proven his abilities in logic, astronomy, and mathematics, as well as in *shar'ī'a*.⁶

The information about the copies in the collection recorded in Suleymaniye Library under Laleli 2432, which includes Samarqandī's *al-Şaḥā'if al-ilāhiyya*, *al-Mu'taqadāt*, *İlm al-āfāq wa-l-anfus*, and *al-Ma'ārif fī sharḥ al-Şaḥā'if* provides various details about the completion and revision of the books and the date of Samarqandī's death. Contradictory dates regarding Samarqandī's death and the second collation (*muqābala*) appear in these manuscripts. The date of the author's death being corrected with "*wa 'ishrīn*" (and 20) in the phrase where the date of the author's

1 Qāḏizādā Rūmī, *Sharḥ ashkāl al-ta'sīs*. (İstanbul: Suleymaniye Library, Ayasofya, 2712), 13a.

2 Kātip Çalabi, *Sullam al-wusūl ilā ṭabaqāt al-fuḥūl*, ed. Selahaddin Uygur (İstanbul: Markaz al-abḥāth li-l-Tāriḫ wa-l-funūn wa al-thāqāfa al-Islāmiyya, 2010), 3/108.

3 Taşköprizâda, *Mawḍū'at al-'ulūm*. (Darsa'āda: İkdām Matbaası, 1313), 630.

4 Kātip Çalabi, *Kashf al-zunūn 'an asāmi al-kutub wa-l-'ulūm*. (Bayrūt: Dār İḥyā'al-turāth al-'Arabī, nd.), 2/1074.

5 İsmail Pasha el-Baghdādi, *Hadiyyat al-'arīfīn Asmā' al-mu'allifīn wa āthār al-muṣannifīn*. (Najaf: Muassat al-turāth el-'Arabī, 1387), 2/106.

6 Kaḥḥāla, *Mu'jam al-mu'allifīn Tarājimu musannif al-kutub al-'Arabīyya*. (Dimashq: Mu'assasat al-risāla, 1376), 3/136.

death is written as 702 eliminates these contradictions by shedding light on the fact that the author had died on 22 Shawwal 722 AH (November 3, 1322 AD).⁷

Samarqandî wrote nearly 20 works on *kalām*, logic, mathematics, astronomy, *tafsîr*, *ādâb*, and *munâzâra*, which are attributed to al-Samarqandî in the sources as follows: *al-Şahâ'if al-ilâhiyya*, *al-Mu'taqadât*, *Kitâb al-Ma'ârif fi sharh al-Şahâ'if*, *al-Anwâr al-ilâhiyya*, *Sharh al-Anwâr al-ilâhiyya*, *Sharh al-Lum'at al-râbi'a min Kitâb al-Anwâr al-ilâhiyya*, *Qıştâs al-afkâr (al-Mizân) fi taḥqîq al-asrâr*, *Sharh al-Qıştâs*, *'Ayn al-nazar fi al-mantiq*, *Bashârât al-Ishârât*, *Sharh al-Fuṣûl (al-Muqaddimât) al-burhâniyya fi 'ilm al-jadal*, *Risâla fi âdâb al-baḥth wa-l-munâzara*, *al-Şahâif fi al-tafsîr*, *'Ilm al-âfâq wa-l-anfus*, *Ashkâl al-ta'sis*, *Al-Munya wa-l-amal fi 'ilm al-khilâf wa âdâb al-baḥth wa-l-jadal*, *al-Tadhkira fi-l-hay'a*, *al-Ḥikma al-ilâhiyya*, *al-Ta'aqqubât*, *Sharh Mansha' al-nazar and Sharh al-Niqât*.⁸

We conduct in this study a critical edition of a theological treatise written by al-Samarqandî that consists of one folio and discusses whether God's attributes are identical to His essence or different from it as well as the issues of the identity of the names and the named (*ism-musammâ*), and the atom (*al-juz' alladhî lâ yatajazzâ*) according to Ahl al-Sunna.⁹

This study will examine this treatise (*risâla*) in terms of the features and content of the manuscript in order to prove that it belongs to al-Samarqandî. We will first make evaluations about the content of the treatise, then introduce the manuscript used in the critical edition, and lastly present the critical edition and translation of the treatise after describing the method we use in the critical edition and translation.

7 For further information, see Tarık Tanrıbilir, *Şemsüddin es-Semerkindî'de Varlık ve Bilgi* (Ankara: Kitabe Yayınları, 2022), 17-24; Şemseddin es-Semerkindî, *Kelâm Mecmuası* (İstanbul: Suleymaniye Library, Laleli 2432), 34a, 52b, 56b, 136b, 153b, 169a.

8 For the books attributed to Samarqandî, see Shams al-din al-Samarqandî, *Kelâm Mecmuası* (İstanbul: Suleymaniye Library, Laleli 2432); *Qıştâs al-afkâr* (İstanbul: Suleymaniye Library, Amcazâde Hüseyin, 342); *Sharh al-Qıştâs* (İstanbul: Fatih, 3360); Qâḍizâde Rûmî, *Sharh Ashkâl al-ta'sis* (İstanbul: Ayasofya, 2712); Shams al-din al-Samarqandî, *Qıştâs al-afkâr*, trs. Necmettin Pehlivan (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2014); *Bashârât al-Ishârât* (İstanbul: Suleymaniye Library, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, 879); Tashkoprizâda, *Mawḍû'at al-'ulûm*, 1/331; Shams al-din al-Samarqandî, *Âdâba al-baḥth wa-l-munâzara*, (Kastamonu: Kastamonu Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, KHK 3666); Shams al-din al-Samarqandî, *'Ilm al-aflâk wa-l-anfus*, ed.-trs. Yusuf Okşar and İsmail Yürük (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2020); Necmettin Pehlivan - Hadi Ensar Ceylan., "Şemseddin Muhammed b. Eşref es-Semerkindî el-Hüseyinî et-Türki'ye Ait İki Yeni Eser: Şerhu Menşe'i'n-nazar ve Şerhu'n-Nikât", *Nazariyat*, 6/1 (May 2020), 115-207; İsmail Yürük, "Şemsüddin Muhammed b. Eşref el-Hüseyinî, es-Semerkindî'nin Belli Başlı Kelami Görüşleri (Allah ve İman Anlayışı)" (Erzurum: Atatürk University, Institute of Social Sciences, PhD Dissertation, 1987), 8-16; İsmail Şık, *Şemsüddin es-Semerkindî'de Varlık* (Adana: Çukurova University, 2011), 13.

9 Shams al-din al-Samarqandî, *al-Risâla al-sharīfa* [fi *al-kalām*] (İstanbul: Suleymaniye Library, Laleli, 2432), 1b; (İstanbul: Suleymaniye Library, Cârullah, 1247), 46a-46b.

The Content of the Treatise and Its Analysis

Samarqandī's treatise consists of a preface (*muqaddima*), three main issues (*mas'ala*), and a conclusion (*khātima*) with prayer. In the preface following the *basmala*, *ḥamdala*, and *ṣalwala*, Samarqandī explains why he wrote the treatise and to whom he dedicates it, then deals with the topics in order.

In this book, al-Samarqandī analyzes the views of the Ahl al-Sunna on whether God's attributes are identical to His essence or different than it, the identity of the names and the named, and the existence of the atom.

Muslim thinkers who agree that Allah possesses the the attributes of competence have disagreed about the relationship between His essence and attributes. One of the key debates between the Mu'tazilites and the Ahl al-Sunna is the relationship between His essence and attributes. Although the Mu'tazilites describe Allah with certain attributes, they do not acknowledge that these attributes have an existence independent of His essence. In their view, accepting attributes being *dhātī* (essential) leads to the multiplicity of pre-eternal beings. However, Allah is the only pre-eternal being. As a result, His attributes are considered to be identical to His essence.¹⁰ According to Ahl al-Sunna on the other hand, identifying God's essence with His attributes leads the attributes being ignored. One cannot claim that the divine attributes are detached from God's essence. Otherwise, many beings are able to exist that are pre-eternal (*qadīm*) *per se*, independent of God's essence. Allah, however, is the only pre-eternal being. Consequently, the Ahl al-Sunna expressed their position on His essence and attributes with this challenging proposition: "God's attributes are neither identical to nor different from His essence."¹¹ In his treatise, al-Samarqandī attempts both to explain and prove this position.

Samarqandī holds the view of the Ahl al-Sunna that Allah's attributes are neither identical to nor different from His essence. According to Samarqandī, if God's attributes were indeed identical to His essence, all divine attributes would have to be identical. Another proof of God's essence and attributes not being the same is the fact that His attributes are not self-subsistent while His essence is. According to al-Samarqandī, nor can God's attributes differ from His essence. This is because being

10 Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-khamsa*, trs. İlyas Çelebi, (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2013), 1/294–342.

11 Sa'd al-din al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-'Aqā'id al-Nasafiyya*, ed. Mustafa Marzūqi (Algeria: Dār al-Hudā, 2000), 42–44.

different implies being detached (*munfaşil*). In reality, however, having attributes be detached from each other as well as from His essence is impossible. Moreover, al-Samarqandī made a linguistic analysis to solve the problem of the relationship between the essence and attributes. For example, if someone says, “There is no one else other than Zayd in the house,” everyone will accept that he is telling the truth, and no one will ask, “Is not Zayd’s hand, shape, and color different from him?” This is also the case with “I have not seen anyone other than so and so.” Therefore, other/different means only that which is detached in terms of the language, the custom, and the *sharī’a*. That what is valid is revealed by the language, custom, and *sharī’a* is beyond dispute, and that the attributes of Allah are not different from Him therefore follows. Samarqandī claimed to be the first one to put forward these proofs, which he characterized as proofs not found in the books of the antecedents (*awwalīn*) or the later ones (*ākhirīn*), and thus these proofs end the discussions on this subject and have no need for further say.

On the other hand, al-Samarqandī also criticized the famous argument put forward by the Ahl al-Sunna on the relation between Allah’s essence and attributes. In his opinion, the Ahl al-Sunna applied two methods to prove their position on this issue: defining the ‘concept of otherness’ (*ghayriyya*) and objecting to the multiplicity of pre-eternal beings. The Ahl al-Sunna define the concept of two others (*ghayrān*) in two different ways: According to the first definition, two others are two entities, one of which exists where the other does not. However, this definition does not imply that negating deities other than Allah means negating pre-eternal beings. Many scholars believe that in verses explaining there is no deity other than Allah, the preposition of exception (i.e., *illā*) is an adjective in the sense of *ghayr* [other]. In this case, the statement that there is no deity other than Allah could imply that there other pre-eternal beings may exist other than the negated deities. According to the second definition, *ghayrān* means that which can be thought of without thinking of another. In this situation, because the attributes may be considered detached from one another and from Allah’s essence, His attributes must be different from His essence.

Ahl al-Sunna holds that, if the attributes that are claimed to be pre-eternal by themselves are considered to be different than the essence of Allah, then a multiplicity of pre-eternal beings must exist. Therefore, God’s attributes cannot be other than His essence. The Ahl al-Sunna consider the attributes that are not different from the essence to be beyond the pre-essence. Yet for al-Samarqandī, no difference exists between something other than the essence being pre-eternal and

something beyond the essence being pre-eternal. The preposition *mā* al-Samarqandī uses in his statement is a question of denial (*al-istifhām al-inkārī*) based on context. Moreover, the real problem here is not the attributes but the acceptance of an essence other than the essence of God as a pre-eternal being. In the relation between essence and attributes, the Ahl al-Sunna express the sameness of essence and attributes in the ontological sense (i.e., that attributes do not have an existence independent of essence) as well as essence being different from attribute in the epistemological sense (i.e., that essence and attributes can be defined independently in the mental plane). Conversely, al-Samarqandī applied a purely ontological approach to both identity and non-identity and conceived the existence of pre-eternal attributes in a way that would not overshadow the unity of essence.

In fact, for al-Samarqandī, two things being neither the same nor different from each other would appear to have ignorance at its core. For if one thing were to have the same meaning as another, they would be considered identical; otherwise, they are considered different. According to al-Samarqandī, the Ash‘arites necessarily knew that essence and attribute cannot be identical. However, if they were considered to be different, the problem of the multiplicity of pre-eternal beings (*ta‘addud al-qudamā’*) would arise. Therefore, in order to eliminate this problem, the Ash‘arites claimed that attributes could not be other than essence, and they assigned meanings to the term of other/different that would support their thesis.¹² According to al-Samarqandī, the Ash‘arites necessarily know that essence and attributes cannot be identical, but they claim that God’s attributes are neither the same nor different from His essence through the meaning they assign to the term *ghayr* out of concern for the multiplicity of pre-eternals (*ta‘addud al-qudamā’*). By doing so, al-Samarqandī reduces the disagreement with the Ash‘arites about the relation between essence and attributes to a literal and terminological dispute. Samarqandī presented his original views and evidence by saying “*al-ḥaqq*” after critically analyzing almost every issue he discussed. Following the principle of scientific continuity, al-Samarqandī endeavored to perpetuate the scholarly legacy and wisdom he had inherited from his predecessors. Samarqandī’s method of analysis is seen to relatively facilitate inter-sectarian transitivity and to adopt a truth-oriented attitude that transcends sects and disciplines.¹³

12 Shams al-Din al-Samarqandī, *al-Ṣaḥā’if al-ilāhiyya*, ed. Ahmad Abdurrahman Sharif (Riyadh: 1990), 300–301; a. mlf., *al-Ma‘ārif fi sharḥ al-Ṣaḥā’if*, ed. Abdullah Muhammad Abdullah Ismail-Nazir Muhammad Nazir Iyadh (Cairo: al-Makṭaba al-Azhariyya li-l-Turāth, 2017-2018), 2/1055-1057.

13 Tanrıbilir, *Şemsüddin es-Semerkandi’de Varlık ve Bilgi*, 241.

One of the crucial topics of discussion on attributes is the relationship between name (*ism*) and essence (*musammā*). On one hand, theologians discussed the relation between essence and attributes, while on the other they discussed the relation between the names (*ism*) from which the attributes are derived and the named (*musammā*) in parallel with the relation with essence.¹⁴ The theologians of the Jahmiyya, Mu'tazila, and Shi'a argued the names to be different from the named and to be the same as the naming (*tasmiya*). According to the Mu'tazilites, multiple pre-eternal beings would emerge if the names were the same as the named. Allah, however, is the only acceptable pre-eternal being.¹⁵ According to the Ahl al-Sunna, though, Allah's names and attributes are meanings attributed to His essence (*dhāt*) and are not independent of it. Therefore, attributing many names or attributes to the essence (*dhāt*) does not harm the belief in Tawhīd. On the contrary, they viewed the belief in Tawhīd to be harmed by considering the names to be other than the essence (*dhāt*).¹⁶ One of the problems that al-Samarqandī tried to solve in this treatise is the relationship between the names and named. In this regard, he tried to prove the Ahl al-Sunna's view that the names are the same as the named.

Samarqandī defended the Ahl al-Sunna's view on the identity of the names and named, citing various verses and hadiths as evidence to prove that the names and the named are identical in the *sharī'a* and not in the lexical sense. According to him, a name contains two meanings, the first of which is *ḥaqīqī shar'ī* and the second of which is *lughawī*. The acceptance of the identity of the names and the named corresponds to the *ḥaqīqī shar'ī* meaning. Because the *ḥaqīqī* [literal] meaning is the principal in speech, it is more appropriate to accept the identity of the names and the named rather than the other way around. Here, Samarqandī accepted the *shar'ī* meaning as *ḥaqīqī* and the *lughawī* meaning as metaphor (*majāz*). In accordance with the rule of Arabic rhetoric, which states that what is principal in speech is the *ḥaqīqī* meaning unless there is an indication to the contrary, he held the *ḥaqīqī*

14 İlyas Çelebi, "Klasik Bir Kelâm Problemi Olarak İsim-Müsemma Meselesi", *İLAM Araştırma Dergisi* 3/1 (June 1998), 103.

15 Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Muğnī fī abwāb al-tawhīd wa-l-'adl*, ed. Mahmūd Moḥammad al-Khudayrī (Cairo: al-Mu'essesat al-Miṣriyya al-'Āmma, ts.), 5/173–185.

16 Abū al-Yusr Muḥammad al-Pazdawī, *Uṣūl al-dīn* (Cairo: al-Maktabat al-Azhariyya li-t-Turāth, 2005), 93–94; Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, *Kitāb al-Irshād ilā kawāṭi' al-adilla fī uṣūl al-i'tiqād* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khanjī, 1950), 141–142; Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, trans. Ömer Türker (Istanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı, 2015), 3/360–64; Şa'd al-Din al-Taftazānī, Mas'ūd b. 'Umar, *Sharḥ al-Maqāsid*, trans. 'Abd al-Raḥman 'Umayra (Beirut: 'Ālam al-Kutub, 1998), 4/337–341; Nūr al-Din al-Sabūnī, *Kitāb al-bidāya min al-Kifāya fī al-hidāya fī uṣūl al-dīn*, ed. Faṭḥullah Ḥulayf (Egypt: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1969) 54–56.

meaning of the names and the named. In addition, he considered these terms to be identical. Clearly, al-Samarqandī analyzed the disputes about the relationship between the names and the named using the linguistic method, just as in the relationship between the essence and the attribute.

Samarqandī analyzed the relationship between the names and the named, and unlike lexical books, he established a terminological identity between them. Hence, if one were to use the lexical meaning as a basis for identification, then the names and the named would be unidentifiable. This is because a name refers to a concept that has an equivalent in language, writing, or the mind, whereas the named corresponds to a concrete entity in the objective world. Consequently, a name can be defined as a symbol indicating a reality, while a named can be defined as the reality itself. Analysis of the relevant sacred texts, however, reveals that in the case of Allah, the names are used instead of the named. Therefore, the Ahl al-Sunna have used the attribution of concepts in the Qur'an, such as glorification (*tasbih*), remembrance (*dhikr*), and greatness (*tebāruk*) both for God and for His names as evidence to prove their view. This brings up a semantic and terminological distinction in the relation between the names and the named. For this reason, al-Samarqandī reduced this debate to a literal disagreement. As a matter of fact, all Islamic *madhhabs* accept God as having the most perfect attributes and being free from any deficient attribute yet disagree over the meaning of the names and the named. Samarqandī reduced both the essence-attribute relationship and the names-named relationship to a dispute over literal meaning. Thus, he displayed an eclectic and analytical approach across *madhhabs*.

Theologians have based many critical problems on the substance-accident theory, including the pre-eternal unity of God, His attributes, His actions, the relationship between His essence and His attributes, the resurrection after death (*hashr*), the perpetuity of the afterlife (*baqā'*), the increment-decrement and continuity of *īmān* [faith/belief], the universe's creation in time (*hudūth*), causality, the soul (*nafs*), goodness and badness (*ḥusn wa qubḥ*), and even fate (*qadar*). Differences in the definition and interpretation of accidents and their substances constitute the basic dynamics of disagreements among the schools of theology, both within themselves and between them and philosophers.¹⁷ Theologians and philosophers have differed over the issue of the existence of the atom. Theologians

17 Tank Tanrıbilir, "Hanefî-Mâtürîdî Âlim Şemseddin es-Semerkindî'de Sürekli Yaratma Eleştirisi", *Çukurova Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 21/2 (December 2021), 703.

defended the existence of the atom, whereas philosophers have rejected it. Many ancient philosophers and a group of theologians such as al-Ḍirār b. 'Amr (d. 200/815 [?]), Ḥāfı̄s al-Fard (d. after 204/820), al-Husayn al-Najjār (d. around 230/845), al-Nazzām (d. 231/845), and Hishām b. al-Ḥakam (d. 179/795) did not accept the existence of substances (*jawhar*). In the view of theologians, the universe is finite, limited, created in time (*ḥādith*), and passive (*munfa'il*), while Greek philosophers believed in a universe composed of a set of pre-eternal and everlasting atoms.¹⁸ According to the Ash'arites, in order for God to be characterized as the creator in the most comprehensive sense, one must accept that He created the universe out of nothingness (i.e., out of absolute non-existence). Hence, creating the universe from something constant such as the first matter (*hayūla*) or existential contingency (*al-imbkân al-wujūdi*) undermines God's absolute power. The demonstrations that the universe is created are based on the following axioms: we can see that the constituent parts of the universe get annihilated, that having a universe with infinite dimensions is impossible, that God is the agent (*fa'il*) with His will and the universe His creation, that bodies (*ajsām*) are contingent in need of an agent, and that everything relies on God as the source of existence.¹⁹

Al-Samarqandî takes a position in this treatise in favor of theologians in order to prove the existence of the atom. Samarqandî defines substance as a structure indivisible by either mental imagination or any external disassembly. He maintained that objects are either divisible down to their non-extended parts or indivisible. As objects are divided up into their non-extended parts, the smallest part that cannot be further subdivided emerges. If objects cannot be divided into their non-extended parts and are composed of an infinite number of extended parts, their size and space must also be infinite. However, observation does not confirm this. In order to remove these mental and perceptual contradictions, one must accept the existence of the components. He deemed this argument uniquely good and original. Placing the science of logic at the center of his system, al-Samarqandî reached metaphysical conclusions based on physical knowledge using logical syllogisms.

In the view of the Ahl al-Sunna, if there was no substance a mustard and a mountain would have equal parts. Samarqandî argued this case to necessarily be

18 Abu al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arî, *Maqālāt al-Islamiyyin wa ikhtilāf al-muṣallîn* (Beirut: al-Maktabat al-'Aşriyya, 2009), 180–186.

19 See Samarqandî, *al-Şaḥā'if al-ilāhiyya*, 159–162, 206–213, 256–268, 400–418; a. mlf., *al-Ma'arîf fi sharḥ al-Şaḥā'if*, 1/689–690, 2/793–827, 2/946–975, 2/1307–1336.

impossible and considered their argument to be weak. Philosophers already accept that all objects have equal parts because they can be divided into infinite parts.²⁰ Samarqandī tried to explain the relationship between God and the universe based on atoms. Taking the universal measurements to be composed of the smallest interdependent units, he established that the universe is finite and created in time, whereas God is pre-eternal. In other words, the finite and limited nature of matter would result in space, motion, and time being finite and limited according to Samarqandī. This would then result in the universe being finite and limited, and thus the creator who created it would be pre-eternal and everlasting.

The Title of the Treatise

This treatise studied herein is called *al-Risāla al-sharīfa* and is found in the collection of Samarqandī's works on theology, logic, and astronomy in the Suleymaniye Library registered under Laleli 2432.²¹ In a one-page, two-folio manuscript registered in Suleymaniye Library under Cârullah 1247, the work is referred to only as *al-Risāla*. In addition, this manuscript is registered as *Risālat al-'aqāid* in the catalog information.²² Because the work adopts the method of philosophical theology and tries to ground the issues of belief by applying the rules of classical logic, language, and philosophy, we have preferred to call it *al-Risāla al-Sharīfa [fī al-Kalām]*, as is mentioned in the Laleli collection of the Suleymaniye Library.

The Attribution of the Treatise

Biographical books provide limited information about Samarkandī and do not mention this treatise. The evidence and signs we have presented provide clear clues that the treatise we have edited belongs to al-Samarqandī. The reason why this treatise is not attributed to al-Samarqandī in biographical books can be considered as a reflection of the limited information about his life. As a matter of fact, various biographical books that contain limited information about his life contain some works known to be his that are not attributed to him, in addition to attributing to him some works that are known not to be his.²³ So can we say that

20 Samarqandī, *al-Risāla al-sharīfa [fī al-kalām]* (Laleli, 2432), 1b; (Cârullah, 1247), 46a–46b.

21 Samarqandī, *al-Risāla al-sharīfa [fī al-kalām]* (Laleli, 2432), 1b.

22 Samarqandī, *al-Risāla al-sharīfa [fī al-kalām]* (Cârullah, 1247), 46a–46b.

23 See Kâtîp Çalabî, *Sullel al-wuşûl ilâ tabaqâti al-fuḥûl*, 3/108; Taşköprizâde, *Mawḍû'ât al-'ulûm*, 630;

this treatise is a summary composed by his pupil al-Ghāzī or by someone else based on al-Samarqandī's other works? In our opinion, this treatise is not a summary or a text quoted from elsewhere, and the following clues indicate this: The scope of the issues addressed in the treatise is analyzed in equal or greater detail than the same issues addressed in Samarqandī's other theological works. In addition, the treatise has an independent feature consisting of a preface (*muqaddima*), the issues (*mas'ala*), and conclusion (*khātima*). The following analysis of this treatise supports this thesis in the form of tables.

The end of the treatise registered in Süleymaniye Library under Cārullah 1247 has the phrase “اتفق الفراغ في كتابة هذه الرسالة التي هي للفاضل السمرقندي” This phrase attributes the treatise to al-Fāḍil al-Samarqandī, another name by which Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī is known. His work *Ādāb al-baḥth wa-l-munāzara* is also noteworthy known as *Ādāb al-Fāḍil*.²⁴

We compared the views in the treatise regarding God's attributes being neither the same nor different from His essence, the identity of the names and the named, and the existence of the atom with Samarqandī's other theological works such as *al-Şaḥā'if al-ilāhiyya* and *al-Ma'arif fi sharḥ al-Şaḥā'if*. Our analysis revealed that the views, the use of language, the exemplification, and the arguments in both the treatise and his other theological works overlap significantly. In particular, the harmony of the form of argumentation in this treatise with the other theological works that are stated to be original to al-Samarqandī strengthens the claim that this treatise belongs to him. A few examples showing the similarities *al-Şaḥā'if* and its commentary *al-Ma'arif fi sharḥ al-Şaḥā'if* have with the texts in the treatise are as follow:

Kātip Çalabī, *Kaṣḥf al-zunūn*, 2/1074; İsmail Pasha al-Baġhdādī, *Hadiyyat al-'arīfin*, 2/106; Kaḥḥāla, *Mu'jam al-mu'allifin*, 3/136.

24 Samarqandī, *Ādāb al-Fāḍil* (Türkiye, Süleymaniye Library, Yazma Baġışlar, 4030/5), 126a; (Türkiye: Raşit Efendi Yazma Eser Library, 26659/3), 75b.

Table 1.

Comparison of the language, arguments, and positions in *al-Ma'arif* and *al-Risāla al-sharīfa* regarding the identity of essences and attributes.

<i>al-Ṣaḥāif al-Ilāhiyya</i>	<i>al-Risāla al-sharīfa</i>
<p>واستدل أصحابنا بأن العلم لو كان عين ماهيته تعالى، والوجود عندكم أيضا عين ماهيته تعالى فيلزم أن يكون العلم عين الوجود، وذلك باطل ضرورة؛ لأن العلم معنى تدرك به الأشياء وليس الوجود كذلك. وكذلك بينوا في الوجوب، وغيره من الصفات. وهذا حق.²⁵</p>	<p>والحق ما ذكره أهل السنة ونحن نبينه بعون الله، وحسن توفيقه على وجه يتوضح به الحال، وينقطع القيل والقال، فنقول أما أنها ليست عين الذات فظاهر؛ لأنها لو كانت عين ذات لكان كل منها عين الآخر، فيلزم أن يكون الوجود عين العلم والقدرة والإرادة وغير ذلك. لكن ذلك باطل بالبداهة؛ لأن الوجود ما به يتحقق الشيء، لا ما يدرك به الشيء، والعلم بعكس ذلك. وكذا في غيرهما. وايضا يحكم العقل بالضرورة أن العلم لا يقوم بنفسه، بل هو صفة نفسه. وكذا القدرة والإرادة وغير ذلك. الذات قائمة بنفسها فليس شيء منها عين الذات.²⁶</p>

25 Samarqandi, *al-Risāla al-sharīfa [fi al-kalām]* (Laleli, 2432), 1b.

26 Samarqandi, *al-Ṣaḥā'if al-ilāhiyya*, 300.

Table 2.

Comparison of the language, arguments, and positions in *al-Ma'ārif* and *al-Risāla al-sharīfa* regarding the relationship between essences and attributes.

<i>al-Ma'ārif fi sharḥ al-Şaḥā'if</i>	<i>al-Risāla al-sharīfa</i>
<p>والحقّ أنّ الغيرين لغةً، وشرعاً، عرفاً أنّها يقال على المنفصلين؛ لأنّ من قال: «ليس في كيسي غير دراهم» ولم يكن زائداً عليها يصدّقه كلّ عاقل من أهل اللغة، والعرف، والشرع، ولا نقول له: «أليس الواحد والإثنان وغير ذلك غير العشرة» حتى لو حلف عليه لا يُجثته الشرع. وكذا لو قال: «ليس في الدار غير زيد» فلا يقال: له «أليس يده ولونه وشكله غيره».²⁷</p>	<p>وأما أنّها ليست غيرها؛ فلأنّ الغير لغةً وعرفاً وشرعاً إنّما يُطلق على المنفصل، وصفات الله تعالى لا يمكن انفصالها عن ذاته تعالى، ولا انفصالاً بعضها عن البعض. فلا تكون متغايرةً. وإنّما قلنا: إنّ الغير بحسب اللّغة والعرف والشرع هو المنفصل؛ لأنّ من قال مثلاً: «ليس في كيسي غير عشرة دراهم»، ولا يكون فيه زائداً عليها يصدّقه كلّ عاقل من أهل اللّغة والعرف والشرع، ولا يقول له «أليس الواحد والإثنان وغير ذلك غير العشرة»، حتى لا يُجثته الشرع لو حلف عليه. وكذا لو قال: «في الدار غير زيد» يصدّقه كلّ واحد، ولا يقول: «أليس يده وشكله ولونه غيره». وكذا لو قال: «ما رأيت غير فلان». وأمثال ذلك كثيرٌ من أن يُحصى. فعلم أنّ الغير بحسب اللّغة والعرف والشرع إنّما يقال على المنفصل. ولا شكّ ولا خلاف أنّ المعبر ما يشهد به اللّغة والعرف والشرع. فعلم أنّ صفات الله تعالى ليست غيرها. وهذا قولٌ فصلٌ لا مزيد عليه. وهو ليس في كتب الأوّلين والآخريين. والحمد لله الذي هدانا وما كنّا لنهتدي لو لا أن هدانا الله.²⁸</p>

27 Samarqandī, *al-Ma'ārif fi sharḥ al-Şaḥā'if*, 2/1055.

28 Samarqandī, *al-Risāla al-sharīfa [fi al-kalām]* (Laleli, 2432), 1b.

Table 3.

Comparison of the language in *al-Ma'ārif* and *al-Risāla al-sharīfa* regarding the response to the objection to the view on the relationship between essences and attributes.

<i>al-Ma'ārif fi sharḥ al-Ṣaḥā'if</i>	<i>al-Risāla al-sharīfa</i>
ثم أهل السنه سلموا أن صفات الله تعالى وراء الذات؛ وفسروا الوراثة أنها ليس مفهومه نفس مفهوم الآخر... والحق أنه لما سلم أن الصفة وراء الذات فقد سلم أن شيئاً آخر وراء الذات قديماً، وحيثما ما في الفائدة في الاحتراز عن القدماء بهذه التكاليفات. ²⁹	ثم سلموا أن صفات الله تعالى وإن لم تكن غير الذات لكنها وراء الذات. واعترضوا عليه بأن عدم قولكم بتغايرها لا يوجب عدم تغايرها. وايضاً المحترز قدّم ذاتٍ آخر سوى الله تعالى لا قدّم الصفات. وايضاً سلمتم أن وراء الله تعالى قديماً فما الفرق بين هذا وبين تسليم قدّم الغير. ³⁰

Table 4.

Comparison of the language, proofs, and positions in *al-Ma'ārif* and *al-Risāla al-sharīfa* regarding the relationship between the names and the named.

<i>al-Ma'ārif fi sharḥ al-Ṣaḥā'if</i>	<i>al-Risāla al-sharīfa</i>
ولاخفاء أن قول أهل السنه هاهنا مشكلاً، وإثباته صعب. لكن يمكن فيه وجه حسنٌ يسهل به التقصي عن مضايق الشبه إلى سعة النجاح وهو أن يقال: المدعا أن الاسم هو عين المسمى بحسب الشرع، لا بحسب اللغة، والعرف؛ لأنه ورد في عدة مواضع من كلام رب العزة إطلاق الاسم، وإرادة المسمى وهذا دليل على أن الاسم في الشرع هو المسمى؛ لأن هذا لو جرد النظر إليه يغلب على الظن أن الاسم هو المسمى. ولا معنى للدليل سوا هذا على أن الأصل في الكلام هو الحقيقة. ³¹	المسئلة الثانية: قال أهل السنه: الاسم عين المسمى. وخالفهم جميع الأمم من أهل اللغة، وغيرهم. وإثبات هذا المعنى في غاية الصعوبة لمخالفته الظاهر. ونحن نذكر ما سئح لنا من فيض رحمة الله تعالى. فنقول: المراد بقولنا «الاسم عين المسمى» أنه في الشرع كذلك، لا بحسب اللغة. وذلك؛ لأنه ورد في عدة مواضع من كلام رب العزة إطلاق الاسم، وإرادة المسمى. وهذا دليل على أن الاسم في الشرع هو المسمى؛ لأن هذا لو جرد النظر إليه يغلب على الظن أن الاسم هو المسمى. ولا معنى للدليل إلا هذا على أن الأصل في الكلام هو الحقيقة. ³²

29 Samarqandi, *al-Ma'ārif fi sharḥ al-Ṣaḥā'if*, 2/1055–6.

30 Samarqandi, *al-Risāla al-sharīfa [fi al-kalām]* (Laleli, 2432), 1b.

31 Samarqandi, *al-Ma'ārif fi sharḥ al-Ṣaḥā'if*, 2/1299.

32 Samarqandi, *al-Risāla al-sharīfa [fi al-kalām]* (Laleli, 2432), 1b.

Table 5.

Comparison of the language, original arguments, and positions in *al-Şahāif* and *al-Risāla al-sharīfa* regarding the proof of the atom.

<i>al-Şahāif al-İlāhiyya</i>	<i>al-Risāla al-sharīfa</i>
<p>والحق وجود الجزء. وذلك؛ لأنه لا يخلو من أن تنتهي التجزئة الى جزءٍ ليس له امتدادٌ في شيءٍ من الجهات أصلاً، أو لا. فإن انتهى فقد وُجد الجزء الذي لا يتجزأ؛ لأنه حينئذ لا يمكنه الانقسام، وإن لم ينته بل يوجد لكل جزءٍ من الأجزاء الغير المتناهية امتدادٌ ولاشك أن انضمام الامتدادات الغير المتناهية توجب امتداد غير متناهٍ فيلزم أن يكون مقدار الجسم الصغير غير متناهٍ وهذا مُحالٌ. فإن قلت: سلمنا أنه حينئذ لا ينقسم بالفك والقطع لكن لم قلت: إنه لا ينقسم بالفرض والوهم؛ قلت: فرض الانقسام، وتوهمه فيما ليس له امتدادٌ في نفس الأمر كاذبٌ فلا عبرة به. وهذا برهانٌ بديعٌ.³³</p>	<p>والحق أنه موجودٌ؛ لأن الجسم بالتجزئة لا يخلو من أن ينتهي الى جزءٍ ليس له امتدادٌ أصلاً لا في الطول، ولا في العرض، ولا في العمق؛ أو لا ينتهي. فإن انتهى فقد وجد الجزء الذي لا يتجزأ؛ لأن ما لا يكون له امتدادٌ في شيءٍ من الجهات لا ينقسم أصلاً؛ وإن لم ينته الى ما لا امتداد له بل ينقسم الى غير النهاية و يكون لكل جزءٍ من تلك الأجزاء امتدادٌ في شيءٍ من الجهات يلزم أن يكون طول جسم صغير كخردلية مثلاً، أو عرضه، أو عمقه غير متناهٍ. وكل أحد يعلم أنه ليس كذلك. فإن قلت سلمنا أن ما لا امتداد له لا ينقسم فكاً أما لم قلت أنه لا ينقسم وهماً؛ قلت توهم القسمة فيما لا امتداد له كاذبٌ؛ لأن القسمة تقتضي امتداداً ولا عبرة بالكاذب. وهذا برهانٌ بديعٌ ليس في كتب الأولين والآخرين، أحسن وأوثق منه.³⁴</p>

The Reason and the Date of Writing of the Treatise

In the preface (*muqaddima*) of his treatise, al-Samarqandī writes, “The head of the leaders of virtue, the guide of the ‘ulamā and the virtuous people, the model of the speculative theologians (*ahl al-naẓar*) and the jurists, the unique character of the *milla* and the religion, the precious one of Islam and the Muslims, *al-şadr* of Almaligh, (may Allah bless the Muslims with his long life and honor them with the *baraka* of his ultimate union) asked me to explain the view of the Ahl al-Sunna on three issues.” The title of *al-şadr* was granted to the families of ‘ulamā with authority in Bukhara and Transoxiana. As a result of historical circumstances and

33 Samarqandī, *al-Şahāif al-ilāhiyya*, 266–267.

34 Samarqandī, *al-Risāla al-sharīfa* [fi al-kalām] (Laleli, 2432), 1b.

political situations, these esteemed families who raised the leading Ḥanafī scholars handed over their authority to other families. In the last half of the thirteenth century and the first quarter of the fourteenth century when Samarqandī lived and wrote his works, the Maḥbūbī family held the title of *al-ṣadr*.³⁵ Samarqandī lived in the same period as three important scholars from the Maḥbūbī family: Ṣadr al-Sharī'a al-Thānī (d. 747/1346) and his two grandfathers, the brothers Tāj al-Sharī'a (d. 709/1309) and Burhān al-Sharī'a (7.-8. /13.-14. centuries). Therefore, the scholar who asked him to compose this treatise must have been one of these three scholars. Samarqandī described the person who asked him to write this text as a speculative theologian (*ahl al-naẓar*) and a jurist (*faqīh*), thus emphasizing his competence in jurisprudence and theology. He also referred to this person not only as "*al-ṣadr*"³⁶ but also as the head *ṣadr* of the leaders of virtue. These two points strengthen the possibility that the person in question was Ṣadr al-Sharī'a al-Thānī. As a matter of fact, 'Ubaydullah b Mas'ūd, known famously as Sadr al-Sharī'a, is known as the only scholar in the Maḥbūbī family to have written both *fiqh* and *kalām*.³⁷ Ṣadr al-Sharī'a refers to al-Samarqandī in many parts of his work *Ta'dīl al-'ulūm*, supporting him on some issues and objecting to others.³⁸ This provides an important clue to the intellectual interaction between al-Samarqandī and Ṣadr al-Sharī'a. Moreover, a comparative analysis of the three issues al-Samarqandī analyzes in his treatise with Ṣadr al-Sharī'a's book on *kalām*, *Sharḥ Ta'dīl al-'ulūm*, reveals a similarity in opinions and general narrative. We also see that Ṣadr al-Sharī'a refers to al-Samarqandī on the issue of the limitation of dimensions, which is complementary to the issue of the atom.³⁹ Ṣadr al-Sharī'a was known to have been middle aged at that time and to have been writing his work *Ta'dīl al-'ulūm* up until his death. However, he belonged to a scholarly family that bore the title *al-ṣadr*. Due to the circumstances, he had additionally begun learning science at a young age and was involved in teaching activities. These factors seem to have prepared the groundwork for him to become a competent and well-known scholar in those times. The above indications lead us to conclude that al-Samarqandī had dedicated his treatise to Ṣadr al-Sharī'a al-Thānī.

35 Ali Öngül, "Burhan Ailesi", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1992), 6/430-32.

36 Samarqandī, *al-Risāla al-sharīfa [fi al-kalām]* (İstanbul: Süleymaniye Library, Cârullah, 1247), 46a.

37 See Ṣadr al-Sharī'a al-Thānī 'Ubaydullāh b. Mas'ūd, *Sharḥ Ta'dīl al-'ulūm* (İstanbul: Hamidiye Library, 721); Ṣadr al-Sharī'a al-Thānī, *al-Tawdīḥ sharḥ al-Tanqīḥ* (Syria: Dār al-Farfūr, 2015).

38 Mahmut Ay, *Sadrüşşerī'a'da Varlık (Ta'dilü'l-Ulūm Temelinde Kelam-Felsefe Karşılaşması)* (Ankara: İlähiyât, 2006), 38.

39 Ṣadr al-Sharī'a al-Thānī 'Ubaydullāh b. Mas'ūd, *Sharḥ Ta'dīl al-'ulūm* (İstanbul: Süleymaniye Yazma Eser Library, Hamidiye, 721), 123a, 125b-126a, 152a-155a, 146b-147a.

In the early eighteenth century, Almaligh was under the rule of Muhammad Arslan Khan, who was reported to have come from the Khākāni Turkic (Qarakhanid) dynasty and to have ruled the Karluk province north of Almaligh. Almaligh, which had been ruled by a Karluk Turkish bey named Bozar for a while, was later included in the borders of the Mongol state. When Genghis' sons divided the country after his death in 1227, Almaligh was given to his second son, Chagatai. Almaligh thus became the second capital of the Chagatai lineage. It used to be a stop on the newly opened roads between various capital cities during the Mongol period. Muslim, Christian, and Chinese merchants and travelers who went to the Uyghur province from the capital city of the Golden Horde, located where the Etil river joins the sea, and the Ilkhanid centers in the Near East would stay in Almaligh. As the capital of the Chagatai dynasty, Almaligh was located in Turkestan, the the heart of Islam, and Almaligh being the Islamic center of Turkestan led to the conversion of the Chagatai lineage.⁴⁰ Even though the sources do not explicitly mention Şadr al-Sharī'a's presence in Almaligh, his path is highly likely to have brought him there.

The manuscript registered in Suleymaniye Library under Laleli 2432 was presented to al-Samarqandī by his student al-Sayf al-Samarqandī through the method of recitation (*qira'a*) and collation (*muqābala*). This manuscript contains Samarqandī's works on theology, logic, and astronomy, including this treatise on the first page. Although the other works in this collection are registered as having been presented (*ard*) to the author by his student al-Ghāzī and revised by him through the method of recitation, no such record exists regarding the treatise. The completion date of the Laleli copy of the treatise in Suleymaniye Library is given as 705 AH. The completion and revision dates of the other works in the same collection are 702, 706, 711, and 712 AH.⁴¹ The completion and revision dates of the copies in the collection containing al-Samarqandī's works are very close to one another. In addition, all the works in the collection, including the treatise, have the same typeface. These factors lead us to the conclusion that this treatise had been recited (*taqrīr*) by al-Samarqandī in the reading circle and double-checked by his pupil al-Ghāzī.

40 Jamāluddīn al-Karshī, *Mulḥaqāt al-Şura*, ed. Barthold-Vassiliy Vladimirovich, (Sankt-Peterburg: Tipografiya Imperatorskoy Akademii Nauk, 1898) 142–144; Emel Esin, «Almalıǵ», *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1989), 2/506.

41 Samarqandī, *Kelam Mecmuası*, (Istanbul: Süleymaniye Library, Laleli, 2432), 34a, 52b, 56b, 136b, 153b, 169a.

Characteristics of Manuscripts

The Laleli Manuscript (ل)

The Laleli manuscript (ل) is located in Suleymaniye Library registered under Laleli 2432 as number 1b of a collection of Samarqandī's works on theology, logic, and astronomy. Many of its words are difficult to read due to its dense writing, deformed margins, and partially faded ink. This manuscript mentions the treatise only under the name *al-Risāla al-sharīfa*. The phrase "تمت هذه الرسالة الشريفة في أوائل شوال سنة خمس وسبعمائة" appears at the end of the treatise and indicates it to have been written during the early days of Shawwal in 705 AH. The treatise in this collection is considered the oldest and most reliable manuscript.⁴²

The Cārullah Manuscript (ج)

The Cārullah manuscript (ج) consists of a single folio numbered 46a and 46b as registered in Suleymaniye Library under Cārullah 1247. This is a very clear manuscript written in *ta'liq* calligraphy with red titles. The work is only referred to as *al-Risāla*. The copy ends with the following statement:

اتفق الفراغ في كتابة هذه الرسالة التي هي للفاضل السمرقندي على يد أضعف الناس محمد بن مصطفى بن علي المعروف بولي الدين الولي بمدينة المنورة نورها الله في حجرة مشرفة على حجرة نبوية في المدرسة العجمية في اليوم الاول في جمادى الآخر سنة اثنين و مائة و ألف.

Although this statement attributes the treatise to Samarqandī, the copying appears to have been completed by Muhammad b. Mustafa b. 'Ali, also known as al-Waliyy al-Dīn al-Walī, in a chamber of the Madrasa al-A'jamiyya overlooking the Prophet's house in Madina on the 1st of Jumada al-Thani 1102.⁴³

The Ayasofya Manuscript (ا)

The Ayasofya Manuscript (ا) is registered at the Suleymaniye Library under Ayasofya 4800 and consists of three folios numbered between 39a and 41b. It is part of a collection of Akmal al-Dīn al-Bāberti's treatises. Although the title of the

42 Samarqandī, *al-Risāla al-sharīfa* (Laleli, 2432), 1b.

43 Samarqandī, *al-Risāla al-sharīfa* (Cārullah, 1247), 46b.

treatise is given in the catalog as *Risāla fi Taḥqīq Qawl Ahl al-Sunna fi Thalāth Masā'il fi Şifātillāh Ta'ālā*, no clear author or treatise name is provided in the work itself. Therefore, we think this title was quoted from the preface of the treatise.⁴⁴ Bāberti stands apart among the eminent scholars of the Ḥanafī *madhhab* and defended the need for its preference and *taqlid* in five separate works. He also was one of the leading scholars and commentators of the Māturidī school of theology and had been appointed by Amīr Shaykhū as the sheikh of the *khankāh* (*Shaykhūniyya*) he had built. He was engaged in teaching activities there for the rest of his life and buried there upon his death on 19 Ramaḍān 786 (November 4, 1384).⁴⁵ We think the treatise does not belong to al-Bābertī for two reasons: First, the main treatise was written in 705, which corresponds to a period preceding al-Bābertī's. Second, the language and content of this treatise are highly comparable to those in Samarqandi's theological works.

The Method of the Critical Edition and Its Translation

When searching the catalogues for Samarkandi's treatise, we found three manuscripts in the Laleli, Cārullah, and Ayasofya collections of the Suleymaniye Library. We think al-Samarqandi had recited it during the reading circles and his pupil al-Ghāzī had revised it based on the following reasons: The manuscript registered in Laleli is in the same collection with other works his student had read to al-Samarqandi. In addition, the dates of the revisions of the other works in the related collection are very close to the date of the completion of the treatise. Lastly, the treatise and the other works in the collection have the same typeface. As a matter of fact, the completion of the treatise took place in 705 AH, and the revision of al-Samarqandi's other works in the same collection took place in 702, 706, 711, and 712 AH.⁴⁶ Considering these factors, we have chosen the Laleli manuscript as the *aşl* [original] and noted the differences from Ayasofya and Cārullah in the footnotes. Our critical edition identifies the manuscript registered in Suleymaniye Library under Cārullah 1247 as ç and the copy registered in Suleymaniye Library under Ayasofya 4800 as İ. We conducted the critical edition in accordance with principles of the Center for Islamic Studies (ISAM).

44 Samarqandi, *al-Risāla al-sharīfa* (Istanbul: Süleymaniye Library, Hagia Sophia, 4800), 39a41b.

45 Arif Aytakin, "Bāberti", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslām Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1991), 4/377–378.

46 Samarqandi, *Kelam Mecmuası*, 34a, 52b, 56b, 136b, 153b, 169a.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ. أَحْمَدُهُ بِالْعَالَمِينَ وَالسَّلَامُ عَلَى نَبِيِّهِ مُحَمَّدٍ وَآلِهِ وَأَصْحَابِهِ الطَّاهِرِينَ. وَبَعْدُ
 فَعَدَا اسْتَوْفَحَ مَبْنَى الْأَمَامِ الْعَالِمِ الْفَاضِلِ صَدْرِ الْمَافِاضِلِ تَدْرُقُ الْعُلَمَاءَ وَالْفَضْلَ اسْتَوْفَحَ النَّظَارَ وَالْفَتْهَى
 وَجَدَ الْمَدَّةَ وَالرِّدْنَ عَزَّزَ الْإِسْلَامَ وَالْمُسْلِمِينَ الصَّدْرُ بِالْمَالِخِ. مَتَعَ اللَّهُ الْمُسْلِمِينَ بِطَوْلِ بَقَائِهِ وَسَرَفِهِمْ بِرُكْنِهِ لِقَائِهِ.
 تَحْقِيقُ قَوْلِ أَهْلِ السُّنَنِ وَالْجَمَاعَةِ كَثْرَتِمْ اللَّهُ فِي ثَلَاثِ مَسَائِلٍ فِي صِفَاتِ أَهْلِ تَوَهُّدِهَا لِأَعْيُنِ الذَّاتِ وَلَا غَيْرِهَا
 وَفِي الْأَسْمِ وَالْمَيْتِيِّ. وَفِي الْجُزْءِ الَّذِي لَا يَنْجِزِي. فَتَلَقَيْتُهُ بِالْبَتُولِ. وَاسْتَوْفَحْتُ مِنْ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى الْهَامُ الْحَقُّ أَنَّهُ تَعَى
 رُفْلَهُمُ الصُّوَابِ. **السُّؤَالُ الْوَيْلِيُّ فِي الصِّنَاتِ.** قَالَ أَهْلُ السُّنَنِ بِعَهْمِ اللَّهِ صِنَاتِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى
 لِأَعْيُنِ ذَاتِهِ وَلَا غَيْرِ ذَاتِهِ وَاسْتَبَعَدَ هَذَا كَثِيرٌ مِنْ أَهْلِ الْعِلْمِ وَقَالُوا سَلَّمْنَا هَاهُنَا لَيْسَتْ عَيْنِ الذَّاتِ أَمَّا هَاهُنَا
 لَيْسَتْ غَيْرِهَا أَيْضًا فَذَلِكَ غَيْرُ مَعْقُولٍ لِأَنَّ كُلَّ مَفْهُومٍ لَيْسَ أَحَدُهُمَا عَيْنَ الْآخَرِ فَمَا غَيْرَانِ وَمَتَعَ أَهْلُ السُّنَنِ
 كَوْنَهُمَا غَيْرِينَ وَاسْتَدَلُّوا عَلَى دَعْوَاهُمْ بِوَجْهِ وَرَدِّهَا الْمُخْتَصِمُ وَمَا انْفَطَحَ الْكَلَامُ بَيْنَهُمْ إِلَى زَمَانِنَا هَذَا وَالْحَقُّ
 مَا ذَكَرَ أَهْلُ السُّنَنِ وَمَحْنُ نَبِيِّتِهِ بِعَوْنِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى وَحَسَنُ تَوْفِيقِهِ عَلَى وَجْهِ تَبَرُّجِهِ بِهِ الْحَالِ وَيَنْتَظِعُ الْبِتْلُ
 كَوَالِقَابِ نَسْتَوْلِي. أَمَّا هَاهُنَا لَيْسَتْ عَيْنِ الذَّاتِ فَظَّ لَهَا لَوْ كَانَتْ عَيْنِ الذَّاتِ لَكَانَ كُلُّ مَفْهُومٍ عَيْنَ الْغَيْرِ
 فَيَلْزَمُ أَنْ يَكُونَ الْوَجْهُ عَيْنَ الْعِلْمِ وَالْقَدْرُ وَالْإِرَادَةُ وَغَيْرُ ذَلِكَ لَكِنَّ ذَلِكَ بَاطِلٌ بِالْمَدْمُومَةِ لِأَنَّ الْحَقَّ
 مَا بِهِ تَحْقِيقُ الشَّيْءِ لَا مَا يَدْرِكُ بِهِ الشَّيْءُ وَالْعِلْمُ بِعَكْسِ ذَلِكَ وَكَذَا فِي غَيْرِهَا وَأَيْضًا أَحْكَمُ الْعَقْلِ بِالضَّرُورَةِ
 أَنَّ الْعِلْمَ لَا يَقْتَرِنُ بِنَفْسِهِ بَلْ هُوَ صِفَةٌ بِنَفْسِهِ وَكَذَا الْقَدْرُ وَالْإِرَادَةُ وَغَيْرُ ذَلِكَ وَالذَّاتُ قَائِمَةٌ بِنَفْسِهَا فَلَيْسَ
 شَيْءٌ مِنْهَا عَيْنَ الْمَذَاتِ وَأَمَّا هَاهُنَا لَيْسَتْ غَيْرِهَا فَلَا نَ الْخَيْرِ لَهَا وَغَرْنَا وَشَرَعْنَا إِنَّمَا يُطْلَقُ عَلَى الْمُنْفَصَلِ
 وَصِنَاتِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى لَا يُمْكِنُ انْفِصَالُهَا عَنْ ذَاتِهِ تَعَالَى وَلَا انْفِصَالُ بَعْضِهَا عَنْ الْبَعْضِ فَلَا تَكُونُ سَخَائِرَةً
 وَأَمَّا قُلْتُمْ أَنَّ الْغَيْرَ حَسْبَ اللَّغَةِ وَالْعَرَفِ وَالشَّيْءُ هُوَ الْمُنْفَصَلُ لِأَنَّ مِنْ قَوْلِهِ شَيْءٌ لَيْسَ بِكَيْسِي
 غَيْرِ عَشْتِ دَرَاهِمٍ وَلَا يَكُونُ فِيهِ رَأْيٌ عَلَيْهَا يُضَدُّهُ كُلُّ عَاقِلٍ مِنْ أَهْلِ اللَّغَةِ وَالْعَرَفِ وَلَا يَقُولُ لَيْسَ
 الْمُرَادُ وَالْإِنْسَانُ وَغَيْرُ ذَلِكَ غَيْرُ الشَّيْءِ حَتَّى لَا يُجَنَّبَهُ الشَّيْءُ لَوْ حَلَفَ عَلَيْهِ وَكَذَا الْقَوْلُ بِالْإِسْرَافِ
 غَيْرُ زَيْدٍ يُضَدُّهُ كُلُّ أَحَدٍ وَلَا يَقُولُ لَيْسَ بَيْنَهُ وَسُكْلُهُ وَلَوْ نَهَيْتُمْ وَكَذَا الْقَوْلُ مَا رَأَيْتُمْ غَيْرَ فُلَانٍ
 وَأَمَّا ذَلِكَ أَكْثَرُ مِنْ أَنْ تَحْيِي نَعْلَمُ أَنَّ الْغَيْرَ حَسْبَ اللَّغَةِ وَالْعَرَفِ وَالشَّيْءُ هُوَ الْمُنْفَصَلُ عَلَى الْمُنْفَصَلِ

تظعا والأساء لا يرعى فيها المعاني فقد اريد بالاسم ههنا المسمى وهو المبدع وليست سلمنا انه ما اراد
المسمى لكن هذا لا يضرنا الجواز ان يكون المراد بالاسم ههنا ما هو محسب للغة فكل هذا الوجه يصير اطلاق
الاسم في التسمين حقيقة في الاول حقيقة شرعية وفي الثاني لغوية فمن لم يجعل الاسم فيما ذكرنا
حقيقة شرعية فقد جعله مجازا والمجاز على خلاف الاصل فما ذكرنا اولى هذا غاية هذا البحث

الملة الثالثة قال اهل السنة الجزء الذي لا يتجزى موجود وقالت
الفلاسفة ليس بموجود والمراد بالجزء الذي لا يتجزى جوهر لا ينقسم لافكا ولا ذمما والحق انه
موجود لان الجسم بالتجزئة المخلو من ان ينتهي الى جزء لا يتجزى ليس له امتداد اصلا في الطول
ولا في العرض ولا في العمق وان انتهى فان انتهى فقد وجد الجزء الذي لا يتجزى لان ما لا يكون
له امتداد في شيء من الجهات لا ينقسم اصلا وان لم ينته الى ما لا امتداد له بل ينقسم الى غير النهاية
ويكون لكل جزء من تلك الأجزاء امتداد في شيء من الجهات يلزم ان يكون طول جميع هذه الخردلة او
عرضه او عمقه غير متناه وكل احد يعلم انه ليس كذلك فان قلت سلمنا ان ما لا امتداد
له لا ينقسم فكما انما قلت انه لا ينقسم ومما قلت توهم التسمية فيما لا امتداد له كاذب لان
التسمية تقتضي امتدادا ولا عبرة بالكاذب وهذا يدعيان بدع ليس في كتب الاولين والآخرين
احسن وأوثق منه وما قيل انه يلزم ان يكون لجزاء الخردلة كجزاء الجبل وهو محال دعوى بلا
دليل لان مذهب الحنفي ان انقسام الخردلة مثل انقسام الجبل في العدة بناء على كونها عكبي
متناهية في يلتزم الحنفي وينبغي استحالة فعل المتدلل بيانه فان قلت استحالة
واضحة لان ما يكون بقدر الخردلة من أجزاء الجبل يكون لجزءه كجزاء الخردلة فزرع والبأ
اضعا فامضا عنه كذلك فيمتنع ان يكون لجزاء الخردلة كجزاء الجبل قلت تجتنب الملازمة
هذا ما اردنا المراد به في هذه الرسالة والحمد لله رب العالمين

والصالح على سيد الخلق محمد وعلى آله واصحابه الطيبين

وسلم تسليمنا دائما لكثيرا الى يوم الدين

The Critical Edition of *al-Risāla al-sharīfa [fi al-kalām]*

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الحمد لله ربّ العالمين. والسلام على نبيّه محمد وعلى⁴⁷ آله وأصحابه الطاهرين. وبعد: فقد استوضح مني الإمام العالم الفاضل صدر صدور⁴⁸ الأفاضل قُدوة العلماء والفضلاء أسوة النظار والفقهاء وحيد الملة، والدين عزيز الإسلام، والمسلمين الصدر بالمألغ متع الله المسلمين بطول بقائه، وشرّفهم ببركة لقائه تحقيق قول أهل السنّة⁴⁹ في ثلاث مسائل: في صفات الله تعالى أنّها لا عين الذات ولا غيرها، وفي الاسم والمسمّى، وفي الجزء الذي لا يتجزّى. فتلقّيته بالقبول واستوهبت من الله تعالى إلهام الحق، إنه⁵⁰ ملهم الصواب.⁵¹

المسئلة الأولى: في الصفات

قال أهل السنّة⁵²: صفات الله تعالى لا عين ذاته ولا غير ذاته.

واستبعد هذا كثيرٌ من أهل العلم، وقالوا: سلّمنا أنّها ليست عين الذات، أمّا أنّها ليست غيرها أيضًا فذلك غير معقول؛ لأنّ كل مفهومين ليس أحدهما نفس⁵³ الآخر فهما غيران.

ومنع أهل السنّة كونها غيرين، واستدلّوا على دعواهم بوجود⁵⁴ وزيفها الخصوم⁵⁵، وما انقطع الكلام بينهم إلى زماننا هذا.

47 أ- على.

48 أ- صدور.

49 أ+ الجماعة كثّرهم الله.

50 أ+ تعالى.

51 ج: بالصواب.

52 أ+ نعمهم الله.

53 أ: عين.

54 ج: بوجوهم.

55 أ: الخصم.

والحق ما ذكره أهل السنّة ونحن نبيّنه بعون الله⁵⁶ وحسن توفيقه على وجه يتوصّح به الحال، وينقطع القيل والقال.

فقول: أمّا أنّها ليست عين الذات فظاهراً؛ لأنّها لو كانت عين ذاتٍ لكان كلُّ منها عين الآخر، فيلزم أن يكون الوجود عين العلم والقدرة والإرادة وغير ذلك. لكنّ ذلك باطلٌ بالبداهة؛ لأنّ الوجود ما به يتحقّق⁵⁷ الشيء، لا ما يدرك به الشيء، والعلم بعكس ذلك. وكذا في غيرهما. وأيضاً يحكم العقل بالضرورة أن العلم لا يقوم بنفسه؛ بل هو صفة نفسه، وكذا القدرة والإرادة وغير ذلك. والذات قائمةٌ بنفسها فليس شيءٌ منها عين الذات.

و«أمّا أنّها ليست غيرها» فلا أنّ الغير لغةً وعرفاً وشرعاً إنّما يُطلق على المنفصل، وصفات الله تعالى لا يمكن انفصالها عن ذاته تعالى، ولا انفصال بعضها عن البعض. فلا تكون متغايرةً. وإنّما قلنا: «إنّ الغير بحسب اللّغة والعرف والشرع هو المنفصل»؛ لأنّ من قال مثلاً: «ليس في كيسي⁵⁸ غير عشرة دراهم»، ولا يكون فيه زائداً عليها يصدّقه كلّ عاقلٍ⁵⁹ من أهل اللّغة والعرف والشرع⁶⁰، ولا يقول له: «أليس الواحد، والاثنان، وغير ذلك غير العشرة»، حتّى لا يُجثّته الشرع لو حلف عليه. وكذا لو قال: «ليس في الدار غير زيد» يصدّقه كلّ واحدٍ⁶¹، ولا يقول⁶²: «أليس يده وشكله ولونه غيره»، وكذا لو قال: «ما رأيت غير فلان». وأمثال ذلك كثيرٌ⁶³ من أن يُخصى⁶⁴. فعلم أنّ الغير بحسب اللّغة والعرف والشرع إنّما يقال على المنفصل. ولا شكّ ولا خلاف أنّ المعتر ما يشهد به اللّغة والعرف والشرع. فعلم أنّ صفات الله تعالى ليست غيرها.

وهذا قولٌ فصلٌ لا مزيدَ عليه. وهو ليس في كتب الأوّلين والآخرين. والحمد لله الذي هدانا لهذا⁶⁵ وما كنا لنهتدي لولا⁶⁶ أن هدانا الله.

56 أ+ تعالى.

57 ج: ما يتحقّق به.

58 أ: كيسي.

59 ج: فاعل.

60 أ- والشرع.

61 ج- ليس.

62 أ: أحد.

63 أ+ له.

64 أ: أكثر.

65 أ: تخصي.

66 أ+ لهذا.

67 ج: لو.

وحينئذٍ نذكر ما قالوا فيه مع ما يرد عليهم، فنقول: المشهور بين أهل السنة في بيان هذا المدعى وجهان:

أحدهما: تعريف الغيرين؛ والثاني: الاحتراز عن القدماء.

أما الأوّل فقالوا: الغيران هما الموجودان اللذان يصحّ وجود أحدهما مع عدم الآخر. فلزمهم^{٦٨} أنّ القديمين حينئذٍ لا يكونان غيرين، فلا يكون نفى إله^{٦٩} غير الله نفيًا لقديم سوى الله تعالى^{٧٠} في قوله تعالى: ﴿لَوْ كَانَ فِيهَا إِلَهٌ إِلَّا اللَّهُ لَفَسَدَتَا﴾ [الأنبياء ١٢ / ٢٢] وقولنا: (لا إله إلا الله)؛ لأنّ «إلا» ههنا بمعنى «الغير» عند الأكثر. وكذا في كلّ موضع وقع فيه^{٧١} ذكر غير الله تعالى كقوله تعالى: ﴿هَلْ مِنْ خَالِقٍ غَيْرِ اللَّهِ﴾ [الفاطر ٥٣ / ٣] وهذا فسادٌ عظيمٌ لا يخفى على أحد.

فإن قلت: المراد أنّ الغيرين هما اللذان يمكن تصوّر أحدهما مع الذهول عن الآخر، لا أن يكون أحدهما موجودًا دون الآخر. وحينئذٍ لا يرد شيء مما ذكرتم.

قلت: حينئذٍ يلزم أن يكون^{٧٢} صفات الله تعالى غير ذاته؛ إذ يمكن تصوّر الذات^{٧٣} مع الذهول عن كلّ صفةٍ فرضت و تصوّر بعض الصفات مع الذهول عن البعض.

واستدلّوا على أنّ الغيرين هما اللذان يصحّ وجود أحدهما مع عدم الآخر، وذلك؛ لأنّه لو لم يصحّ لما كان أحدهما غير الآخر، وإلا يلزم كون الشيء مغايرًا لنفسه وهو محال. كالواحد مثلاً من العشرة: أي: الواحد الموصوف بآته من العشرة، واليد من زيد؛ لأنّ العشرة اسم يقع على مجموع فهو الأفراد فكان متناوِلًا كلّ^{٧٤} فردٍ مع أغياره: ^{٧٥} أي: مع التسعة، فلو كان الواحد الذي في العشرة غير العشرة لصار غير نفسه؛ لأنّه من العشرة فيكون فردًا مع أغياره. ^{٧٦} وكذا اسم زيد

68 ج: فيلزمهم.

69 ج: الله.

70 أ- تعالى.

71 ج- فيه.

72 أ: تكون.

73 أ- تصوّر الذات.

74 أ: لكل.

75 ج: اعتبره.

76 ج: اعتبره.

يقع عليه باعتبار هذه الأعضاء فكان متناوياً لمجموع هذه الأعضاء. فإذا^{٧٧} قيل: «يد زيد غير زيد» كانت اليد غير نفسها. هذا ما قالوا وفساده في غاية الظهور؛ لأن قوله «فكان متناوياً لكل فرد مع أغياره»^{٧٨} له معنيان: أحدهما: كل فرد موصوفٍ بآته مع أغياره،^{٧٩} الثاني: كل فردٍ وأغياره مجموعاً حتى يكون العشرة مجموع الأفراد. فان أراد به الأوّل ففيه فسادٌ من وجهين: الأوّل: لو كان اسم العشرة متناوياً لكل فردٍ موصوفٍ بالمعيّة يلزم أن يكون^{٨٠} العشرة مائة؛ إذ في العشرة عشرة أفرادٍ موصوفةٍ بالمعيّة كلّ منها غير الآخر. الثاني: يلزم أن يكون الواحد من العشرة الذي^{٨١} هو فردٌ موصوفٌ بالمعيّة عين العشرة مع أنهم في بيان أن الواحد ليس عين العشرة ولا غيره، وهذا تناقضٌ ظاهرٌ، ومُحالٌ بلا خلافٍ. وإن أراد به الثاني فلا نسلم أن الواحد لو كان غير العشرة يلزم أن يكون غير نفسه، وإتّما يلزم أن^{٨٢} لو كان الواحد عين المجموع وليس كذلك بالضرورة.

الوجه الثاني: وهو الاحتراز عن القدماء. قالوا: لو قلنا إن صفات الله تعالى أغياره^{٨٣}، وصفات الله^{٨٤} لا يبدّ وأن تكون قديمةً فيلزم القدماء وهو مُحالٌ. فنقول: إتّما ليست غيرها. ثمّ سلّموا أن صفات الله تعالى وإن لم تكن غير الذات لكنّها وراء الذات. وفسّروا وراء الشيء بما لا يكون مفهومه نفس مفهوم الشيء فعلى هذا يكون الوراثة اعمّ من الغير.^{٨٥} واعتراضوا عليه بأنّ عدم قولكم بتغايرها لا يوجب عدم تغايرها. وأيضاً المحترز قدم ذاتٍ آخر سوى الله تعالى لا قدم الصفات. وأيضاً سلّمتم^{٨٦} أن وراء الله تعالى قديمٌ فما الفرق^{٨٧} بين هذا وبين تسليم^{٨٨} قدم الغير؟^{٨٩}

77 أ: وإذا.

78 ج: اعتباره.

79 ج: اعتباره.

80 أ: تكون.

81 أ- الذي.

82 ج- أن.

83 ج+ وصفات الله. | ل- أغياره، [صح في الهامش]

84 أ+ تعالى.

85 ل- وفسّروا وراء الشيء بما لا يكون مفهومه مفهوم الشيء فعلى هذا يكون الوراثة اعمّ من الغير، [صح في الهامش]

86 أ- وأيضاً سلّمتم.

87 أ: يفرق.

88 ج- تسليم.

89 أ+ والله أعلم.

المسئلة الثانية: [الاسم و المسمى]

قال أهل السنة^{٩٠}: الاسم عين المسمى^{٩١}. وخالفهم جميع الأمم من أهل اللغة، وغيرهم. وإثبات هذا المعنى^{٩٢} في غاية الصعوبة لمخالفته الظاهر. ونحن نذكر ما سُنِحَ لنا من فيض رحمة الله تعالى، فنقول: المراد بقولنا «الاسم عين المسمى» أنه في الشرع كذلك، لا بحسب اللغة. وذلك؛ لأنه ورد في عدة مواضع من كلام رب العزة إطلاق الاسم وإرادة المسمى، وهذا دليل على أن الاسم في الشرع هو المسمى؛ لأن هذا لو جُرد النظر إليه يَعلَبُ على الظن أن الاسم هو المسمى، ولا معنى للدليل^{٩٣} إلا هذا على أن الأصل في الكلام هو الحقيقة.

أما أنه ورد في عدة مواضع إطلاق الاسم وإرادة المسمى فلما جاء من قوله تعالى: ﴿مَا تَعْبُدُونَ مِنْ دُونِهِ إِلَّا أَسْمَاءُ﴾ [يوسف ١٢/٤٠] والمعبود أتمها هو المسمى؛ ولما ورد من قوله تعالى: ﴿سَبِّحْ اسْمَ رَبِّكَ﴾ [الأعلى ١/٨٧] والمسبح^{٩٤}؛ أتمها هو الرب، لا غير؛ ولقوله تعالى: ﴿تَبَارَكَ اسْمُ رَبِّكَ﴾ [الرحمن ٥٥/٧٨] و«تَبَارَكَ» بمعنى «بَارَكَ»، والمتبارك هو الرب؛ لقوله تعالى: ﴿تَبَارَكَ اللَّهُ﴾ [المؤمنون ٣٢/١٤]، و﴿تَبَارَكَ الَّذِي بِيَدِهِ الْمُلْكُ﴾ [الملك ١/٦٧]. فقد تحقّق^{٩٥} الدليل الشرعي على^{٩٦} أن الاسم في الشرع هو المسمى. فإن قلت هذا معارض لقوله^{٩٧} تعالى: ﴿قُلْ ادْعُوا اللَّهَ أَوْ ادْعُوا الرَّحْمَنَ أَيًّا مَا تَدْعُوا فَلَهُ الْأَسْمَاءُ الْحُسْنَى﴾ [الإسراء ١٧/١١٠] جعل الأسماء متعدّدة والتعدّد في الذات محال^{٩٨}؛ ولقوله عليه السلام: (إن لله تعالى تسعة و تسعين اسماً^{٩٩} من أحصاها دخل الجنة)^{١٠٠} والكثرة في

90 أ + كثرهم الله.

91 ج + أ + اى مفهوم لفظ الاسم عين مفهوم لفظ المسمى.

92 ج: هذه المدعى.

93 أ: للدليل.

94 أ- والمسبح.

95 أ: يحقّق.

96 أ- على.

97 أ: بقوله.

98 ج- هذا معارض لقوله تعالى: ﴿قُلْ ادْعُوا اللَّهَ أَوْ ادْعُوا الرَّحْمَنَ أَيًّا مَا تَدْعُوا فَلَهُ الْأَسْمَاءُ الْحُسْنَى﴾ جعل الأسماء متعدّدة والتعدّد في الذات محال.

99 ج: تسعة و تسعين أسماء.

100 صحيح البخاري، شروط، ١٨.

الذات مُحَالٌ قلتُ: ^{١٠١} هذا لا يضُرُّنا لجواز أن يكون المراد بالاسم ههنا ما هو بحسب اللغة. فعلى هذا الوجه بصير إطلاق الاسم في القسمين: حقيقة في الأوّل حقيقةً شرعيّةً وفي الثاني لُغويّةً، فمن لم يجعل الاسم فيها ذكرنا حقيقةً شرعيّةً فقد جعله مجازاً، والمجازُ على خلاف الأصل. فما ذكرنا أولى. هذا غاية هذا البحث.

المسئلة الثالثة: [في الجزء الذي لا يتجزى]

قال أهل السنّة: الجزء الذي لا يتجزى موجودٌ، وقالت الفلاسفة: ليس بموجودٍ. والمراد بالجزء الذي لا يتجزى: جوهرٌ لا ينقسم لا فكاً ولا وهماً. والحقُّ أنّه موجودٌ؛ لأنّ الجسم بالتجزئة لا يخلو ^{١٠٢} من أن ينتهي إلى جزءٍ ليس ^{١٠٣} له امتدادٌ أصلاً لا في الطول ولا في العرض ولا في العمق؛ أو لا ينتهي. فإن انتهى فقد وُجد الجزء الذي لا يتجزى؛ لأنّ ما لا يكون ^{١٠٤} له امتدادٌ في شيءٍ من الجهات لا ينقسم أصلاً؛ وإن لم ينته إلى ما لا امتداد له؛ بل ينقسم إلى غير النهاية ويكون لكلِّ جزءٍ من تلك الأجزاء امتدادٌ في شيءٍ من الجهات يلزم أن يكون طول جسمٍ صغيرٍ كخردلةٍ مثلاً ^{١٠٥} أو عرضه أو عمقه غير متناهٍ. وكلُّ أحد ^{١٠٦} يعلم أنّه ليس كذلك.

فإن قلت: سلّمنا أن ما لا امتداد له لا ينقسم فكاً، أمّا لم قلتُ أنّه لا ينقسم وهماً؟

قلتُ: توهم القسمة فيها لا امتداد له كاذبٌ؛ لأنّ القسمة تقتضي امتداداً ولا عبرة بالكاذب. وهذا برهانٌ بديعٌ ليس في كتب الأوّلين والآخرين أحسن وأوثق منه.

وما قيل: «إنّه يلزم أن يكون أجزاء الخردلة كأجزاء الجبل» وهو مُحَالٌ، دعوى بلا دليل؛ لأنّ

101 أ ج + قلت: هذا محققٌ لمذهبنا؛ لأنّ المراد بالأسماء هاهنا الصفات؛ لأنّ معاني تلك الألفاظ مرادة قطعاً والأسماء لا يراعى فيها المعاني فقد أريد بالاسم هاهنا المسمّى وهو المدعى؛ ولئن سلّمنا أنّه ما أراد المسمّى لكن.

102 ج - فما ذكرنا.

103 ج: وليس.

104 ج - له امتدادٌ أصلاً لا في الطول ولا في العرض ولا في العمق؛ أو لا ينتهي. فإن انتهى فقد وُجد الجزء الذي لا يتجزى؛ لأنّ ما لا يكون.

105 أ - مثلاً.

106 ج: واحد.

مذهب الخصم أن انقسام الخردلة مثل^{١٠٧} انقسام الجبل في العدة؛ بناءً على كونها غير متناهيين،
فحينئذ يلتزمه الخصم، ويمنع استحالتّه، فعلى المستدلّ بيانه^{١٠٨}.

هذا ما أردنا إيرادَه في هذه الرسالة.

والحمد لله رب العالمين.^{١٠٩}

107 ج: أن.

108 أ + فإن قلت استحالتّه واضحة لأنّ ما يكون بقدر الخردلة من أجزاء الجبل يكون أجزاءه كأجزاء الخردلة ضرورةً والباقي أضعافاً مضاعفةً فيمتنع أن يكون أجزاء الخردلة كأجزاء الجبل قلت حينئذ تبطل الملازمة.

109 أ + والصلاة على سيّد الخلق محمد وعلى آله وأصحابه أجمعين وسلّم تسليماً دائماً كثيراً إلى يوم الدين.

The Translation of *al-Risāla al-sharīfa [fī al-kalām]*

In the name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the worlds. Peace be upon the Prophet of Allah, Muḥammad, and his pure family and companions. After this, the head of the leaders of virtue, the guide of the *‘ulamā* and the virtuous people, the model of the speculative theologians (*al-nuẓẓar*) and the jurists, the unique character of *milla* and the religion, the mighty one of Islam and the Muslims, the *ṣadr* of Almaligh, (may Allah bless the Muslims with his long life and honor them with the *baraka* of his ultimate union) asked me to explain the position of Ahl al-Sunna on three issues: the attributes of Allah are neither the same nor different from His essence, the name and the named [*al-ism wa al-musammā*], and the atom. I accepted this request graciously and asked Allah to inspire me with the truth. Indeed, He is the one who inspires truth.

The First Issue: On the Attributes

Ahl al-Sunna say, “Allah’s attributes are neither the same nor different from His essence.”

Most people of *‘ilm* regard this to be unlikely and say, “We have accepted that the attributes and essence are not identical, but it is not reasonable to hold that they cannot be different at the same time because two concepts (*mafḥūm*) that are not identical are different from each other.”

Ahl al-Sunna reject that the two are different and have provided evidence for their claim from several perspectives. The opponents consider these arguments weak, and the debate between them has continued uninterrupted until today.

The position of Ahl al-Sunna is the correct one. With Allah’s grace and success in the best way, we will clarify this matter and put an end to the rumors.

We say that the attributes are clearly not identical to the essence. If the attributes were identical to the essence, each of them would be the same as the other. In this case the [attribute of] existence would have to be the same as the attributes of knowledge, power, will, and the others. But this is obviously *bi-l-badāha* [false], because existence is not an attribute by which something is perceived, but by which something is realized. Knowledge, however, is the opposite

of this. This is also true for the other attributes. Moreover, the intellect necessarily concludes that knowledge does not exist on its own but is an attribute belonging to the essence. This is also the case with power, will, and other attributes. On the other hand, essence exists by itself. Therefore, none of the attributes can be identical to the essence.

The attributes are different from the essence because other/different means detached in language, custom, and *sharī'a*. Allah's attributes cannot be detached either from His essence or from each other. Therefore, they cannot be *mutāghāyir* [different] from each other.

We say, "Different means detached in language, custom, and *sharī'a*." This is because if someone for example says, "I have nothing other than ten dirhams in my pouch" and does not have more than ten dirhams, he will be presumed to be telling the truth by every rational person of the language, custom and *sharī'a*. No one will ask him, "Are not one and two dirhams different from ten dirhams?" In addition, according to *sharī'a*, he will not be considered to breach his oath if he swears on this. And if someone says, "There is no one else in the house other than Zayd," everyone will confirm that, and no one will ask, "Is not Zayd's hand, shape, and color other than his being?" The example of "I have not seen anyone other than so-and-so" is also like that. Countless examples can be found here. And so, other/different are learned to only mean detached in language, custom, and *sharī'a*. There is no doubt or dispute that what is valid is that which is revealed by language, custom, and the *sharī'a*. Therefore, the attributes of Allah are learned to be no different from Him.

This position is the end of the discussion. There is no need to say more. And this is not in the books of the antecedents (*awwalīn*) or the later ones (*ākhirīn*). Praise be to Allah, Who guides us to the truth. If Allah had not guided us, we would not have found the truth.

Now, we discuss the position of the Ahl al-Sunna on this matter, along with their objections. We say that two methods are found to be famous among the Ahl al-Sunna for explaining this claim:

The first method is to define the two others (*ghayrān*), and the second method is to avoid a multiplicity of pre-eternals.

For the first one they say, The two others are two entities, one of which can exist where the other one does not exist. In this case the two pre-eternals are not different from each other. Consequently, in the verse "Had there been any gods in the heavens and the earth apart from Allah, the order of both the heavens and

the earth would have gone to ruins” [Qur’an 21:22]. And our saying “There is no god but Allah” negating a deity other than Allah does not mean negating a pre-eternal being other than Allah because, to most people, *illā* in these words means other. This is the case wherever one mentions, “other than Allah,” and resembles the verse, “Is there a creator other than Allah?” [Qur’an 35:3].

This is a massive fault that can be hidden from no one.

If you say, “What is meant by ‘two others’ is that a person can think of the other without thinking of the one, not that the other exists without the one,” then your objection is invalid.

I answer that in this case, Allah’s attributes must be different from His essence, for one can think of Allah’s essence independently of His attributes, just as one can think of His attributes independently of one another.

They provided proof for the claim that two others are two entities, one of which can exist where the other one does not exist, as follows: This is the case because if this were not, one could not be different from the other. Otherwise, something would have to be other than itself, which is impossible: for example, the ‘1’ in ‘10’, (i.e., the ‘1’ characterized by being part of ‘10’) and the hand which is part of Zayd. Because 10 is a term given to the accumulation of units. Therefore, it includes each unit together with its others, (i.e., nine here). If the ‘1’ in ‘10’ were other than ‘10’, it would be other than itself. This is because one is a part of 10. Therefore, one is an individual unit with the others. Such is the case with the name Zayd, which is given to a person based on his organs. Thus, this name includes all his organs. Someone who says, “Zayd’s hand is other than him” means Zayd’s hand is different from itself. This is what they say, and the fallacy of this is very clear because their statement “It includes each individual unit together with its others” has two meanings. The first meaning is every individual unit is characterized by being a unit with others. The second meaning is every individual is a whole with others, so that 10 is the accumulation of the individual units. If they meant the first meaning, two fallacies arise here. The first fallacy is that if 10 as a term includes every individual unit characterized by togetherness, then 10 would have to be 100, because 10 has 10 individual units characterized by togetherness, each of which is different from the other. The second fallacy in this case is that the one as a term that belongs to 10 and as an individual unit characterized by togetherness must be the same as 10. However, they [the Ahl al-Sunna] explain the one as a term being neither the same as 10 nor different from it. This is a very clear contradiction and

is indisputably impossible. If this is what they mean by the second meaning, then if one is other than 10, we do not then accept that it must be different from itself. This is only required if one as a name is identical to the accumulation. However, this is not necessarily the case.

The second method is to avoid multiple pre-eternals. They say, “If we say that the attributes of Allah are different from Him and that His attributes are pre-eternal, then we have to accept pre-eternal beings. This is impossible. Therefore, we say that His attributes are not different from His essence.” As a result, they acknowledged the attributes of Allah to be beyond (*warā*) His essence, even though they are no different from His essence. They explained being beyond something as not having the same meaning as that thing. In this case, beyond is a more general concept than otherness/differentness. They were then objected to by saying, “The fact that you do not argue for their otherness does not entail that they are not different. Moreover, what is being avoided here is that some other essence other than Allah is pre-eternal, not that the attributes are pre-eternal. Furthermore, you accept a pre-eternal being beyond the essence of Allah. What is the difference between that and accepting something else as pre-eternal?”

The Second Issue: On the Name and the Named

The Ahl al-Sunna claim the names to be identical to the named. Linguists and all other groups oppose this view. Proving this meaning is quite difficult because the statement is contrary to what is apparent. We will explain what has become clear to us by the grace of Allah’s mercy. We say, “The names are identical to the named” not in the linguistic sense but in the *sharī* sense. This is because in many places in the Word of the Lord of Dignity, the name is used to refer to the named. This is evidence for the names being identical to the named in terms of the *sharī’a* because when someone focuses on it, the overwhelming probability arises in the person that a name is the named thing itself. This is because what is principal in speech is the *ḥaqīqī* meaning, and the evidence can only express this meaning.

As for the use of names in many places to mean the named, Allah says, “Whatever you worship instead of Him are mere names” [Qur’an 12:40]. What is worshipped here is the named. In the verse, Allah says, “Glorify the name of your Lord” [Qur’an 40:1]. Here it is the Lord who is glorified, not someone else. Allah also says, “How glorious is the name of your Lord” [Qur’an 55:78]. In other verses, *tabāraka* means *bāraka*, and the blessed one is the Lord: Allah says, “So Blessed is

Allah” [Qur’an 23:24] and “Blessed is the One in Whose Hands rests all authority” [Qur’an 67:1]. Thus, the *shar’i* evidence that the names and the named are identical with regard to the *shar’i’a* has been established. If you say, “All of this contradicts this verse, ‘Say to them (O Prophet!): “Call upon Him as Allah or call upon Him as al-Rahman; call Him by whichever name you will, all His names are beautiful”” [Qur’an 17:110]. Multiple names are mentioned here, whereas the multiplicity of essence is impossible. Also, this would contradict the following *hadith* of the Prophet (PBUH): “Allah has ninety-nine names. Whoever counts them will enter Paradise.”¹¹⁰ While multiplicity in essence is impossible, I answer that this does not disprove our claim, because what is meant by the names here could be its *ḥaqīqī* meaning. Accordingly, the concept of name has two meanings, the first one is *ḥaqīqa*, [or] *ḥaqīqī shar’i*, and the second one is the *lughawī* meaning. Whoever does not use the concept of a name in its *ḥaqīqī shar’i* meaning as we have mentioned is using it in a metaphorical [*majāz*] sense. Metaphorical meaning is contrary to *ḥaqīqī* meaning. Therefore, our position is more appropriate. This is the last point regarding this issue.

The Third Issue: On the Atom

The Ahl al-Sunna say that atoms exist, while the philosophers say they do not exist. What is meant by the atom is a substance that cannot be divided through disassembly or imagination. The correct position is that it exists, because by means of division, a body either ends in a part that has no extension in width, length, and depth or it does not. If it ends, then the atom exists. For that which has no extension in any direction can never be divided. If it does not come to an end in a structure without extension but rather divides infinitely with each of these parts having an extension in some direction, then the width, length, or depth of a small object like a mustard seed, for example, must be infinite. But everyone knows that this is not so.

If you say, “We accept that what has no extension cannot be divided by disassembly, but why do you claim that it cannot be divided by imagination?”

I answer that by saying to imagine a division in which something has no expansion is false, because division requires expansion. Indeed, what is false is not taken into account. This is an original proof that has no better or more reliable proof in the books of the ancients or the later ones.

110 *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, *Shurūt*, 18.

To claim that the parts of the mustard must be equal to the parts of the mountain is a false and baseless claim because the opponents consider the division of the mustard and the division of the mountain to be numerically equal. According to them, both are infinite. In this case, their opponent makes them answerable to this and rejects its impossibility. And the one who brings the evidence is the one who is obliged to explain.

This is what we wanted to explain in this treatise.

Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the worlds.

Conclusion

Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī was an esteemed Islamic scholar who wrote works in various fields such as philosophy, logic, mathematics, the etiquette of disputation, astronomy, and theology. He is considered the first Hanafi-Māturīdī scholar to have adopted the philosophical-theological method. In addition, al-Samarqandī attempted in the treatise discussed herein to prove his position using all the ways of language, logic, and philosophy. He applied the method of *taḥqīq* in this treatise, a method that he had also adopted in his theological works, analyzed the views of the Ahl al-Sunna within a logical framework, and defended them with his own original arguments. Based on the information recorded in Samarqandī's manuscripts, we can conclude that he had written this treatise on 22 Shawwal 722 AH (November 3, 1322).

The biography books provide very limited information about Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī's life and do not mention his theological treatise. As a result of our research, we have concluded one theological treatise exists from al-Samarqandī. One of the indications that led us to this conclusion is the attribution of the treatise registered in Suleymaniye Library under Cārullah 1247 to Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī, who was also known as al-Fāḍil al-Samarqandī. Moreover, the same treatise appears on the first page of his collection of theological, logical, and astronomical works Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd b. 'Umar al-Ghāzī had presented to him through the method of recitation, as registered in Suleymaniye Library under Laleli 2432. This treatise and the other works in the collection al-Ghāzī had recited to al-Samarqandī and double-checked have the same typeface. In addition to all these indications, we believe that this treatise belongs to him because of the overlap between the positions, the original arguments, and the language used in the treatise and those used in his other works on *kalām*. The biographical books

did not attribute this treatise to him because the information about his life was generally inadequate.

In the preface of the treatise, al-Samarqandī implicitly mentions the person who requested that he compose this work. Based on the praise and characterization of the person who'd asked al-Samarqandī to compose this treatise, we think that the person in question was Şadr al-Sharī'a al-Thānī 'Ubayd 'Abdullah b. Mas'ūd. As a matter of fact, al-Samarqandī described him as a speculative theologian (*ahl al-nazar*) and as a jurist, referring to him as the head (*şadr*) of the leaders of virtue in addition to the title of *al-şadr*. Samarqandī's descriptions of this person as a speculative theologian and a jurist indicate this person to have been a competent scholar in the fields of *kalām* and *fiqh*. Moreover, the attribution of the epithet *şadr* in addition to the title *al-şadr* strengthens the likelihood that this person was Şadr al-Sharī'a al-Thānī. This is because 'Ubaydullah b. Mas'ūd, who was known as *al-Şadr al-Sharī'a*, was the only scholar in the Maḥbūbī family to possess the title of *al-şadr* at that time and to have written on both *fiqh* and *kalām*. Moreover, the existence of intellectual interaction between Samarqandī and Şadr al-Sharī'a supports our thesis.

In his treatise, al-Samarqandī analyzes the position of the Ahl al-Sunna on whether God's attributes are the same or different from His essence, on the identity of the names and the named, and on the existence of the atom. Samarqandī agrees with the general acceptance of the Ahl al-Sunna on these issues and tries to prove these ideas using an original method. He proves the same position in a logic-centered way. In his analysis of the issue, al-Samarqandī reduces the disagreement regarding the relationship between essence and attributes and between the names and the named to a literal dispute. That he had been asked about these three issues and that he had devoted his treatise to them are not difficult to envision because the relation of essence and attribute and of the names and the named are important parameters that determine God's state regarding Himself; also, the atom is an important parameter that determines the relation between God and the universe. Therefore, al-Samarqandī drew a succinct and comprehensive perspective on the relationship between God and the universe in his treatise.

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